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1 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
When a benefit plan, in violation of ERISA, 
wrongfully denies or delays payment of a benefit, the 
court may award relief because of the improper delay 
in the payment of that benefit. The question pre-
sented is: 
Should 'the amount of a remedy based on the im-
proper delay in the payment of a benefit be based on: 
(1) only the amount needed to redress the 
loss that the beneficiary sustained as a re-
sult of the wrongful delay (the rule in the 
Sixth Circuit), 
(2) either the amount needed to redress the 
loss that the beneficiary sustained as a re-
sult of the wrongful delay or the amount 
needed to disgorge any gain improperly real-
ized by the plan as a result of that wrongful 
delay (the rule in the Second, Third, Sev-
enth, Eighth and District of Columbia Cir-
cuits), 
(3) the most analogous state prejudgment , 
interest rate (the rule in the Fifth, Tenth and 
Eleventh Circuits), or 
(4) the § 1961 post-judgment interest rate 
(the rule in the Ninth Circuit)? 
11 
PARTIES 
The parties are set out in the caption. 
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Petitioners Todd Rochow and John Rochow, per-
sonal representatives of the Estate of Daniel J. 
Rochow, respectfully pray that this Court grant a writ 
of certiorari. to review the judgment and opinion of 
the United States Court of Appeals entered on March 
5, 2015. 
--------·----------------
OPINIONS BELOW 
The March 5, 2015 en bane opinion of the court of 
appeals, which is reported at 780 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 
2015) (en bane), is set out at pp. 1a-73a of the Appen-
dix.1 The March 23, 2012 order of the district court, 
which is reported at 851 F.Supp.2d 1090 (E.D.Mich. 
2012), is set out at pp. 74a-99a of the Appendix. The 
June 16, 2009 order of the district court, which is not 
officially reported, is set out at pp. 100a-119a of the 
Appendix. The April 3, 2007 opinion of the court of 
appeals, which is reported at 482 F.3d 860 (6th Cir. 
2007), is set out at pp. 120a-131a of the Appendix. 
----------------·----------------
JURISDICTION 
The decision of the court of appeals was entered 
on March 5, 2015. On May 14, 2015, Justice Kagan 
extended the deadline for filing the petition until 
1 An earlier panel decision, reported at 737 F.3d 415 (6th 
Cir. 2013), was withdrawn. 
2 
August 2, 2015. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). 
--------·-------
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
Section 502(a) of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) provides in 
pertinent part: 
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil ac-
tion 
A civil action may be brought -
(1) by a participant or beneficiary-
(A) for the relief provided for In 
subsection (c) of this section, or 
(B) to recover benefits due to him 
under the terms of his plan, to en-
force his rights under the terms of 
the plan, or to clarify his rights to 
future benefits under the terms of 
the plan; 
* * * 
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fi-
duciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice 
which violates any provision of this sub-
chapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) 
to obtain other appropriate equitable re-
lief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to 
3 
enforce any provisions of this subchapter 
or the terms of the plan .... 
--------·--------
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., establishes 
detailed standards governing certain benefit plans 
established by employers for their employees. The 
covered benefit plans may provide such things as 
retirement income, medical coverage, and (in this 
case) disability benefits. Violations of ERISA take a 
variety of forms, including wrongful denials of a ben-
efit, wrongful delays in the payment of a benefit, and 
improper actions that adversely affect the amount of 
funds available to pay benefits.2 Section 502(a) 
authorizes courts to fashion appropriate remedies 
for such violations. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). 
In fashioning such remedies, courts usually must 
decide what additional remedy to provide to address 
the consequences of the passage of time between 
when a violation first occurs (e.g., when a benefit is 
wrongfully denied) and when that violation is ulti-
mately corrected (e.g., when the benefit is finally 
paid). Often, although not invariably, that type of re-
dress is referred to as "prejudgment interest." 
2 The remedial:lssue presented in this case arises in a va-
riety of contexts. For simplicity we refer to the most common 
context, the improper denial of a benefit. 
4 
There is a longstanding, multi-faceted conflict 
among the courts of appeals regarding the standard 
governing the amount of this type of remedy, and the 
rate at which it should be calculated. This issue 
arises in the vast majority of all successful ERISA 
cases, and it often has substantial financial signifi-
cance; in the instant case millions of dollars in illicitly 
gained profits are at issue. This Court has repeatedly 
granted review to resolve issues about the availability 
or amount of prejudgment interest, and should do so 
here. 
Factual Background 
In mid-2001, the late Daniel J. Rochow was a 
high-level employee of Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., an 
insurance company. Rochow was covered by a disabil-
ity policy issued by Life Insurance Company of North 
America ("LINA"). The policy provided for substantial 
disability benefits if an employee because of sickness 
became "unable to perform all material duties" of his 
regular occupation. The benefits were available only 
if the covered individual was still an employee when 
he or she became unable to perform those duties. 
In 2001, Rochow began to experience increasing 
cognitive problems, particularly loss of short-term 
memory. In July of 2001, Rochow was demoted be-
cause of the effect of that then-unexplained illness. 
"[A]s a result of his inability to perform [even the] job 
[to which he had been demoted]," Gallagher in 2001 
forced Rochow to resign, effective on January 2, 2002. 
5 
App. 123a. By February 2002, Rochow's medical con-
dition required hospitalization, and he was diagnosed 
with HSV-Encephalitis, a rare and severely debili-
tating brain infection. In March 2002, Rochow was 
placed in an assisted living facility where he re-
mained until his death in 2008. App. 124a. 
In late 2002, Rochow's conservator filed a claim 
for long-term disability benefits with LINA. Rochow 
supplemented his application with a statement by a 
company vice-president who identified the material 
duties of Rochow's position with Gallagher, and 
stated that during 2001- while he was still employed 
- Rochow "was not able to perform the material 
duties of his job due to a lack of memory." The vice-. 
president stated "that Rochow was demoted, and 
ultimately terminated, because he could no longer 
perform the duties required of his position." App. 
130a. 
LINA denied Rochow's benefits and rejected a 
series of appeals. LINA maintained that because 
Rochow continued to be employed until January 2, 
2002, he could not yet have been disabled. It reasoned 
that Rochow could only have become disabled after he 
had resigned, at a point in time when he was no 
longer covered by the disability insurance policy. 
Proceedings Below 
(1) In September 2004, Rochow sued LINA. His 
complaint stated claims under the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et 
6 
seq. ("ERISA"). Following cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the district judge in June 2005 concluded 
that LINA had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in 
fmding that Rochow was not disabled while still 
employed. 
That finding was upheld on appeal. App. 131a. 
"[T]he entire record ... confirm[s] the district court's 
ruling that LIN.Ns denial of benefits was arbitrary 
and capricious and unsupported by substantial evi-
dence." I d. Later in 2007, five years after Rochow had 
first applied for disability benefits, LINA finally 
began making partial monthly disability payments, 3 
and it paid him a lump sum of approximately 
$300,000 in partial payment for the benefits that had 
improperly been withheld between 2002 and 2007. In 
2009, after Rochow had died, LINA paid his estate an 
additional sum of approximately $420,000 of unlaw-
fully withheld disability benefits. Subsequently LINA 
made a third payment of about $28,000, which, in 
combination with the earlier payments, rectified most 
of the principal underpayment . 
. On remand following the 2007 Sixth Circuit 
decision, Rochow sought additional relief because of 
the lengthy delay in the payment of the disability 
benefits. In June 2009, the district court held that 
Rochow's estate was entitled to that type of additional 
3 The district court later concluded that the payments that 
began in 2007 were lower than required by Rochow's policy. App. 
108a-09a. 
7 
relief. The district court emphasized that LINA had 
breached its fiduciary duty to Rochow when it with-
held for years the benefits to which he was entitled. 4 
The court made extensive findings that LINA had 
acted in bad faith. It concluded that LINA had re-
jected Rochow's claims based on (~[n]on-existent policy 
requirements,"5 had asserted a "[k]nowingly false 
rationale for [denying Rochow's second application]," 
and had sandbagged Rochow by waiting until the 
administrative record had closed before asserting 
that he was required to submit certain medical rec-
ords. App. llla; see App. 42a, 59a-60a. 
The district court concluded Rochow was entitled 
to additional relief calculated as a percentage of 
the amount that LINA owed Rochow, and that the 
rate used should be based on the return on equity 
that LINA earned during the relevant period.6 The 
4 App. lOla ("defendant had ... custody over [the] money that 
it withheld from Rochow in breach of its fiduciary duty to him"), 
105a ("[T]he court rejects LINA's argument that there has been 
no finding of a breach of fiduciary duty .... "), 106a (defendant's ac-
tions were "a breach of the high standards that the law imposes 
on fiduciaries"); see App. 76a ("it has already been determined 
that Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty of loyalty and breached 
this duty"). 
5 "LINA did not have serious arguments based in the policy 
language to support its position." App. 115a. 
6 For a regulated insurer such as LINA, the amount of 
insurance it can write depends on the amount of the company's 
own funds, referred to as its "surplus." The requirement is like 
the capitalization requirements that limit how much a bank can 
lend based on the amount of equity the bank has. LINA did not 
(Continued on following page) 
8 
court held that this type of remedy was authorized 
because it is "a type of relief that was typically avail-
able in equity and therefore is appropriate under 
§ 1132(a)(3)(B)," which provides that a court may 
order "appropriate equitable relief" for a wrongful 
denial of benefits. App. 104a (quoting Parke v. First 
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 368 F.3d 999, 1008-
09 (8th Cir. 2004)). The district court referred to the 
equitable remedies of avoiding unjust enrichment, 
disgorging improper profits, and equitable account-
ing. App. 104a. (For the purposes of this appeal any 
differences among those equitable remedies is not 
relevant.). 
The district court ·calculated the total additional 
amount LINA owed by multiplying a rate based on 
the rate of return that LINA had enjoyed each year 
by the total amount owed as of each month. (LINA's 
annual rate of return on equity averaged about 26%,7 
segregate the benefits claimed by Rochow in a separate account, 
but held them in a general account which was part of the firm's 
surplus. Thus, the total benefits unlawfully withheld from 
Rochow enabled LINA to sell significantly more insurance, and 
to reap the profits from those sales. LINA's Chief Accounting 
Officer acknowledged that the withheld benefits were held in a 
general account, the amount of which "formed a basis for LINA 
to write insurance coverage." App. 9a; Hearing Tr. 123-24. 
7 "LINA's intentional delay in paying Rochow's substantial 
disability benefits for more than seven years allowed LINA to 
earn millions of dollars in profits for its own gain.... [T]he dis-
trict court found that LINA's average rate of return during the 
seven-year period was 26%." App. 42a. 
9 
but varied from year to year.). The calculations cov-
ered the period from 2002 (when Rochow's represent-
atives first applied for benefits) until the entry of 
fmal judgment by the district court in 2012. The net 
effect of those interest calculations was that Rochow's 
estate was to receive about $2.8 million. 8 
(2) On appeal, a divided panel of the Sixth 
Circuit upheld the district court award. The majority 
reasoned that § 1132(a) provides two distinct bases 
for redress for a wrongful denial of or delay in paying 
benefits. First, under § 1132(a)(1)(B) a plaintiff may 
recover unlawfully withheld benefits themselves. Sec-
ond, under§ 1132(a)(3)(B) a plaintiff may also recover 
other relief, including additional monetary relief at 
the rate sufficient to result in disgorgement of profits 
unjustly obtained during the period when benefits 
were wrongfully withheld. Rockow v. Life Ins. Co. of 
North America, 737 F.3d 415, 423-26 (6th Cir. 2013). 
The panel also concluded that the district court's 
calculation of the amount of unjust enrichment was 
not an abuse of discretion. 737 F.3d at 427-31. A 
dissenting opinion argued that under ERISA a plain-
tiff cannot obtain disgorgement of profits under 
§ 1132(a)(3). 737 F.3d at 431-35. 
8 For reasons related to tax law and certain Sixth Circuit 
precedents, the gross amount of the calculation was approxi-
mately $3.6 million, but tax adjustments will mean that the net 
to the estate, and the net cost to LINA, would be about $2.8 
million. 
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LINA sought rehearing en bane regarding 
whether ERISA authorizes a court to order relief at 
a rate calculated for the purpose of avoiding unjust 
enrichment. 9 
(3) The Sixth Circuit granted rehearing en bane 
and overturned the decision of the district court in a 
sharply fractured set of four opinions. 
(a) The majority opinion concluded that ERISA 
does not authorize a court to use a rate intended to 
bring about disgorgement of the profits that a plan 
wrongfully earned during the period when it was 
illegally using funds that should have been paid to 
the beneficiary. 
The en bane majority insisted that ERISA is 
concerned only with providing compensation to vic-
tims of unlawful behavior, and not with preventing 
wrongdoers from profiting from their own violations 
of the law. "The district court's use of equitable relief 
under § [1132](a)(3) as the vehicle for its disgorge-
ment award misses the mark .... [T]he award reflects 
concern that LINA had wrongfully gained something, 
a consideration beyond the ken of ERISA .... " App. 16a 
(emphasis added). The majority held that the purpose 
of ERISA remedies is limited to making whole the 
9 Petition for Rehearing En Bane of Defendant-Appellant. 
LINA also sought rehearing en bane regarding whether the dis-
trict court had authority following the 2007 appeal to order any 
relief that had not been included in its original 2005 order 
directing that LINA pay the disputed benefits. 
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victim of the wrongful actions of the defendant. 
"ERISA remedies are concerned with the adequacy of 
relief to redress the claimant's injury, not the nature 
of the defendant's wrongdoing." App. 15a-16a. 
The majority reasoned that this restriction is 
embedded in the structure of ERISA's remedial 
provision. 29 U.S.C. § 1132. The district court and 
panel had concluded that authority to use an unjust-
enrichment-based rate is conferred by § 1132(a)(3)(B), 
which empowers courts, in addition to enjoining 
violations of the terms of a plan, to order "other 
appropriate equitable relief." App. 104a-08a; 737 F.3d 
at 426. The en bane court, however, held that relief 
is· never available under § 1132(a)(3) if "adequate" 
relief is already provided by § 1132(a)(1)(B), and that 
an order under § 1132(a)(1)(B) directing the restora-
tion of benefits is inherently "adequate" because it 
makes a beneficiary whole. App. 16a. "[A] claimant 
cannot pursue a ... claim under § [1132](a)(3) based 
solely on an arbitrary and capricious denial of 
benefits where the § [1132](a)(1)(B) remedies is ade-
quate to make the claimant whole." App. 16a. Because 
"Rochow's loss remained exactly the same irrespective 
of the use made by LINA of the withheld benefits" 
(App. 21a), it reasoned, the court's authority was 
limited to compensating Rochow for that loss. 
Prejudgment interest, the majority held, is per-
mitted only at a rate no greater than that needed to 
"plac[e] the plaintiff in the position he or she would 
have occupied but for the defendant's wrongdoing." 
App. 26a (quoting Ford v. Uniroyal Pension Plan, 
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154 F.3d 613, 616 (6th Cir. 1998)). If, as the district 
court had concluded, the profit LINA made using 
Rochow's money was greater than the interest 
Rochow might have earned with that money, LINA 
was legally entitled to keep those ill-gotten gains. 
(b) Judge White, concurring and dissenting, 
rejected the majority's "blanket rule" barring a rem-
edy intended to prevent unjust enrichment. App. 32a-
41a. She reasoned that under some circumstances a 
district court would have discretion to set a rate at a 
level intended to avoid unjust enrichment. Such a 
rate could be used, for example, if a plan had denied 
the benefits pursuant to "an organizational policy to 
delay paying valid claims for as long as possible .... " 
App. 39a. Judge White would have remanded the case 
to permit the district court to apply that proposed 
standard. App. 41a. 
(c) Judge Stranch, in an opinion joined in whole 
or in part by six other judges, would have upheld the 
district court decision. The dissenting opinion dis-
agreed with the majority's interpretation of § 1132, 
and insisted that, in addition to make-whole relief, a 
court under § 1132(a)(3)(B)(ii) may award relief in-
tended to prevent unjust enrichment. 
"The [district] court below got it exactly right." 
App. 70a. "LINNs fiduciary wrongdoing and self-
dealing warrant equitable remedies under § 1132(a)(3) 
- an accounting and disgorgement of the consider-
able profits LINA earned on the benefits it withheld 
from Rochow." App. 42a-43a. "The elementary rule 
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of restitution is that if you take my money and make 
money with it, your profit belongs to me." App. 
70a (quoting Nickel v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & 
Sav. Ass'n, 290 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
"Varity Corp. [v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996)] ... fully 
support[s] . . . disgorgement of LIN.Ns profits under 
§ 1132(a)(3)." App. 43a-44a. "[C]ourts sitting in equity 
'possessed the power to provide relief . . . to prevent 
the trustee's unjust enrichment."' App. 52a (quoting 
CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S.Ct. 1866, 1880 (2011)) 
(citing Restatement (Third) of Trusts,§ 95). 
The dissenting opinion objected that the Sixth 
Circuit standard conflicted with the decisions of the 
Second, Third, Seventh and Eighth Circuits. "[T]he 
majority opinion stands at odds with governing 
law ... [:] Supreme Court opinions ... and cases from 
our sister circuits .... " App. 45a. "[S]everal ... circuits ... 
authorize[] the remedy that the district court below 
awarded to Rochow." App. 68a. 
----·----
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 
This case presents a recurring issue that affects a 
substantial majority of all successful ERISA cases. In 
virtually every case in which a plan wrongfully denies 
or delays a benefit, or in which a fiduciary engages 
in misconduct that adversely affects the amount of 
funds from which benefits can be paid, the court· 
must determine what additional remedy should be 
provided in light of the delay between the initial 
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violation and the correction of that violation. The de-
termination thus must be made in a large proportion 
of the cases in which the beneficiary (or plan) estab-
lishes a violation of ERISA. 
In most cases there are two distinct types of 
consequences of a violation and the ensuing delay in 
its correction. First, the beneficiary (or the fund from 
which benefits will ultimately be paid) is deprived of 
the use of the funds for the period in question; for 
example, a beneficiary who has been denied a retire-
ment or disability payment would be unable (for the 
period in question) to use that money for his or her 
own benefit. Second, the party that violated ERISA, 
such as a fund that wrongfully refused to pay a 
benefit, is ordinarily in a position to use for its own 
ends the funds that it should have paid to the benefi-
ciary, and thus to profit from its own violation of the 
law. Courts disagree about which of these problems 
can be remedied under ERISA, and about what 
methodology should be used to determine the amount 
of the redress. 
Often the remedy is characterized as "prejudg-
ment interest." But that phrase does not denote any 
particular rationale for the amount to be paid or any 
specific rate. Rather, it merely designates a method of 
calculation: multiplying a rate (e.g., 5% a year) times 
a period of time (e.g., 2 years) times a dollar amount 
(e.g., $10,000). 
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I. THERE IS A DEEPLY ENTRENCHED AND 
IMPORTANT CIRCUIT CONFLICT RE-
GARDING THE GROUNDS ON WHICH 
AND RATE AT WHICH REDRESS MAY BE 
AWARDED IN AN ERISA CASE FOR THE 
DELAY BETWEEN THE OCCURRENCE 
AND CORRECTION OF A VIOLATION 
There are two distinct types of circuit conflicts 
regarding the appropriate type of redress addressing 
the delay between the occurrence and correction of an 
ERISA violation. 
First, there is a conflict regarding what types of 
problems can be remedied by a court in fashioning 
the rate to be used in addressing that delay. Five 
circuits hold that relief to address that delay can be 
based on either (or both) of two distinct justifications: 
the extent to which the delay itself has injured the 
beneficiary, and the extent to which the plan has 
profited from the use of the unlawfully withheld 
funds. The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, insists 
that only the first, make-whole factor can be con-
sidered. The appropriate rationale necessarily deter-
mines the rate at which additional relief (such as 
prejudgment interest) would be calculated.10 
10 Hizer v. General Motors Corp., Allison Gas Turbine Diu., 
888 F.Supp. 1453, 1462 (S.D. Ind. 1995) ("Just as case law deal-
ing with prejudgment interest provide[s] guidance as to whether 
interest on delayed payment is available at all, it also provides 
guidance in calculating that interest."); Jones v. Unum Life Ins. 
Co. of America, 223 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2000) ("the same 
(Continued on following page) 
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Second, another set of circuits has adopted per 
se rules, not based on a case-specific application of 
either factor, for setting that rate. Three circuits 
utilize the most analogous prejudgment interest rate 
of the state in which the claim arose. One circuit 
uses the post-judgment interest rate in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1961(a). Neither of these types of rates is tied to the 
level needed to provide make-whole relief for a par-
ticular beneficiary or to prevent unjust enrichment of 
a particular wrongdoer. 
This conflict regularly and predictably leads to 
substantial and unjustifiable differences in the rem-
edy provided when a plan has wrongfully refused to 
pay a required benefit. For example, as we explain 
below, in a case arising in Oklahoma, the federal 
courts (using the Oklahoma prejudgment rate) calcu-
late additional redress at a rate of 15%, whereas 
federal courts in the Ninth Circuit (which utilizes 
§ 1961) today routinely use a rate of 0.27%. 
A. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT LIMITS REME-
DIES TO THE AMOUNT NEEDED TO 
MAKE THE BENEFICIARY WHOLE 
The en bane Sixth Circuit decision establishes a 
clear, and unprecedented, limitation on the authority 
of federal courts to provide remedies for violations of 
considerations that inform the court's decision whether or not to 
award interest at all should inform the court's choice of interest 
rate."). 
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ERISA. As the decision below makes clear, courts in 
that circuit may not - in addition to ordering pay-
ment of improperly withheld benefits- adopt a rem-
edy intended to prevent unjust enrichment on the 
part of a plan or fiduciary who violated federal law. 
The district court finding "that LINA had wrongfully 
gained something" - in the district court's calculation, 
over $2.8 million - was, in the words of the Sixth 
Circuit, "a consideration beyond the ken of ERISA." 
App. 16a. 
The en bane court imposed this restriction in two 
distinct ways. First, it held that the award ordered by 
the district court was impermissible because its very 
purpose - the prevention of unjust enrichment - was 
outside the authority of the court. The remedial au-
thority of the district court under ERISA ended, the 
Sixth Circuit held, once it had provided make-whole 
relief to Rochow. App. lla-25a. A court is restricted 
to compensating the victim for his or her loss, and 
Rochow's "loss remained exactly the same irrespective 
of the use made by LINA of the withheld benefits." 
App. 21a. 
Second, the Sixth Circuit held that the award of 
prejudgment interest must be limited to the amount 
necessary to compensate the beneficiary for his or her 
losses arising out of the delay in payment. "An award 
of interest should 'simply compensate a beneficiary 
for the lost interest value of money wrongfully with-
held from him or her.'" App. 26a (quoting Rybarczyk 
v. TRW, Inc., 235 F.3d 975, 985 (6th Cir. 2000)). 
"Awards of prejudgment interest are compensatory .... " 
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App. 26a (emphasis in original). Prejudgment interest 
· larger than that amount - such as interest based on a 
higher rate to avoid unjust enrichment - "would 
'contravene ERIS.Ns remedial goal of simply placing 
the plaintiff in the position he or she would have 
occupied but for the defendant's wrongdoing.'" App. 
27a (quoting Schumacher v. AK Steel Corp. Retire-
ment Accumulation Pension Plan, 711 F.3d 675, 686 
(6th Cir. 2013)). The court remanded the case to 
permit the district court to decide only whether an 
"award of prejudgment interest is warranted under 
§ [1132](a)(1)(B) to make Rochow whole." App. 28a. 
B. FIVE CIRCUITS AUTHORIZE REME-
DIES INTENDED TO PREVENT UN-
JUST ENRICHMENT 
Five circuits expressly apply the contrary rule, 
permitting a district court to consider the need to 
avoid unjust enrichment in framing a remedial or-
der.11 Indeed, those circuits expressly instruct district 
courts to consider the danger of unjust enrichment in 
framing such remedies. In the Third, Seventh and 
Eighth Circuits, the courts of appeals have upheld 
11 The Department of Labor takes the position that ERISA 
remedies may be framed to prevent unjust enrichment. Joint 
Merits Response Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee and Appellee, Chao 
v. Consulting Fiduciaries, Inc., Nos. 08-1228 and 08-2254 (7th 
Cir.), available at 2008 WL 4212720 at *47 ("prejudgment 
interest is necessary not only to fully compensate the victim but 
also to prevent unjust enrichment."). 
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awards of prejudgment interest in cases in which it 
was not needed to make the beneficiary whole. In the 
Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth and District of Co-
lumbia Circuits, the remedy ordered in this case 
would have been upheld, and LINA would not have 
been permitted to retain the millions of dollars in 
profits at issue. 
The Third Circuit has repeatedly made clear that 
courts may frame ERISA remedies for the purpose 
of avoiding unjust enrichment. Skredtvedt v. E.I. 
DuPont de Nemours, 372 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2004), in 
an opinion joined by then-Judge Alito, explained that 
the purposes of prejudgment interest itself are both 
"making the claimant whole and preventing unjust 
enrichment." 372 F.3d at 209.12 Fotta v. Trustees of 
United Mine Workers of America, 165 F.3d 209, 211 
(3d Cir. 1998), also held that where benefits have 
been wrongfully denied, prejudgment interest is 
awarded because "[t]o allow the Fund to retain the 
interest it earned on funds wrongfully withheld 
would be to approve of unjust enrichment. Further, 
the relief granted would fall short of making [the 
claimant] whole because he has been denied the use 
of money that was his." 165 F.3d at 212 (quoting 
Short v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas 
12 "[M]aking the claimant whole and unjust enrichment are 
concerns equally present ... where benefits have been awarded 
pursuant to a judgment and where benefits have been withheld 
but are ultimately awarded without resort to a judgment." I d. at 
209. 
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Pension Fund, 729 F.2d 567, 576 (8th Cir. 1984)).13 
Anthuis v. Cold Industries Operating Corp., 971 F.2d 
999, 1010 (3d Cir. 1992), held that "[a]warding pre-
judgment interest is intended to serve at least two 
purposes: to compensate prevailing parties for the true 
costs of money damages incurred, and ... to promote 
settlement and deter attempts to benefit from the 
inherent delays of litigation." (Quoting Stroh Con-
tainer Co. v. Delphi Industries, Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 750 
(8th Cir. 1986)). National Security Systems, Inc. v. 
lola, 700 F.3d 65 (3d Cir. 2012), upheld an award of 
prejudgment interest even though it was not needed 
or justifiable as a remedy to make the beneficiaries 
whole, the only permissible justification in the Sixth 
Circuit. The Third Circuit rejected the defendant's 
contention "that because the District Court found that 
prejudgment interest was not needed to make the 
plaintiffs whole, they should not have been awarded 
interest .... That argument neglects that prejudgment 
interest aims to make plaintiffs whole and to prevent 
unjust enrichment." 700 F.3d at 103 (emphasis In 
original).14 That is precisely the interpretation of 
§ 1132(a) rejected by the Sixth Circuit below. 
13 "[T]he concerns animating [the award of prejudgment in-
terest are] ... making the clahnant whole and preventing unjust 
enrichment." I d. at 213. "[T]he awarding of interest where ben-
efits have been unjustifiably delayed not only ensures full com-
pensation, but also serves to prevent unjust enrichment." ld. 
14 See 700 F.3d at 102 ("[p]rejudgment interest exists to 
make plaintiffs whole and to preclude defendants from garner-
ing unjust enrichment."). 
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The Seventh Circuit agrees that prejudgment 
interest or other relief can be awarded for the purpose 
of avoiding unjust enrichment. "Prejudgment interest 
is designed not only to fully compensate the victim, 
but also to prevent unjust enrichment." Trustmark 
Life Ins. Co. v. University of Chicago Hospital, 207 
F.3d 876, 885 (7th Cir. 2000). 
[Without prejudgment interest] there is in-
complete compensation to victims of wrong-
doing and there are added incentives to 
resist and delay the bringing of the wrong-
doer to book .... The award of prejudgment in-
terest is necessary for full compensation of 
the victims of wrongdoing .... Moreover, the 
award of prejudgment interest has an inde-
pendent ground ... : the principle of unjust 
enrichment.... The retirement plan [in this 
case] held money that belonged to [the plain-
tiff] - held it on her account, as it were .... 
[T]he plan mu~t return it to her together 
with the fruits that it has gleaned by holding 
on to it. 
Lorenzen v. Employees Retirement Plan of Sperry & 
Hutchinson Co., 896 F.2d 228, 236-37 (7th Cir. 1990). 
The requirement that a wrongdoer return to its 
victim the fruits it gleaned by that violation is in 
other Seventh Circuit cases referred to as "restitution 
of wrongful gain" or a constructive trust. Clair v. 
Harris Trust and Savings Bank, 190 F.3d 495, 498 
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(7th Cir. 1999).15 That remedy, however labeled, can 
be awarded even if the victim sustained no loss as a 
result of the wrongful delay in the payment of a 
benefit. In Rivera v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 921 
F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1991), for example, the Seventh 
Circuit rejected a contention that a plan that had 
wrongfully refused to pay medical bills should not pay 
prejudgment interest because the victim himself had 
not paid those bills, and thus had not lost the use of 
the funds needed to do so. 
The premise of defendants' argument is that 
the plaintiffs did not pay the medical bills at 
issue and therefore they did not forego the 
use of the money. However, . . . prejudgment 
interest is designed not only to fully compen-
sate the victim, but also to prevent unjust 
enrichment .... The ability of defendants to 
earn interest on funds which should have 
been expended to pay plaintiffs' medical ben-
efits under the policy would result in the un-
just enrichment of defendants. Relieving 
defendants from the payment of prejudgment 
interest would create an incentive for insur-
ers to delay payments and would under com-
pensate victims by forcing them to absorb 
expenses incurred as a result of the delay. 
15 See May Department Stores Co. v. Federal Insurance Co., 
305 F.3d 597, 603 (7th Cir. 2002) ("unjust enrichment is a basis, 
indeed the usual basis, for imposing a constructive trust on a 
sum of money."). 
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921 F.2d at 696-97; see Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.3d 113, 
122 (7th Cir. 1984) ("ERISA clearly contemplates ac-
tions against fiduciaries who profit by using trust 
assets, even where the plan beneficiaries do not suffer 
direct financial loss."). 
In the Eighth Circuit, avoidance of unjust en-
richment is the primary purpose of prejudgment 
interest or other remedies that transfer to the victim 
profits illicitly earned by the wrongdoer. "A common 
thread throughout the prejudgment interest cases is 
unjust enrichment - the wrongdoer should not be 
allowed to use the withheld benefits or retain interest 
earned on the funds during the time of the dispute .... " 
Kerr v. Charles F. Vatterott & Co., 184 F. 3d 938, 946 
(8th Cir. 1999); see Short, 729 F.3d at 576 ("To allow 
the Fund to retain the interest it earned on funds 
wrongfully withheld would be to approve of unjust 
enrichment. Further, the relief granted would fall 
short of making [the beneficiary] whole because he 
has been denied the use of money which was his."). 
Opinions in this circuit at times characterize these 
remedies as an accounting for profits or the imposi-
tion of a constructive trust. 
In the particular context of withheld benefits 
under ERISA, we conclude that interest is an 
appropriate measure of the profits made by a 
defendant who breaches its fiduciary duty to 
a defendant .... Interest is, in many respects, 
the only way to measure of the extent to 
which [a wrongdoer] was unjustly enriched. 
We emphasize that the purpose of this award 
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is to prevent [the wrongdoer] from profiting 
by its breach of fiduciary duty and not to 
compensate [the victim] for the delay in 
payment. 
Parke v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 368 
F.3d 999, 1007 (8th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). 16 For 
this reason, in the Eighth Circuit prejudgment inter-
est can be awarded even though the victim experi-
enced no injury as a result of the delay in payment of 
a benefit. 17 The Eighth Circuit's interpretation of the 
16 See id. at 1007 ("interest is an appropriate remedy under 
§ 1132(a)(3)(B) to avoid unjust enrichment of a plan provider 
who wrongfully delays the payment of benefits."). 
17 In Mansker v. TMG Life Ins. Co., 54 F.3d 1322, 1330-31 
(8th Cir. 1995), "TMG argue[d] that there is no equitable basis 
for prejudgment interest in the present case because appellee 
has not yet paid the hospital bills and has not been charged 
interest. Thus, TMG contend[ed], prejudgment interest is not 
necessary to make appellee whole and would simply constitute a 
windfall." 54 F.3d at 1330. The court upheld the award of 
prejudgment interest to assure that the plan would not ''benefit 
unfairly from ... [the] delays." 
Christianson v. Poly-America, Inc. Medical Benefit Plan, 412 
F.3d 935, 941 (8th Cir. 2005), involved a similar situation and 
holding: 
According to Poly-America, the award of prejudgment 
interest constitutes a windfall to Christianson ... be-
cause Christianson never spent any of Christianson's 
money to pay medical costs. 
We believe that Poly-America's argument miscon-
strues the purpose of prejudgment interest.... [W]hile 
one purpose of the remedy is to compensate the pre-
vailing party for financial damages occurred, ... another 
important purpose is to "promote settlement and 
deter attempts to benefit unfairly from the inherent 
(Continued on following page) 
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ERISA remedial scheme is thus essentially the oppo-
site of the Sixth Circuit rule, which recognizes only 
compensation as a legitimate basis for an award of 
prejudgment interest. 
The Second Circuit directs the lower courts to 
consider both compensation and the avoidance of un-
just enrichment in fashioning a remedy for delay. 
Thus in Novella v. Westchester County, 661 F.3d 128, 
150 (2d Cir. 2011), the court of appeals upheld the 
prejudgment rate imposed by the district court as 
"entirely consistent with the principle that plaintiffs 
should be 'made whole' and that defendants should 
'not profit by their failure to comply with their ERISA 
obligations.'" (quoting Algie v. RCA Global Commc'ns, 
Inc., 891 F.Supp. 875, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)). Another 
Second Circuit opinion instructed the district court to 
"consider whether the plaintiff would have invested 
the money at some higher rate [than the Treasury bill 
rate] ... ; or it may take into account the rate of inter-
est the defendant would have had to pay to borrow 
the money it withheld from the plaintiff .... " Jones v. 
delays of litigation." Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi 
Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 7 43, 752 (8th Cir. [] 1986). A 
common thread throughout the prejudgment interest 
cases is unjust enrichment - the wrongdoer should 
not be allowed to use the withheld benefits or retain 
interest earned on the funds during the time of the 
dispute. Kerr, 184 F.3d at 946. Regardless of whether 
Christianson spent his own money, Poly-America does 
not dispute that Poly-America retained the use of the 
funds during the dispute. 
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Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, 223 F.3d 130, 139 (2d 
Cir. 2000). Dunnigan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 277 F. 3d 
223, 230 (2d Cir. 2002), warned that unless remedied 
"[an unjustified] delay enriches the fiduciary at the 
expense of the beneficiary." 
The District of Columbia Circuit also recognizes 
that preventing unjust enrichment is a legitimate 
purpose of an award of prejudgment interest, and 
thus a basis for determining the amount of such an 
award. 
The presumption in favor of prejudgment in-
terest has three recognized bases. First, to 
permit the fiduciary to retain the interest 
earned on wrongfully withheld . benefits 
would amount to unjust enrichment - a fi-
duciary would benefit from failing to pay 
ERISA benefits .... Second, prejudgment in-
terest ensures that a beneficiary is fully 
compensated, including for the loss of the use 
of money that is his .... Finally, prejudgment 
interest promotes settlement and deters any 
attempt to benefit unfairly from inevitable 
litigation delay. 
Moore v. CapitalCare Inc., 461 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 
2006). 
C. THREE CIRCUITS UTILIZE STATE 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATES 
In three circuits, federal courts presumptively 
apply state prejudgment interest statutes in deter-
mining the rate for prejudgment interest in ERISA 
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cases, an approach that does not consider either the 
rate needed to make the beneficiary whole or the rate 
needed to prevent unjust enrichment. The Sixth 
Circuit disapproves of this practice. 
The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly advised district 
courts to look to state law in determining the pre-
judgment interest rate for ERISA claims. Transitional 
Learning Center at Galveston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co., 1996 WL 625412 at *3 (5th Cir. Oct. 19, 1996) 
(courts "consult [state law] for guidance in assessing 
prejudgment interest in ERISA claims .... "); Hansen v. 
Continental Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971, 984-85 (5th Cir. 
1991) ("state law ... provides guidance [in fixing the 
prejudgment interest rate in ERISA claims]"). Dis-
trict courts in the Fifth Circuit regularly apply state-
law prejudgment interest rates in ERISA cases; we 
set out a list of such cases in the Appendix. App. 
132a-33a. 
In the Tenth Circuit "[c]ourts commonly look to 
state statutory prejudgment interest provisions as 
guidelines for a reasonable rate." Weber v. GE Group 
Life Assurance Co., 541 F.3d 1002, 1016 (lOth Cir. 
2008). Garrett v. Principal Life Insurance Co., 557 
Fed.Appx. 734, 738 (lOth Cir. 2014), upheld the use in 
ERISA cases of the 15% prejudgment interest rate 
established by Oklahoma statute. "[W]e have ap-
proved of the use of the relevant state's statutory 
prejudgment interest rate, including Oklahoma's, as 
appropriate in ERISA cases as long as 'nothing in 
the record suggests that the award ... is punitive.'" 
(Quoting Weber). Weber explained that a state rate is 
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nonpunitive so long as it is a rate of general applica-
bility and is not limited to cases in which a defendant 
acted in bad faith. 541 F.3d at 1017; see Biava v. 
Insurers Administrative Corp., 1995 WL 94461 (lOth 
Cir. March 1, 1995) ("State law governs prejudgment 
interest."). The Tenth Circuit imposes prejudgment 
interest on the proportion of an award that will be 
used to pay taxes, clearly not a make-whole remedy 
because it was the Internal Revenue Service, not the 
plaintiff, that would have benefitted from an earlier 
payment. See Dalal v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 72 
F. 3d 137, 1995 WL 7 4 7 442 at *6 (lOth Cir. 1995) 
("prejudgment interest should be awarded on the 
entire back pay award in employment discrimination 
cases because it is better to confer a windfall upon a 
claimant than the defendant in order to discourage 
future discrimination."). District courts in the Tenth 
Circuit regularly apply state-law prejudgment inter-
est rates in ERISA cases; we set out a list of such 
cases in the Appendix. App. 134a-35a. 
The Eleventh Circuit also suggests that district 
courts "look to state interest rates to fill a gap in 
ERISA law." Smith v. American Int'l Life Assurance 
Co. of New York, 50 F.3d 956, 958 (11th Cir. 1995); 
Florence Nightingale Nursing Service v. Blue Cross/ 
Blue Shield of Alabama, 41 F. 3d 14 76, 1484 (11th Cir. 
1995), approved the district court decision to use an 
Alabama prejudgment interest statute, which pro-
vides an interest rate of over 18% a year, to "fill a gap 
in ERISA law." The district courts in the Eleventh 
Circuit understand the court of appeals to have 
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"endorsed the practice of looking to analogous state 
· law provisions" in setting prejudgment interest rates 
in ERISA cases. Kinser v. Plans Administration 
Committee of Citigroup, Inc., 2008 WL 762200 at 
*1 (M.D. Ga. March 18, 2008); Lyons v. Georgia-
Pacific Corp. Salaried Employees Retirement Plan, 
196 F.Supp.2d 1260, 1271 (N.D. Ga. 2002). District 
courts in the Eleventh Circuit regularly apply state-
law prejudgment interest rates in ERISA cases; we 
set out a list of such cases in the Appendix. App. 136a. 
The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, expressly 
rejects this mechanical adoption of state law rates. 
"Among the constraints on a district court's discretion 
to shape an award of prejudgment interest in an 
ERISA case is the fact that we look with disfavor on 
simply adopting state law interest rates." Rybarczyk 
v. TRW, Inc., 235 F. 3d 975, 985 (6th Cir. 2000). "In-
corporation of state standards in the calculation of 
prejudgment interest could frustrate ERISA's reme-
dial scheme." Ford v. Uniroyal Pension Plan, 154 F.3d 
613, 617 (6th Cir. 1998). "[T]he calculation of pre-
judgment interest is not an area 'primarily of state 
concern' for which there does not exist a substantial 
body of federal law." Id. District courts in the Sixth 
Circuit understand Rybarczyk and Ford to bar utili-
zation of state interest rates. 18 A state prejudgment 
18 Masters v. Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan for 
Automated Packaging Systems, Inc., 2009 WL 1183377 at *2 
(N.D. Ohio May 1, 2009) (declining to apply Ohio prejudgment 
interest rates of 5% to 8% in light of Rybarczyk); Kramer v. Paul 
(Continued on following page)· 
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interest rate could be used in the Sixth Circuit only if 
that rate happened to coincide with the particular 
rate that a court concluded was needed to make the 
beneficiary whole. 
D. THE NINTH CIRCUIT UTILIZES THE 
POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST RATE IN 
§ 1961 
The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly admonished 
district courts to calculate prejudgment interest using 
the post-judgment rate in § 1961(a). 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1961(a). That rate is the weekly average yield on 
one-year Treasury bills. The most recent rate was 
0.27% for July 2015.19 
"[T]his circuit has a strong policy in favor of the 
Treasury bill rate .... " Blanton v. Anzalone, 813 F.2d 
157 4, 1576 (9th Cir. 1987). "We have held that the 
interest rate prescribed for post-judgment interest 
Revere Life Ins. Co., 2007 WL 1218715 at *1-*2 (E.D. Mich. April 
23, 2007) (declining to apply Michigan prejudgment interest rate 
in light of Ford and Rybarczyk); Brooking v. Hartford Life & 
Accident Ins. Co., 2007 WL 781333 at *2 (E.D. Ky. March 12, 
2007) (declining to apply Kentucky prejudgment interest rate of 
12% in light of Ford and Rybarczyk); Loucks v. Liberty Life 
Assurance Co. of Boston, 2004 WL 3255332 at *1 (W.D. Mich. 
Nov. 22, 2004) (declining to apply Michigan prejudgment in-
terest rate under Mich. Comp. Law § 438.31 (5%) in light of 
Ford; "[Ford] favored the application of the post-judgment rate 
specified under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 rather than a state interest 
rate"). 
19 http://www. utd. uscourts.gov/ documents/judgpage.html. 
31 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 is appropriate for fixing the 
rate of pre-judgment interest 'unless the trial judge 
finds, on substantial evidence, that the equities of that 
particular case required a different rate.'" Nelson v. E 
G & G Energy Measurements Group, Inc., 37 F.3d 
1384, 1391 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Western Pacific 
Fisheries, Inc. v. S.S. President Grant, 730 F.2d 1280, 
1289 (9th Cir. 1984)). "The district court may depart 
from the Treasury bill rate, but only if substantial 
evidence supports the decision to do so and only if the 
departure is accompanied by a reasoned justifica-
tion." Hayes v. Arthur Young & Co., 1994 WL 463493 
at *17 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 1994); see Day v. AT&T 
Disability Income, 2015 WL 1567857 (9th Cir. April 9, 
2015); Blankenship v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of 
Boston, 486 F.3d 620, 628 (9th Cir. 2007); Orosz-
Salomon v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 237 F. 3d 1154, 
1164 (9th Cir. 2001). 
District courts in the Ninth Circuit regularly 
apply § 1961(a) in ERISA cases; we set out a list of 
such cases in the Appendix. App. 137a-40a. 
Unlike the limitation established by the Sixth 
Circuit in this case, the Ninth Circuit awards pre-
judgment interest even in cases in which doing so is 
not necessary to make the plaintiff whole. Zumstein 
v. Great-West Life Assurance Co., 1992 WL 124424 at 
*2 (9th Cir. June 9, 1992) (approving prejudgment 
interest for failure to pay medical benefits despite the 
fact that the beneficiary had not paid the bills in 
question and was not being charged interest by the 
medical provider.). 
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E. THE CIRCUIT CONFLICT IS WELL REC-
OGNIZED 
The multi-faceted conflict is widely recognized. 
Courts have repeatedly noted the circuit conflict 
regarding whether to use state rates rather than the 
§ 1961 rate20 and regarding whether to use the § 1961 
20 Hansen v. Continental Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971, 984-85 (5th 
Cir. 1991) ("Continental would apply the rate set down in the 
postjudgment interest statute to awards of prejudgment inter-
est. This court, however, has already rejected that position.") 
(citing United States ex rel. Canion v. Randall & Blake, 817 F.2d 
1188, 1193 (5th Cir. 1987)); Rybarczyk v. TRW, Inc., 1997 WL 
580609 at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 1997). 
("[T]here is considerable support for using the§ 1961 rate to 
calculate prejudgment interest.... [T]he Ninth Circuit has held 
that the § 1961 rate should be applied unless the trial court 
finds that the equities of a particular case justify use of a dif-
ferent rate .... On the other hand, many courts have held that a 
federal court may look to state law for guidance in determining 
the rate of prejudgment interest."); DeGrado v. Jefferson Pilot 
Financial Ins. Co., 2009 WL 1198173 at *2 (D. Colo. May 1, 
2009) (contrasting Tenth Circuit rule relying on state law with 
practice in "other circuit courts" applying § 1961); DeGrado v. 
Jefferson Pilot Financial Ins. Co., 367 F.Supp.2d 1315, 1328 (D. 
Colo. 2005) (contrasting Tenth Circuit standard and that in 
"many circuits" applying state law with use of§ 1961 in "several 
courts"); Edmonds v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 1998 WL 782016 at *2 
(E.D. Va. Nov. 6, 1998) ("several circuits have approved the use 
of the post-judgment interest rate in 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) to 
compute pre-judgment interest on ERISA damage awards .... 
Nonetheless, several decisions have used state law interest rates 
in setting the rate of pre-judgment interest on ERISA damages 
awards."); Smith v. American Int'l Life Assurance Co. of New 
York, 50 F.3d 956, 958 (11th Cir. 1995) ("We recognize that some 
circuit courts have approved the use of the section 1961(a) post-
judgment rate to compute pre-judgment interest.... Because 
(Continued on following page) 
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rate rather than make an individualized determina-
tion of the appropriate rate.21 
The dissenting opinion in the court below, citing 
a number of the cases described above, correctly 
noted that the standard adopted by the en bane 
majority conflicted with the standard applied in the 
Second, Third, Seventh and Eighth Circuits, all of 
which permit or require the use of a rate based in 
whole or in part on the need to prevent unjust en-
richment. App. 63a-68a. The dissenters, citing many 
of the same decisions from those circuits described 
above, noted that "a litany of [cases] from four of our 
sister circuits undermine the majority's premise that 
no legal basis exists to conclude that ... a breach of 
LINA's fiduciary duties [is] remediable under 
§ 1132(a)(3)." App. 69a.22 "[T]he relief for the wrongful 
district courts have discretion in determining pre-judgment 
interest rates, we hold that district courts are not required to 
use section 1961(a) in computing such interest."). 
21 Hizer v. General Motors Corp., Allison Gas Turbine Diu., 
888 F.Supp. 1453, 1463 (S.D. Ind. 1995), noted that the Fifth 
Circuit in Hansen and the Tenth Circuit in Biava had borrowed 
the state statutory rate. "But the Seventh Circuit has followed a 
different course .... [T]he Seventh Circuit has ... held that the ap-
propriate rate is the market rate .... A simple (and acceptable) 
approximation of the market rate is the prime rate .... " Roden v. 
Amerisourcebergen, 186 Cal.App. 4th 620, 656-57 (4th App.Dist. 
2010), "recognized that not all circuits agree with the Ninth Cir-
cuit in terms of the particular rate of interest to be applied .... 
The First and Fourth Circuits ... leave it to the full discretion of 
the trial court to set the interest rate." 
22 The dissenting opinion cited, inter alia, the Second Cir-
cuit decision in Dunnigan, and Third Circuit decision in Fotta, 
(Continued on following page) 
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gain falls squarely within ERISA's equitable remedies, 
as recognized by the Supreme Court, .. . and other 
circuits." "[By] affirm[ing] the district court's decision 
to require LINA to disgorge the profit it earned by 
breaching its fiduciary duties to Rochow, . . . we 
[would] simply join the mainstream view of our sister 
circuits acknowledging the trust law principles that 
undergird ERISA's equity jurisprudence." App. 71a. 
II. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS OF EX-
CEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE 
The question presented in this case affects a far 
larger number of ERISA cases than any of the ERISA 
issues on which this Court has granted review in the 
past. In virtually every case in which a beneficiary 
establishes that a plan wrongfully denied, or delayed, 
benefits, the court will be called upon to determine 
whether to award prejudgment interest or some other 
delay-related remedy, and to determine the appro-
priate rate. This issue was litigated in the district 
court decision in Amara.23 The question also has 
been litigated in cases in which the Department of 
Labor seeks benefits on behalf of a beneficiary.24 
the Seventh Circuit decisions in Clair and May, and the Eighth 
Circuit decision in Parke. App. 63a-68a. 
23 Amara v. Cigna Corp., 559 F.Supp.2d 192, 220-21 (D. 
Conn. 2008). 
24 E.g., Perez v. Bruister, 54 F.Supp.3d 629, 680 (S.D. Miss. 
2014). 
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Benefit disputes constitute the largest portion of the 
more than 7,000 ERISA cases filed each year in 
federal court. 
This Court has repeatedly granted certiorari to 
resolve issues regarding prejudgment interest.25 The 
practical importance of the issue in this case is par-
ticularly great. 
The consequences of the en bane decision in this 
case are not limited to litigated cases; by stripping 
courts in the Sixth Circuit of the power to require 
ERISA violators to disgorge their ill-gotten gains, the 
decision below seriously weakens the incentive to 
comply with ERISA itself. "Allowing LINA to retain 
its profit creates an incentive for claims administra-
tors to delay paying much-needed benefits to partici-
pants and beneficiaries while investing that money 
for their own gain .... LINA gains from delaying the 
claims process as long as possible. Permitting LINA 
to keep its profit also encourages fiduciaries to com-
mingle plan assets with company funds." App. 72a. 
That consequence is particularly serious with 
regard to the insurance companies that generally 
provide ERISA-regulated health, life and disability 
25 E.g., City of Milwaukee v. Cement Division, National Gyp-
sum Co., 515 U.S. 189 (1995); Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical 
Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827 (1990); Loeffler v. Frank, 486 
U.S. 549 (1988); Monessen Southwestern Rwy. Co. v. Morgan, 
486 U.S. 330 (1988); General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 
u.s. 648 (1983). 
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insurance. As this case illustrates, the total amount 
of insurance that these companies can write, and 
thus their profits, are generally proportional to the 
assets (or "surplus") of the company itself. Each 
dollar of wrongfully unpaid benefits may permit the 
insurance company to write (and profit from) more 
insurance. This "surplus" functions like capitalization; 
the amount of additional insurance a company can 
write is typically a significant multiple of the amount 
of its surplus. Insurance firms cannot, however, treat 
borrowed money as part of their surplus. 
Congress enacted ERISA because it well under-
stood that plans and fiduciaries are often in a position 
to profit from the types of wrongdoing forbidden by 
the statute. Violations of ERISA can be quite profit-
able, whether on a plan-wide scale or- as here- in 
individual cases. The decision of the Sixth Circuit, 
guaranteeing that wrongdoers will be able to pocket 
those ill-gotten gains in the right circumstances, is an 
intolerable invitation for plans and fiduciaries to en-
gage in dubious or even palpably unlawful practices. 
The decision of the Sixth Circuit is clearly wrong. 
The essential premise of the decision below, that 
ERISA remedies are limited to providing compensa-
tion, is inconsistent with the decisions of this Court. 
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the 
"appropriate equitable relief" authorized by 
§ 502(a)(3) encompasses those categories of relief that 
"were typically available in equity." Sereboff v. Mid 
Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 361 
(2006); Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 
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256 (1993). CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S.Ct. 1866 
(2011), made clear that "[e]quity courts possessed the 
power to provide relief in the form of monetary 'com-
pensation' for a loss resulting from a trustee's breach 
of duty, or to prevent the trustee's unjust enrichment." 
131 S.Ct. at 1880 (emphasis added). This Court 
should grant review to restore the equitable power of 
federal courts to prevent such unjust enrichment. 
This case is an excellent vehicle for resolving the 
question presented. The Sixth Circuit decided this 
case on a single ground, that under ERISA the rem-
edy for the wrongful delay in paying a benefit is 
limited to the amount needed to make whole the 
beneficiary, and cannot be framed to prevent unjust 
enrichment. The court of appeals decision did not 
turn on the particular facts of this case, and did not 
address the particular rates and amounts involved. If 
this Court holds that such remedies are limited to 
making whole the beneficiary, the case would then be 
an ideal vehicle for determining whether the rate to 
be used should be based on state law, on§ 1961(a), or 
on the particular circumstances of each case. 
--------·--------
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, a writ of certiorari should 
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 
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BEFORE: COLE, Chief Judge; KEITH, BOGGS, 
BATCHELDER, MOORE, CLAY, GIBBONS, ROG-
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joined, and WHITE, J., joined in part. GIBBONS, J. 
(pp. 376-78), delivered a separate concurring opinion 
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ion in which COLE, C.J., KEITH, MOORE, CLAY, 
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part. 
OPINION 
McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. 
This is the second time this case has been before 
the Sixth Circuit. The first time, we affirmed the 
district court's determination that defendant Life 
Insurance Company of North America ("LINA") acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously when it denied Daniel 
Rochow's claim for long-term disability benefits under 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. ("ERISA"). Rochow v. LINA, 482 
F.3d 860 (6th Cir.2007) ("Rochow I"). Our second 
review comes after the district court ordered that 
3a 
LINA disgorge profits flowing from its wrongful 
denial of benefits. A divided three-judge panel af-
firmed the district court's order. Rockow v. LINA, 737 
F.3d 415 (6th Cir.2013) ("Rockow II"). We granted 
rehearing en bane, thereby vacating Rockow II, in 
order to reconsider as a full court whether the dis-
gorgement award was proper. For the reasons that 
follow, we vacate the disgorgement award and re-
mand the case to the district court to determine 
whether prejudgment interest is appropriate. 
I 
The facts of this case are adequately summarized 
in Rockow II and are reproduced here: 
In mid-2000, the late Daniel J. Rochow 
("Rochow"), a principal of Universico Insur-
ance Company ("Universico"), sold his inter-
est in Universico to Arthur J. Gallagher & 
Co. ("Gallagher") and became President of 
Gallagher. As an employee of Gallagher, 
Rochow was covered under Life Insurance 
Company of North America ("LINA") policy 
number LK 30214. LINA's policy provided for 
disability benefits if an employee gave "satis-
factory proof" that "solely because of Injury 
or Sickness [the employee is] unable to per-
form all material duties of [his or her] Regu-
lar Occupation or a Qualified Alternative[.]" 
See Rockow v. LINA ("Rockow I"), 482 F.3d 
860, 863-64 (6th Cir.2007). 
In 2001, Rochow began to experience short 
term memory loss, occasional chills, sporadic 
4a 
sweating, and stress at work. Id. In July 
2001, Gallagher demoted Rochow from Pres-
ident to Sales Executive-Account Manager 
because Rochow could no longer perform 
his duties as President. Id. Rochow con-
tinued to have difficulties, and as a result of 
his inability to perform his job, Gallagher 
forced Rochow to resign effective January 2, 
2002. Id. In February 2002, Rochow experi-
enced periods of amnesia and was hospital-
ized. Id. During his February 2002 hospital 
stay, Rochow was diagnosed with HSV-
Encephalitis, a rare and severely debilitating 
brain infection. Id. 
On or about December 31, 2002, Rochow filed 
a claim for long term disability benefits. 
LINA denied Rochow benefits stating that 
Rochow's employment ended before his disa-
bility began. Rochow I, 482 F.3d at 864. 
Rochow appealed LINA's denial and included 
medical records from 2001 that stated 
Rochow was suffering short-term memory 
loss during 2001. In denying Rochow's ap-
peal, LINA noted that Rochow experienced 
the effects of encephalitis during 2001 but 
denied coverage because Rochow continued 
to work and was not disabled until February 
2002. Rockow I, 482 F.3d at 864. 
Rochow again appealed and included a re-
port from Jack Tellerico, an area vice presi-
dent for Gallagher, which identified the 
material duties of Rochow's position with 
Gallagher and stated that during 2001, 
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Rochow was not able to perform all the ma-
terial duties of those jobs due to his lack of 
memory. LINA again denied Rochow's claims 
stating, "[s]ince, Mr. Rochow's long-term dis-
ability claim was not filed until after his 
termination date; his claim was denied be-
cause of, 'not considered actively working at 
time of disability.' It appears no additional 
documentation was provided which would 
support that Mr. Rochow was actively work-
ing when he became disabled.'" (Page ID 
4056) (Joint App'x) (sic). 
Rochow appealed the denial a third time. 
LINA denied his claim for the final time stat-
ing Rochow had not presented any medical 
records to support his inability to work prior 
to the date he was terminated. 
On September 17, 2004, Rochow filed a com-
plaint against Cigna Group Insurance, 
LINA's parent company, in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan. Compl., ECF No. 1. The complaint 
states two claims under ERISA § 502(a)(3), 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3): one to recover full 
benefits due to the failure to pay benefits in 
violation of the terms of the plan and one to 
remedy the alleged breach of fiduciary duty 
in ERISA Section 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a). 
Defendant moved for judgment on the record 
and Plaintiff moved for summary judgment. 
On June 24, 2005, Judge Tarnow of the 
United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan heard oral arguments on 
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the parties' motions. At the conclusion of oral 
argument, Judge Tarnow stated on the rec-
ord that LINA acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously in finding Rochow was not disabled 
while still employed and that Rochow had 
prevailed. In a one page order which incorpo-
rated the reasoning stated on the record, the 
Court granted Rochow's motion and denied 
LINA's motion. The same day, the district 
court clerk filed a judgment which purported 
to dismiss the case and was signed by the 
district court clerk and Judge Tarnow. 
LINA appealed the June 24, 2005 Order 
denying Defendant's motion and granting 
Plaintiff's motion. Rochow moved to enforce 
judgment or require Defendant to post a su-
persedeas bond pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 62(d). Eventually this motion 
was withdrawn and Defendant deposited a 
supersedeas bond in the amount of $250,000. 
On April 3, 2007, a panel of this Court af-
firmed Judge Tarnow's Order. Rochow I, 482 
F.3d at 866. The Rochow I panel held the 
record supported the district court's decision 
that LINA's denial of Rochow's claims was 
arbitrary and capricious, was not the result 
of a deliberate, principled reasoning process, 
and did not appear to have been made "'solely 
in the interest ofthe participants and benefi-
ciaries and [] for the exclusive purpose of [] 
providing benefits to participants and their 
beneficiaries' as required by ERISA. 29 
U.S.C. § 1104(A)(l)." 1d. The opinion noted, 
"there is no 'logical incompatibility between 
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working full time and being disabled from 
working full time'" and that the policy re-
quired only "satisfactory proof of disability, 
not medical evidence." Id. (internal citations 
omitted). On the same day, the clerk for this 
Court entered judgment stating "the order of 
the district court is AFFIRMED." The clerk 
of this Court issue4 the mandate on April 26, 
2007, and it was filed May 3, 2007. 
On May 10, 2007, the parties filed a stipula-
tion "to toll the time for all parties and coun-
sel to bring any post remand motions," and 
the district court entered an Order tolling 
the filing deadlines for post-remand motions 
until further order of the court. On April 3, 
2008, the district court referred the remain-
ing issues in dispute to United States Magis-
trate Judge Whalen. Over the next few 
months, Judge Whalen held several status 
conferences. 
On November 10, 2008, LINA filed a state-
ment of resolved and unresolved issues and 
Plaintiff1 filed motions for attorneys' fees and 
costs and equitable accounting. LINA's state-
ment of issues represented that the par-
ties still disputed several issues, including 
1 Rochow died on October 16, 2008, and the representative 
of his estate, Patrick Rochow, was substituted as plaintiff in this 
action. Later, Todd R. Rochow and John D. Rochow were substi-
tuted as administrators of Daniel Rochow's estate and as plain-
tiffs in this case. For consistency, this opinion refers to all liti-
gation actions taken on behalf of Rochow's estate as actions by 
[Rochow]. 
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whether Plaintiff was entitled to a disgorge-
ment of profits. 
Plaintiff also filed a motion seeking an 
equitable accounting and a request for dis-
gorgement. In that motion, Plaintiff argued 
Rochow's estate was entitled to disgorgement 
of profits because LINA breached its fiduci-
ary duties, and disgorgement was necessary 
to prevent LIN.A:s unjust enrichment resulting 
from profits it earned on the wrongfully re-
tained benefits. Plaintiff supported the motion 
with the report of his expert, Dr. David C. 
Crosen [sic]. In calculating LIN.A:s "Return 
on (Average) Equity" ("ROE"), Dr. Crosen [sic] 
determined LINA used Rochow's benefits to 
earn between 11 percent and 39 percent an-
nually and, therefore, made approximately 
$2.8 million by retaining Rochow's benefits. 
In June 2009, the district court granted 
Plaintiff's motion for an equitable ac-
counting of profits and disgorgement of 
the same. LINA then moved to strike 
Croson's report and to preclude him from 
testifying as an expert on the ground 
that his principles and methods were 
unreliable under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 702 and Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 
579, 589 [113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 
469] (1993). The motion was referred to 
the magistrate judge, who issued a re-
port recommending that the motion be 
denied, noting that the matter was being 
tried to the court rather than a jury and 
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finding that many of LINA's objections 
went to the weight of Croson's opinions, 
not their admissibility. The district court 
adopted the magistrate judge's recom-
mendation over LINA's objections. 
After the parties briefed the issue, the 
district court conducted an evidentiary 
hearing in November 2011 on the issue 
of calculation of profits for disgorgement. 
At the hearing, LINA offered the testi-
mony of its expert, Timothy Holzli, who 
served as the Chief Accounting Officer 
for the group insurance division of 
Cigna. Holzli opined Rochow's withheld 
benefits earned LINA profits of $32,732. 
He arrived at that figure by treating the 
withheld benefits as though they were 
earning interest as part of LINA's in-
vestment assets. On cross examination, 
Holzli acknowledged, however, that the 
account was not a separate or segregat-
ed account. He also conceded that LINA 
payed [sic] its operating expenses and 
benefits from the account, and the money 
in the account formed a basis for LINA 
to write insurance coverage. 
Following additional briefing and oral ar-
gument, the district court issued its decision 
on calculation of profits for disgorgement in 
March 2012.2 The district court adopted 
2 The district court's decision is reported at Rochow v. 
LINA, 851 F.Supp.2d 1090 (E.D.Mich.2012). 
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Croson's ROE metric as the basis for deter-
mining the profits LINA gained from the 
wrongfully withheld funds, and it rejected 
Holzli's retained investment margin metric. 
It did so, in part, based upon its factual find-
ing that the subject money was not placed in 
a separate investment account, but rather 
was available for LINA to use for any busi-
ness purpose. In the last paragraph of its de-
cision, the district court stated: 
Plaintiff will, within two weeks from this or-
der, submit a final amount to be disgorged by 
Defendant based upon the Court's rulings, 
above. Defendant may then submit a memo-
randum in response within seven days. This 
memorandum is limited only to any objec-
tions regarding the accuracy of Plaintiff's 
calculations based on this order, and is not 
an invitation to relitigate issues already de-
cided by this Court. 
(Page ID 3576). 
On May 4, 2012, in its response brief to 
Plaintiff's final calculation of disgorge-
ment, LINA argued for the first time 
that permitting disgorgement was out-
side the scope of the mandate in the first 
appeal. Nonetheless, on July 24, 2012, 
the district court ordered disgorgement 
of $3,797,867.92. The court noted, "De-
fendant has, in response to a proposed 
order submitted by Plaintiff, raised ob-
jections. To the extent that these objec-
tions do not simply repeat arguments 
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already rejected by the Court, and raise 
new issues in Defendant's argument 
concerning the 'mandate rule,' they are 
untimely and will not be considered." 
(Page ID 3907). LINA timely appealed. 
Rochow II, 737 F.3d at 417-20 (alteration in original). 
On December 6, 2013, a panel of this court af-
firmed the disgorgement award, holding that dis-
gorgement was properly ordered under ERISA 
§ 502(a)(3) for LINA's breach of fiduciary duty and 
that Rochow's claim for such relief was not an im-
permissible repackaging of a claim for wrongful 
denial of benefits under§ 502(a)(1)(B). Id. at 423. The 
Rochow II panel stated that the successful result 
obtained by Rochow on his claim for wrongful denial 
of benefits in Rochow I did not preclude additional 
relief on Rochow's breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim. Id. 
at 422-23. LINA's petition for en bane rehearing was 
granted on February 19, 2014, vacating the panel's 
decision in Rochow II. 
II 
There is essentially one issue before us: Is Rochow 
entitled to recover under both ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) 
and § 502(a)(3) for LINA's arbitrary and capricious de-
nial of long-term disability benefits? As a result of our 
ruling in Rochow I, Rochow recovered all benefits that 
he had been wrongfully denied under § 502(a)(l)(B). 
We now decide whether Rochow may also recover un-
der § 502(a)(3), which makes "appropriate equitable 
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relief" available to redress such violations as a breach 
of fiduciary duty. 3 The district court held that Rochow 
3 We assume, for present purposes, that the district court 
made a finding that LINA breached a fiduciary duty owed to 
Rochow. However, the district court's various orders are devoid 
of any such express finding. When the case was before the dis-
trict court on the issue of whether the plan administrator ar-
bitrarily and capriciously denied benefits, the court ruled from 
the bench in granting summary judgment for Rochow. The tran-
script of the hearing reveals no express finding of a breach of 
fiduciary duty. R. 19, Hearing Tr. at 24, Page ID 4095. Further, 
the one-page order that memorialized the district court's ruling 
includes the finding simply that "the denial of Plaintiff's claim 
was arbitrary and capricious." R. 16, Order at 1, Page ID 105. 
There is no mention of a breach of fiduciary duty. The judgment 
order that issued the same day, apart from granting Rochow's 
claim for benefits wrongfully denied, "dismissed" the case. That 
is, the district court appeared to have dismissed the breach-of-
fiduciary-duty claim as a claim pled in the alternative and 
rendered moot by Rochow's success on the principal claim. R. 17, 
Judgment, Page ID 106. 
In Rockow I, similarly, we did not address any claim 
for breach of fiduciary duty, or even use the terms "fi-
duciary," "duty," or ''breach" in the opinion. Admittedly, 
one could infer from Rockow I that LINA's fiduciary 
duty was alluded to in the observation that LINA's de-
cision did not appear to have been made "'solely in 
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries 
and [] for the exclusive purpose of [] providing bene-
fits to participants and their beneficiaries' as required 
by ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)." See Rockow I, 482 
F.3d at 866. However, no ruling on a breach-of-
fiduciary-duty claim was before the court and the 
opinion contains no analysis of the point. 
After the district court's initial decision was affirmed 
and the district court took up the motion for equitable 
accounting, however, the court rejected LINA's argu-
ment that it had not made the requisite finding of a 
(Continued on following page) 
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could recover under both provisions because Rochow 
pleaded claims for two distinct kinds of relief, namely 
one claim to recover benefits arbitrarily and capriciously 
breach of fiduciary duty to trigger the availability of 
equitable relief. Citing Varity, the court stated, "an 
arbitrary or capricious denial of benefits can count as 
a breach of fiduciary duty." R. 67, Order at 4, Page ID 
935. Further, when the district court set the method of 
accounting for the disgorgement award, it stated "it 
has already been determined that Defendant owed 
Plaintiff a duty of loyalty and breached this duty 
through its arbitrary and capricious denial of disabil-
ity benefits to Plaintiff." R. 113, Order at 2, Page ID 
3562. The district court thus treated its fmding of an 
arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits, in and of 
itself, as a breach of fiduciary duty. The district court 
never identified any other grounds for finding a 
breach of a fiduciary duty. In the district court's rul-
ing, it was one and the same injury that made out 
two distinct ERISA violations and justified both rem-
edies. 
Though we are aware of no persuasive authority for 
the proposition that a wrongful denial of benefits in 
and of itself constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty re-
mediable under both § 502(a)(l)(B) and § 502(a)(3), we 
assume, without deciding, that the district court per-
missibly found a breach of fiduciary duty based on the 
administrator's arbitrary and capricious denial ofben-
efits. The dissenting opinion suggests other ways in 
which LINA might be deemed to have breached a fi-
duciary duty, but the district court's judgment now 
under review clearly includes no such ruling. Careful 
review of the district court rulings cited in the dissent 
discloses that the asserted fmdings of other instances 
of misconduct by LINA were not identified by the dis-
trict court as grounds for holding that LINA breached 
its fiduciary duty. 
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denied by LINA, and one claim for disgorgement of 
profits realized by LINA as a result of its breach of 
fiduciary duty consisting of the arbitrary and capri-
cious denial of benefits. Contrary to Rochow's argu-
ments, Rochow is made whole under § 502(a)(l)(B) 
through recovery of his disability benefits and attor-
ney's fees, and potential recovery of prejudgment 
interest, discussed below. Allowing Rochow to recover 
disgorged profits under § 502(a)(3), in addition to his 
recovery under§ 502(a)(l)(B), based on the claim that 
the wrongful denial of benefits also constituted a 
breach of fiduciary duty, would - absent a showing 
that the § 502(a)(l)(B) remedy is inadequate- result 
in an impermissible duplicative recovery, contrary to 
clear Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent. 
ERISA has six remedial provisions. The remedial 
provisions relevant to this action are § 502(a)(l)(B) 
and § 502(a)(3), which state: 
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil ac-
tion 
A civil action may be brought -
(1) hy a participant or beneficiary-
(B) to recover benefits due him under 
the terms of his plan, to enforce his 
rights under the terms of the plan, or to 
clarify his rights under the terms of the 
plan; 
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(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduci-
ary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which vi-
olates any provision of this subchapter or the 
terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other ap-
propriate equitable relief (i) to redress such 
violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of 
this subchapter or the terms of the plan. 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). 
Unfortunately for Rochow, Supreme Court prece-
dent construing the interplay of these provisions 
dictates a result contrary to that reached by the 
district court. In Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 
116 S.Ct. 1065, 134 L.Ed.2d 130 (1996), the Supreme 
Court allowed a group of plaintiffs, who were unable 
to bring a claim under§ 502(a)(1)(B), to bring suit for 
breach of fiduciary duty under § 502(a)(3). As the 
Court explained, § 502(a)(3) "functions as a safety 
net, offering appropriate equitable relief for injuries 
caused by violations that § 502 does not elsewhere 
adequately remedy." Id. at 513, 116 S.Ct. 1065. Im-
portantly, however, the Varity Court limited this 
expansion of ERISA coverage by noting that "where 
Congress elsewhere provided adequate relief for a 
beneficiary's injury, there will likely be no need for 
further equitable relief, in which case such relief 
normally would not be appropriate." Id. at 515, 116 
S.Ct. 1065 (emphasis added) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
The Varity Court thus emphasized that ERISA 
remedies are concerned with the adequacy of relief to 
redress the claimant's injury, not the nature of the 
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defendant's wrongdoing. The district court's use of 
equitable relief under § 502(a)(3) as the vehicle for its 
disgorgement award misses the mark. Instead of 
focusing on the relief available to make Rochow 
whole, the award reflects concern that LINA had 
wrongfully gained something, a consideration beyond 
the ken of ERISA make-whole remedies. Varity indi-
cates that equitable relief is not ordinarily appropri-
ate where Congress has elsewhere provided adequate 
means of redress for a claimant's injury. In other words, 
a claimant cannot pursue a breach-of-fiduciary-duty 
claim under § 502(a)(3) based solely on an arbitrary and 
capricious denial of benefits where the § 502(a)(l)(B) 
remedy is adequate to make the claimant whole. 
Here, there is no showing that the benefits recovered 
by Rochow, plus the attorney's fees awarded, plus the 
prejudgment interest that may be awarded on re-
mand, are inadequate to make Rochow whole. Absent 
such a showing, there is no trigger for "further equi-
table relief" under Varity. 
If an arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits 
implicated a breach of fiduciary duty entitling the 
claimant to disgorgement of the defendant's profits in 
addition to recovery of benefits, then equitable relief 
would be potentially available whenever a benefits 
denial . is held to be arbitrary or capricious. This 
would be plainly beyond and inconsistent with 
ERIS.Ns purpose to make claimants whole. Tellingly, 
the appellate briefing contains citation to no case that 
allowed disgorgement of profits under § 502(a)(3) 
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after the claimant recovered for wrongful denial of 
benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B). 
Here in the Sixth Circuit we have had occasion to 
apply Varity's teaching on the relationship between 
§ 502(a)(1)(B) and § 502(a)(3) in Wilkins v. Baptist 
Healthcare System, Inc., 150 F.3d 609 (6th Cir.1998). 
In Wilkins, Wilkins applied for long-term disability 
benefits and, after the plan administrator denied his 
claim, sued for benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B) and for 
equitable relief under § 502(a)(3) based on breach of 
fiduciary duty. We denied relief under § 502(a)(3) 
stating: 
Because [§ 502(a)(1)(B)] provides a remedy 
for Wilkins's alleged injury that allows him 
to bring a lawsuit to challenge the Plan Ad-
ministrator's denial of benefits to which he 
believes he is entitled, he does not have a 
right to a cause of action for breach of fiduci-
ary duty pursuant to [§ 502(a)(3)]. 
Id. at 615. Just like the plaintiff in Wilkins, Rochow is 
not entitled to relief under the catchall provision: 
such relief is unnecessary and unavailable because he 
has an adequate remedy under § 502(a)(1)(B). 
LINA thus contends the district court's disgorge-
ment award contravenes Wilkins and allows a claim-
ant to improperly repackage a claim for benefits 
wrongfully denied as a cause of action for breach of 
fiduciary duty. Rochow insists that Wilkins provided a 
way to ensure only that claimants do not attempt an 
"end run" around ERISA's limitations by repackaging 
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an unsuccessful claim for benefits as a claim for 
"appropriate relief" based on an alleged breach of 
fiduciary duty. Rochow claims that Wilkins bars relief 
sought under § 502(a)(3) only if that same type of 
relief could have been obtained under § 502(a)(1)(B). 
Because he purportedly seeks a type of relief under 
§ 502(a)(3) (i.e., disgorgement of LIN.Ns profits) dif-
ferent from and in addition to what is available to 
him under § 502(a)(1)(B), Rochow contends that 
Wilkins does not preclude his claim for this additional 
remedy to obtain complete relief. 
Rochow mischaracterizes Wilkins. A claimant 
can pursue a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim under 
§ 502(a)(3), irrespective of the degree of success 
obtained on a claim for recovery of benefits under 
§ 502(a)(1)(B), only where the breach of fiduciary duty 
claim is based on an injury separate and distinct from 
the denial of benefits or where the remedy afforded 
by Congress under § 502(a)(1)(B) is otherwise shown 
to be inadequate. See Gore v. El Paso Energy Corp. 
Long Term Disability Plan, 4 77 F.3d 833, 840-42 (6th 
Cir.2007). Wilkins simply affords no support for the 
argument that § 502(a)(3) equitable relief may be 
appropriate to further redress a wrongful denial of 
benefits adequately remediable under § 502(a)(1)(B). 
Rather, Wilkins makes clear that the availability of 
relief under § 502(a)(3) is contingent on a showing 
that the claimant could not avail himself or herself 
of an adequate remedy pursuant to § 502(a)(1)(B). 
Wilkins, 150 F.3d at 615. 
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Rochow contends there is no legitimate concern 
about impermissible claim "repackaging'' when a 
benefits-claimant prevails and seeks "other appro-
priate equitable relief." We disagree. Impermissible 
repackaging is implicated whenever, in addition to 
the particular adequate remedy provided by Con-
gress, a duplicative or redundant remedy is pursued 
to redress the same injury. Because Rochow was able 
to avail himself of an adequate remedy for LIN.Ns 
wrongful denial of benefits pursuant to § 502(a)(1)(B), 
he cannot obtain additional relief for that same injury 
under § 502(a)(3). 
In Hill v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michi-
gan, 409 F.3d 710 (6th Cir.2005), we further clarified 
the interplay of§. 502(a)(1)(B) and § 502(a)(3). In Hill, 
the plaintiffs brought a class-action lawsuit seeking 
individual relief for wrongfully denied benefits under 
§ 502(a)(1)(B) and for plan-wide injunctive relief 
under § 502(a)(3) based upon the defendant's alleged 
breach of its fiduciary duty. The district court dis-
missed the § 502(a)(3) claim, finding that "these 
claims were merely repackaged claims for individual 
benefits and did not constitute actual fiduciary-duty 
claims." Id. at 717. We reversed. Whereas Wilkins 
involved the rejection of fiduciary-duty claims on the 
basis that they were actually disguised individual-
benefits claims, in Hill the need for relief under the 
catchall provision arose out of a defect in plan-
wide claim handling procedures, implicating a differ-
ent injury. "The award of benefits to a particular 
[plaintiff] based on an improperly denied claim for 
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emergency-medical-treatment expenses will not change 
the fact that [defendant] is using an allegedly im-
proper methodology for handling ... claims." Id. at 
718. To remedy this separate and distinct injury, we 
permitted injunctive relief under § 502(a)(3), not an 
additional award of monetary damages for the same 
denial of benefits. Thus, Hill recognized an exception 
to Varity and Wilkins where "[o]nly injunctive relief of 
the type available under [§ 502(a)(3) would] provide 
the complete relief sought by Plaintiffs by requiring 
[Defendant] to alter the manner in which it adminis-
ters all the Program's claims .... " Id. at 718 (empha-
sis added). In Hill, as in Varity, the primary purpose 
of ERISA was given effect - ensuring availability of 
an adequate remedy to make the plaintiffs whole. 
The present case does not fall within the Hill 
exception to Varity and Wilkins. Hill distinguished 
between the denial of individual claims and plan-wide 
mishandling of claims as two distinct injuries. Section 
502(a)(1)(B) provided relief for the denial of the Hill 
plaintiffs' individual benefits, and § 502(a)(3) reme-
died the systemic plan-wide problems that posed a 
potential for future injury. Contrast Hill with the 
present case, where the only asserted injury to 
Rochow is the denial of benefits and withholding of 
the same benefits. These are not distinct injuries; 
they are one and the same injury. Because Rochow 
has an adequate and effective remedy for this injury 
under § 502(a)(1)(B), he is not also entitled to relief 
under § 502(a)(3). 
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Rochow continues to claim that the disgorgement 
award ("equitable accounting") remedies an injury 
entirely distinct from the injury remedied by recovery 
of his benefits, and that he has therefore suffered two 
distinct injuries. Rochow contends that he suffered 
his first injury when LINA improperly denied his 
benefits, and he suffered his second "injury'' when 
LINA used the funds it owed him to generate $3.7 
million in profits for its own account without remit-
ting the profits to him. Yet, in an action for wrongful 
denial of benefits, like this one, the denial of benefits 
necessarily results in a continued withholding of 
benefits until the denial is either finalized or recti-
fied. The denial is the injury and the withholding is 
simply ancillary thereto, the continuing effect of the 
same denial. Together they comprise a single injury. 
By withholding payment of benefits until the denial 
was either finalized or rectified, LINA did not violate 
a second, distinct duty owed to Rochow and did not 
inflict a second injury. 
Nor can it be said that Rochow suffered a second 
injury, or that his injury was exacerbated, as a re-
sult of any gain realized by LINA before it paid the 
wrongfully withheld benefits. Rochow's loss remained 
exactly the same irrespective of the use made by 
LINA of the withheld benefits. Despite Rochow's 
creative use of semantics, the reality remains clear: 
Rochow suffered one injury, the denial of his benefits. 
And neither Rochow nor the dissent has succeeded in 
identifying any way in which the remedy available 
under § 502(a)(l)(B) - i.e., recovery of benefits and 
22a 
attorney's fees and, potentially, prejudgment interest 
- is inadequate to make Rochow whole. The remedy 
Congress chose to make available under § 502(a)(1)(B) 
having thus not been shown to be inadequate, it 
follows that permitting Rochow to obtain further 
equitable relief for the same injury under § 502(a)(3) 
would contravene the scheme established by Con-
gress as well as the Supreme Court's teaching in 
Varity. 
Rochow cites two cases to support his claim that 
he is entitled to equitable relief under § 502(a)(3). He 
contends that Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 
725 F.3d 406 (3d Cir.2013), stands for the proposition 
that disgorgement of profits may be an appropriate 
remedy for breach of fiduciary duty even in the ab-
sence of a showing of financial loss by the claimant. 
The discussion in Edmonson on which Rochow relies 
is addressed solely to the question whether an ERISA 
claimant had standing to bring a claim for disgorge-
ment of profits notwithstanding a lack of showing of 
financial loss. The court answered this question in 
the affirmative, based on trust law principles. Id. at 
415-17. However, the court ultimately denied relief 
for lack of a showing of a breach of fiduciary duty and 
lack of a showing that any such breach proximately 
caused injury to the claimant. Id. at 423-26. There 
was no claim in Edmonson for benefits wrongfully 
denied, but only a stand-alone claim for breach of fi-
duciary duty. Hence, the Edmonson court did not have 
occasion to address the interplay of§ 502(a)(1)(B) and 
§ 502(a)(3) or to consider whether the availability of 
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other remedies under ERISA rendered equitable re-
lief under § 502(a)(3) inappropriate. Edmonson's ob-
servations about standing, viewed in context, are of 
limited significance to the issue before us. 
Rochow also relies on CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, _ 
U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. 1866, 1881, 179 L.Ed.2d 843 
(2011), to support his argument that the failure to 
show a second, distinct injury is not fatal to his 
disgorgement award under § 502(a)(3). In Amara, he 
contends, the Court recognized that in an action for 
equitable relief under § 502(a)(3), the requisite "actu-
al harm" may consist simply of "the loss of a right 
protected by ERISA or its trust-law antecedents." Id. 
at 1881. Again, the argument misses the point. There 
is no dispute that "appropriate equitable relief" may 
be obtained under § 502(a)(3) to redress an ERISA 
violation by a plan fiduciary. The point, as detailed 
above, is that Rochow did not suffer an injury rem-
ediable under § 502(a)(3) in this case. Rochow suf-
fered the wrongful denial of his benefits, an injury 
adequately remedied under § 502(a)(1)(B). Despite 
Rochow's insistence to the contrary, his breach-of-
fiduciary-duty claim for disgorgement of profits is 
nothing but a repackaged claim for benefits wrong-
fully denied, a claim for which, per Varity, additional 
equitable relief is not appropriate because not neces-
sary to make Rochow whole. Rochow's reliance on 
Amara is to no avail. 
Rochow insists that Varity and Amara, read 
together, indicate that a plaintiff may obtain relief 
under both § 502(a)(l)(B) and § 502(a)(3) if "other 
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appropriate equitable relief" is necessary to make the 
plaintiff whole for injury caused by the wrongful 
denial of benefits. He argues that Varity made clear 
that "other appropriate equitable relief" may be 
available under § 502(a)(3) when a party cannot 
obtain relief under § 502(a)(l)(B). Further, Amara 
identified a range of equitable remedies potentially 
available under § 502(a)(3), including surcharge.4 
Reading Varity and Amara together thus supports the 
notion, Rochow contends, that disgorgement of profits 
is available in the instant case because recovery of 
benefits under§ 502(a)(l)(B) did not make him whole 
for the injury caused by LINA's breach of fiduciary 
duty. 
Rochow's reading misses a logical step: "other 
appropriate equitable relief" is not necessary to make 
him whole. While Varity certainly acknowledges the 
possibility of equitable relief, and Amara outlines the 
4 The statements made by the Supreme Court in Amara 
regarding the equitable remedies available to courts under 
§ 502(a)(3) are merely dicta. The sole question before the Court 
in Amara was whether the district court applied the correct 
legal standard in determining whether CIGNA's failure to in-
form its employees of changes to the benefits plan caused its 
employees sufficient injury to warrant legal relief. Amara, 131 
S.Ct. at 1871. The Court also discussed whether § 502(a)(1)(B) 
authorized the relief the district court awarded. In finding that 
§ 502(a)(1)(B) was not the appropriate remedy, the Court went 
on to acknowledge that § 502(a)(3) authorizes forms of relief 
similar to§ 502(a)(l)(B). However, the Court did not decide what 
remedies were available, and did not conclusively decide which 
remedy was appropriate in the case before it. Id. at 1880. 
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scope of potential equitable relief, when appropriate, 
the Supreme Court has never stated that recovery 
under both § 502(a)(3) and § 502(a)(l)(B) may be war-
ranted for a single injury. Rochow claims two injuries 
- the arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits, and 
the breach of fiduciary duty consisting of the contin-
ued withholding of the wrongfully denied benefits. 
These "injuries," however, as explained above, are 
indistinguishable. The Court in Varity made clear 
that equitable relief is not ordinarily appropriate 
where Congress has provided adequate relief for a 
claimant's injury. The purpose behind ERISA contin-
ues to be remedial, and Rochow's injury was remedied 
when he was awarded the wrongfully denied benefits 
and attorney's fees - as potentially supplemented by 
award of prejudgment interest, still to be determined. 
Despite Rochow's attempts to obtain equitable relief 
by repackaging the wrongful denial of benefits claim 
as a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim, there is but one 
remediable injury and it is properly and adequately 
remedied under § 502(a)(l)(B). Rochow and our dis-
senting colleagues wholly fail to explain how his 
§ 502(a)(l)(B) remedies are inadequate to remedy his 
lnJUry. 
Rochow's final argument is that even if the 
disgorgement relief is not available under § 502(a)(3), 
he is entitled to prejudgment interest under 
§ 502(a)(l)(B), a matter the district court failed to 
address. We acknowledge that prejudgment interest 
may be awarded in an appropriate case under ERISA. 
"Though ERISA does not address the propriety of 
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awarding prejudgment interest, prejudgment interest 
may be awarded in the discretion of the district court. 
Awards of prejudgment interest are compensatory, 
not punitive, and a finding of wrongdoing by the 
defendant is not a prerequisite to such an award." 
Tiemeyer v. Cmty. Mut. Ins. Co., 8 F. 3d 1094, 1103 
(6th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1005, 114 S.Ct. 
1371, 128 L.Ed.2d 48 (1993) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted); see also Wells v. U.S. Steel, 76 F.3d 
731, 737 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that district court did 
not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment 
interest when pension fund wrongfully withheld 
benefits). 
Prejudgment interest cannot be awarded, how-
ever, at a rate so high that the award amounts to 
punitive damages: 
Although prejudgment interest is typically 
not punitive, an excessive prejudgment in-
terest rate would overcompensate an ERISA 
plaintiff, thereby transforming the award of 
prejudgment interest from a compensatory 
damage award to a punitive one in contra-
vention of ERISA's remedial goal of simply 
placing the plaintiff in the position he or she 
would have occupied but for the defendant's 
wrongdoing. 
Ford v. Uniroyal Pension Plan, 154 F.3d 613, 616 (6th 
Cir.1998). An interest award should "simply compen-
sate a beneficiary for the lost interest value of money 
wrongfully withheld from him or her." Rybarczyk v. 
TRW, Inc., 235 F.3d 975, 985 (6th Cir.2000) (quoting 
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Ford, 154 F.3d at 618). An excessive prejudgment 
interest rate would "contravene ERISA's remedial 
goal of simply placing the plaintiff in the position he 
or she would have occupied but for the defendant's 
wrongdoing." Schumacher v. AK Steel Corp. Retire-
ment Accumulation Pension Plan, 711 F.3d 675, 686 
(6th Cir.2013). Conversely, an exceedingly low award 
would fail to make the plaintiff whole. !d. 
Rochow's request for prejudgment interest ap-
pears to be a remedy the district court could have 
granted, though not at an excessive rate. In his initial 
complaint, Rochow requested various forms of relief, 
including an "[o]rder compelling Defendant to pay 
Plaintiff forthwith the full amount of employee bene-
fits due him and to continue such payments for a 
period set forth in the Plan, including interest on all 
unpaid benefits." R. 1, Compl. at 6, Page ID 6. 
Rochow also requested "[r]easonable attorney fees 
and costs" and "[s]uch other relief as may be just and 
appropriate." Id. When the case was remanded to the 
district court following Rochow I, the parties treated 
prejudgment interest as a live issue, fully briefing the 
issue in connection with the proceedings on equitable 
remedies. Yet when disgorgement of profits was 
ordered, the question of prejudgment interest was 
given no further consideration. Rochow thus prayed 
for such relief in his complaint and has preserved his 
request throughout the proceedings. The issue having 
been thus far been [sic] pretermitted through no fault 
of the parties, we remand the case once more to the 
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district court for fresh consideration of Rochow's 
entitlement to prejudgment interest. 
III 
For the reasons stated above, we VACATE the 
district court's disgorgement award under § 502(a)(3) 
and REMAND the case to the district court for 
consideration of whether and, if so, to what extent, 
award of prejudgment interest is warranted under 
§ 502(a)(l)(B) to make Rochow whole. 
JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
If one accepts the rather charitable assumptions 
made in footnote 1 of the majority opinion, its reason-
ing is entirely correct. For that reason I concur in it. I 
write separately to note, however, that if one does not 
make those assumptions, the district court's dis-
gorgement order cannot stand for purely procedural 
reasons. 
Rochow's complaint stated two claims: He alleged 
that LINA wrongfully denied him benefits under 29 
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B), and he alleged that in doing 
so, LINA breached its fiduciary duties under 29 
U.S.C. § 1104(a). The second claim was styled as one 
arising under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). In his prayer for 
relief, in addition to seeking an order compelling 
LINA to pay him the benefits he believed he was due, 
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Rochow sought disgorgement of any profits that LINA 
had obtained as a result of its conduct. 
The parties filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment. LINA requested that the district court 
affirm its denial of Rochow's claim for benefits. 
Rochow asserted only that LINA erroneously denied 
him benefits pursuant to § 1132(a)(l)(B).1 He styled 
his summary judgment motion as a motion for partial 
summary judgment, did not argue his breach-of-
fiduciary-duty claim under § 1104(a) and § 1132(a)(3), 
and did not mention disgorgement. When the district 
court issued an order memorializing its from-the-
bench grant of Rochow's motion, it granted summary 
judgment in full and made no mention of Rochow's 
second claim. 
Were there any doubt that Rochow's § 1132(a)(3) 
claim no longer remained in the suit, the district 
court's judgment ordered the case "DISMISSED." 
This was a final judgment, conferring upon the 
Rochow I panel appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. There was no other basis for appellate 
jurisdiction, as the district court did not issue an 
injunction triggering. the application of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(a), nor did it certify the case for interlocutory 
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Rochow 
1 Among the other relief he sought, Rochow requested "[a] 
full and accurate accounting by Defendant of all computations 
for Plaintiff's disability benefits in sufficient detail so that 
Plaintiff may ascertain that his benefits are being paid in the 
proper amount." 
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raised no issue on appeal regarding the district 
court's failure to address his breach of fiduciary duty 
claim. The Rockow I panel affirmed the district 
court's grant of Rochow's motion for summary judg-
ment, thus ending the case. The district court had 
ordered the case dismissed. A panel of this court had 
affirmed. And the panel did not remand the case to 
the district court. 
Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, however, the 
district court agreed to accept "post-remand" motions. 
But the case had never been remanded, and, of 
course, the parties could not stipulate to the district 
court's retention of jurisdiction. Still, the district 
court permitted Rochow to resuscitate his abandoned 
disgorgement claim, after Rochow moved for the court 
"to supervise the equitable accounting granted with 
summary judgment." This motion was highly prob-
lematic. For starters, the district court never granted 
equitable accounting as part of its summary judg-
ment order. And to the extent Rochow mentioned 
"accounting" in his motion for summary judgment~ he 
sought an accounting of the amount of benefits due so 
that he could ensure "that his benefits [ we]re being 
paid in the proper amount," not equitable accounting 
tantamount to disgorgement. LINA is not without 
fault either. It spent years litigating the case without 
bringing these procedural defects to the district 
court's attention. 
When the district court finally granted Rochow's 
motion for equitable accounting and ordered LINA to 
disgorge profits, it violated the mandate rule. The · 
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mandate rule is a multifaceted "rule" governing the 
relationship between the courts of appeals and the 
district courts. Its fundamental principle is straight-
forward: A district court may not contravene an 
appellate court's mandate. United States v. Campbell, 
168 F.3d 263, 265 (6th Cir.1999). For instance, if 
a case is remanded, the mandate rule "forecloses 
relitigation of issues expressly or impliedly decided by 
the appellate court." United States v. O'Dell, 320 F.3d 
674, 679 (6th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). And "where an issue was ripe for review at 
the time of an initial appeal but was nonetheless 
foregone, the mandate rule generally prohibits the 
district court from reopening the issue on remand 
unless the mandate can reasonably be understood as 
permitting it to do so." I d. 
Here, the Rockow I panel did not remand the 
case to the district court, so any "post-remand" liti-
gation was contrary to this court's mandate. See 
United States v. Hamilton, 440 F.3d 693, 697-98 (5th 
Cir.2006); Green v. Nevers, 196 F.3d 627, 632 (6th 
Cir.1999). Even if Rockow I could be read as remand-
ing the case to the district court for the issuance of a 
remedy, a district court violates the mandate rule 
when it orders an additional remedy beyond that 
contemplated by the appellate panel's opinion. See 
Briggs v. Pa. R.R. Co., 334 U.S. 304, 306, 68 S.Ct. 
1039, 92 L.Ed. 1403 (1948); Schake v. Colt Indus. 
Operating Corp. Severance Plan for Salaried Emps., 
960 F.2d 1187, 1191 (3d Cir.1992); Stiller v . .Squeez-A-
Purse Corp., 296 F.2d 504, 506 (6th Cir.1961). Since 
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Rochow had abandoned his claim for disgorgement 
under § 1132(a)(3) by not seeking its resolution in the 
district court after that court treated a motion for 
"partial" summary judgment as one warranting sum-
mary judgment on all issues and by not raising the 
district court's failure to resolve the breach of fiduci-
ary duty claim on appeal, the district court violated 
the mandate rule when it ordered disgorgement. 
Our mandate issued on May 3, 2007. Over seven 
years later this case is still being litigated. The ma-
jority's charitable view of the case's procedural histo-
ry allows that unfortunate history to continue with 
some legitimacy. In short, while I agree with the 
majority's analysis if one accepts its accommodations 
in footnote 1 to reposition the case for en bane review, 
I am unable to refrain from presenting another take 
on the history of this case, one which would preclude 
the district court's jurisdiction to order any further 
relief, except the prejudgment interest directed by the 
majority opinion. 
HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge, concurring m 
part and dissenting in part. 
I write separately because I do not entirely agree 
or disagree with either the majority or dissenting 
opinion. I would vacate the judgment on the basis 
that the order of disgorgement is not adequately 
supported. I would, however, permit consideration of 
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a refashioned disgorgement remedy on remand if 
properly supported.1 
There is less light between the two opinions than 
might appear on the surface. The majority under-
stands Rochow's fiduciary-duty claim as a repackag-
ing of his benefits-denial claim, for which it believes 
Rochow obtained adequate relief as a result of 
Rockow I, 482 F.3d 860 (6th Cir.2007), and a potential 
award of prejudgment interest on remand. Operating 
under this conclusion, the majority holds the district 
court erred when it ordered LINA to disgorge its 
profits because ERISA, in its view, precludes "a 
duplicative or redundant remedy . . . to redress the 
same injury." Maj. Op. 373. The majority opinion does 
not, however, appear to foreclose disgorgement as 
an appropriate equitable remedy under § 502(a)(3) in 
some cases. The dissent too interprets ERISA to 
authorize equitable relief, including disgorgement of 
profits, to remedy distinct injuries, such as a plan 
administrator's breach of a fiduciary duty owed to 
plan participants and beneficiaries. Thus, all appear 
to agree disgorgement of profits is a potential remedy 
under ERISA. The two opinions part on whether 
Rochow's fiduciary-duty claim is merely a repackag-
ing of his benefits-denial claim. This, I believe, is a 
false dichotomy that imposes a requirement not found 
in ERISA. 
1 This is not to say that such a remedy would be appropri-
ate, only that it might be and that I would not foreclose it at this 
point. 
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I do not agree that the dispositive inquiry gov-
erning the availability of equitable relief under 
§ 502(a)(3) is whether the cla~m is a repackaging of a 
benefits-denial claim. Rather, the governing inquiry 
under ERISA is whether other equitable relief is. 
appropriate under the circumstances, and the extent 
to which the equitable disgorgement claim duplicates 
the benefits-denial claim is one factor to be consid-
ered in making that determination. 
The statutory framework that authorizes "other 
appropriate equitable relief" confides the determina-
tion whether and what equitable relief is appropriate 
to judges, who presumably are well equipped to de-
termine when a particular set of circumstances 
warrants additional relief by focusing on ERISA's 
objectives. This understanding of and respect for the 
discretionary role of the courts in evaluating claims 
for equitable relief is consistent with the Supreme 
Court's statements in Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 
489, 116 S.Ct. 1065, 134 L.Ed.2d 130 (1996), which 
contemplate courts' sound exercise of their discretion 
in fashioning appropriate equitable relief: 
We should expect that courts, in fashioning 
"appropriate" equitable relief, will keep in 
mind the special nature and purpose of em-
ployee benefit plans, and will respect the pol-
icy choices reflected in the inclusion of 
certain remedies and the exclusion of others. 
Thus, we should expect that where Congress 
elsewhere provided adequate relief for a ben-
eficiary's injury, there will likely be no need 
for further equitable relief, in which case 
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such relief normally would not be "appropri-
ate." 
ld. at 515, 116 S.Ct. 1065 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). Varity does not require a 
showing of a "s·eparate and distinct" injury. Maj. Op. 
372; cf. id. at 371 (recognizing that Varity "empha-
sized that ERISA remedies are concerned with the 
adequacy of relief to redress the claimant's injury"). 
Rather, it speaks of injury for which adequate relief 
has not been elsewhere provided, uses the qualifying 
terms "likely'' and "normally," and ultimately focuses 
on the governing word "appropriate." We should, 
therefore, address whether additional equitable relief 
is appropriate here, even discuss the types of con-
siderations that should guide the determinations 
whether and what equitable relief is appropriate, but 
we should not preemptively disallow equitable reme-
dies in particular circumstances where ERISA has 
not done so . 
. Nevertheless, the majority fashions a bifurcated 
standard, holding that a breach-of-fiduciary-duty 
claim is actionable under§ 502(a)(3) where the claim 
is based on "an injury separate and distinct from the 
denial of benefits or where the remedy afforded by 
Congress under § 502(a)(1)(B) is otherwise shown to 
be inadequate." Id. at 372 (second emphasis added). I 
find this standard both confusing and unnecessary. If 
the remedy afforded by Congress under§ 502(a)(1)(B) 
is adequate, it should not matter that the benefici-
ary suffered an injury separate and distinct from 
the denial of benefits; I doubt the majority intends 
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otherwise. Conversely, if the remedy afforded by 
Congress under § 502(a)(l)(B) is inadequate, it also 
should not matter whether the claimant suffered 
distinct injuries. Ultimately the question must rest 
on the majority's second inquiry- whether the "rem-
edy afforded by Congress under § 502(a)(l)(B) is 
otherwise shown to be inadequate." I have no doubt 
that whether the beneficiary suffered multiple inju-
ries is a factor that is relevant to the ultimate ques-
tion whether § 502(a)(l)(B) provides adequate relief. 
But the majority's focus on whether a fiduciary's 
breach of its duties in denying benefits and then 
withholding them are "separate and distinct" injuries 
or a single injury seems irrelevant in light of its 
conclusion that Rochow failed to show that the relief 
already received together with the relief that might 
be awarded on remand is inadequate. The majority 
implicitly acknowledges the dispositive inquiry with 
its conclusion that Rochow made "no showing that the 
benefits [he] recovered ... , plus the attorney's fees 
awarded, plus the prejudgment interest that may be 
awarded on remand, are inadequate to make [him] 
whole." Id. at 371-72. 
Further undermining the separate-and-distinct-
injury requirement for relief under § 502(a)(3) is the 
majority's acknowledgement that a plaintiff who 
recovers benefits under§ 502(a)(l)(B) can also obtain 
"other appropriate equitable relief" under § 502(a)(3) 
in the form of prejudgment interest, an- equitable 
remedy. The majority allows an interest award even 
as it asserts that Rochow suffered only one injury 
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that was "adequately remedied under § 502(a)(l)(B)," 
and that he "did not suffer [a separate and distinct] 
injury remediable under § 502(a)(3)." Id. at 374-75. 
Clearly, Rochow was not made whole by the award of 
benefits and attorney's fees. Nearly seven years 
elapsed between the time he sought benefits and 
when LINA finally paid all benefits that were due. 
Further equitable relief is necessary to compensate 
Rochow for LINA's extraordinary delay in paying 
benefits. The majority concedes as much in its re-
mand order directing the district court to consider the 
award of interest, although it leaves the ultimate 
determination to the district court. But, having · ac-
knowledged the possibility that delay in payment 
might require further appropriate equitable relief, 
the majority does not explain why one equitable 
remedy (interest) may be appropriate in a benefits-
denial case, but another equitable remedy (disgorge-
ment) is never appropriate in such a case, except to 
say that there is only one injury. 
There is a valid distinction between the two 
equitable remedies that has nothing to do with 
whether there is an injury separate and distinct from 
the denial of benefits: Interest is generally compensa-
tory, while disgorgement is generally geared toward 
deterring future misconduct. See Drennan v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 253 (6th Cir.1992); The 
Law of Trusts and Trustees§ 484. I share the major-
ity's concern that Congress· did not intend to turn the 
routine denial of benefits into the basis for a recovery 
of benefits and also an array of equitable relief, but I 
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would direct that concern to the question whether, in 
light of the historic distinction between the two 
equitable remedies, disgorgement constitutes "other 
appropriate equitable relief" under the facts of a 
particular case, and would refrain from announcing 
what appears to be a blanket rule that bars equitable 
relief in a benefits-denial case. 
Turning to the instant case, the district court did 
not find that disgorgement of profits is necessary to 
make Rochow whole, or that Rochow could have 
earned the same rate of return had he been paid his 
benefits on time.2 Rather, the court's primary basis for 
awarding further equitable relief was LIN.Ns unjust 
enrichment, Order, R. 67 at 5-6, and the disgorge-
ment of profits was largely based on the fmding that 
LINA did not segregate Rochow's wrongfully withheld 
benefits and instead left the amount in its general 
fund to be used for general operating expenses, 
Rochow v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 851 F.Supp.2d 
1090, 1097-98 (E.D.Mich.2012). The district court 
reasoned that LINA earned a rate of return on 
Rochow's benefits that it would not have earned had 
it segregated the funds in an investment account, and 
that because Rochow's money was inseparable from 
LIN.Ns money, he is entitled to a percentage of LIN.Ns 
return on its investments during this period. How-
ever, the district court did not find that either the 
2 The circumstances might, however, support a finding that 
interest at the actual market rates during the period of delay 
would be inadequate compensation for the delay. 
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Plan or ERISA required that Rochow's disputed ben-
efits be segregated pending resolution of the claim. 
Nor is it apparent on what basis the dissent con-
cludes that LINA engaged in prohibited self-dealing 
under 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b). There has been no finding 
that Rochow's disputed benefits constituted "plan 
assets," or that LIN.Ns actions in failing to segregate 
the disputed benefits and leaving them in the general 
· fund constituted self-dealing under ERISA. Without 
such findings or further explanation, I cannot agree 
that disgorgement is justified based only on the 
maxim emphasized by the district court - "if you take 
my money and make money with it, your profit be-
longs to me." Rockow, 851 F.Supp.2d at 1094 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
In the absence of such justifications, disgorge-
ment as an equitable remedy in a denial-of-benefits 
case should be premised on a finding that the decision 
to deny benefits was not only arbitrary and capricious 
but also based on impermissible considerations that 
call for an equitable judicial response geared toward 
deterring similar decision making in the future, as, 
for example, where the denial of benefits is not the 
product of particular claims evaluators' misguided 
evaluations, but rather, an organizational policy to 
delay paying valid claims for as long as possible; or 
where repeated wrongful denials lead to the conclu-
sion that disgorgement is necessary to assure proper 
claims processing in the future. See Hill v. Blue Cross 
& Blue Shield of Mich., 409 F.3d 710, 718 (6th 
Cir.2005); Parke v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. 
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Co., 368 F. 3d 999, 1008 (8th Cir.2004) (quoting 1 
Dobbs § 4.3(5), at 611 n.16); Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment §51 (2011). 
Further, even when these types of considerations 
support disgorgement, the court should consider the 
effect of disgorgement on innocent participants in the 
plan and tailor the remedy accordingly. 
To be clear, a finding that disgorgement is an 
appropriate remedy in such circumstances would be 
based on the totality of the circumstances of the 
denial, as well as the consequences of disgorgement, 
and would not depend on a fmding of a separ~te and 
independent injury, which, although relevant, may or 
may not be present. 
In sum, to the extent the majority's bifurcated 
rule identifies two circumstances or considerations 
that might justify an award of additional equitable 
relief, I agree that those circumstances or considera-
tions are relevant; however, to the extent the majority 
intends to announce a rule that either dictates an 
award of additional equitable relief where either of 
those circumstances is present or prohibits such an 
award where neither is present, I disagree. Ulti-
mately, the governing inquiry is whether additional 
equitable relief is appropriate, a decision normally 
left to the sound discretion of the district courts, to 
be exercised according to the totality of the circum-
stances surrounding the denial, and subject to review 
for abuse of discretion. See Tiemeyer v. Cmty. Mut. 
Ins. Co., 8 F.3d 1094, 1103 (6th Cir.1993). Addressing 
that question, I conclude that the record as it stands 
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does not support the district court's exercise of its 
discretion in awarding the disgorgement ordered 
here. Thus, I agree that the order should be vacated. I 
would, however, permit the district court to address 
on remand the concerns raised here and in the major-
ity opinion, and would not foreclose a disgorgement 
remedy as "other appropriate equitable relief" if 
properly supported on remand. 
STRANCH, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
The issue before us arises under a remedial 
statute, fashioned on the precepts of equity, which 
empowers a plan participant to bring a civil action to 
"recover benefits due" and "to obtain other appropri-
ate equitable relief." 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(l)(B) & 
(a)(3). In the parlance of ERISA and equity jurispru-
dence, the remedy is to "make whole" the injured. 
Here, Rochow - a company president whose mental 
capacity was destroyed over time by a brain infection 
- sought disability benefits from LINA starting in 
2002. Over five years later, in October 2007, he 
received his first benefit payment (a lump sum of over 
$300,000), and monthly benefits began. In June 2009, 
almost seven years after the disability date and eight 
months after Rochow died in October 2008, LINA 
paid a second lump sum for underpayment of benefits 
approximating $420,000. 
Rochow sought, and the district court awarded, a 
make-whole remedy for two ERISA violations commit-
ted by LINA, failure to pay benefits due and breach of 
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fiduciary duty. Based on evidence presented, the 
district court found that LINA engaged in deliberate 
and willful wrongful acts, created non-existent insur-
ance policy requirements, concocted a knowingly false 
rationale for its second denial of benefits, closed the 
administrative record without medical input or 
evidence, and acted in bad faith. R. 67, Order; 
Rockow v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 851 F.Supp.2d 
1090, 1101 (E.D.Mich.2012). Proceedings in the 
district court confirmed that LINA also engaged in 
prohibited self-dealing under 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b) in 
the course of delaying payment of Rochow's disability 
benefits for more than seven years. During that 
lengthy period of delay, rather than segregating the 
disability benefits it owed to Rochow in an interest-
bearing account for his later use, LINA commingled 
Rochow's benefits with company funds in a general 
equity account used in part for corporate investment. 
Because Rochow earned a high salary before the 
onset of his disability, LINNs intentional delay in 
paying Rochow's substantial disability benefits for 
more than seven years allowed LINA to earn millions 
of dollars in profit for its own gain, in breach of its 
fiduciary duty not to engage in self-dealing. 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1104(a)(1), 1106(b). Based on expert evidence, the 
district court found that LINNs average rate of re-
turn during the seven-year period was 26%. Rochow's 
health deteriorated during that time and he was 
forced to meet the financial demands of everyday 
living and serious illness without employment income 
or the disability benefits promised under the Plan. 
LINNs fiduciary wrongdoing and self-dealing warrant 
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equitable remedies under § 1132(a)(3) - an account-
ing and disgorgement of the considerable profits 
LINA earned on the benefits it withheld from Rochow. 
The majority avers that such equitable remedies 
are prohibited under ERISA jurisprudence because 
obtaining a remedy under both § 1132(a)(1)(B) and 
§ 1132(a)(3) amounts to double recovery. Its insistence 
that Rochow is not entitled to disgorgement of LINNs 
profit under § 1132(a)(3) rests on a faulty premise -
its assumption that Rochow suffered the single injury 
of LINNs arbitrary and capricious denial of ben-
efits. · Maj. Op. at 369-70. The majority states 
that, [a]llowing Rochow to recover disgorged profits 
under § 502(a)(3), in addition to his recovery under 
§ 502(a)(1)(B), based on the claim that the wrongful 
denial of benefits also constituted a breach of fi-
duciary duty, would - absent a showing that the 
§ 502(a)(1)(B) remedy is inadequate - result in an 
impermissible duplicative recovery, contrary to clear 
Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent. Maj. Op. 
at 370-71. Relying primarily on Varity Corp. v. Howe, 
516 U.S. 489, 116 S.Ct. 1065, 134 L.Ed.2d 130 (1996), 
and Wilkins v~ Baptist Healthcare System, Inc., 150 
F.3d 609 (6th Cir.1998), the majority concludes that 
"Rochow is not entitled to relief under the catchall 
provision" of § 1132(a)(3) because "such relief is un-
necessary and unavailable" and "he has an adequate 
remedy under"§ 1132(a)(1)(B). Maj. Op. at 372-73. 
I will demonstrate below that Varity Corp. and nu-
merous cases decided after it fully support Rochow's 
recovery of benefits under § 1132(a)(1)(B) and the 
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disgorgement of LIN.Ns profit under § 1132(a)(3). 
Wilkins is inapplicable to the issues before us because 
it is legally and factually distinguishable. Wilkins 
sued for disability benefits under § 1132(a)(1)(B) and 
failed to prove that his medical condition warranted 
payment of plan benefits. Wilkins, 150 F.3d at 612-13. 
Trying a second time to obtain plan benefits, he 
"repackaged" the benefits claim as a breach of fiduci-
ary duty under § 1132(a)(3), but he sought a tradi-
tionally legal remedy - compensatory damages. Id. at 
613-14. We barred the "repackaging" of the claim 
because Wilkins had an adequate remedy to recover 
benefits under § 1132(a)(1)(B) and recovery of com-
pensatory damages would not constitute "other ap-
propriate equitable relief" under § 1132(a)(3). Id. at 
615-16. Wilkins thus insures that a plan participant 
cannot make an end-run around a denial of benefits 
under§ 1132(a)(1)(B) by "repackaging" the claim and 
seeking compensatory damages under § 1132(a)(3). 
In contrast to the facts of Wilkins, LINA injured 
Rochow in two distinct ways: by arbitrarily and ca-
priciously denying his disability benefits claim and by 
breaching its fiduciary duties to him. LIN.Ns denial of 
benefits breached the Plan terms; LIN.Ns breach of its 
fiduciary obligations violated ERISA statutes and 
added the element of wrongdoing to the contract 
breach. Equity has long recognized that "[a] trustee 
(or a fiduciary) who gains a benefit by breaching his 
or her duty must return that benefit to the benefi-
ciary." Skinner v. Northrop Grumman Retirement 
Plan B, 673 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir.2012). Unlike 
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Wilkins, Rochow sued under§ 1132(a)(l)(B) to recover 
Plan benefits and under § 1132(a)(3) to obtain an 
accounting and disgorgement of profits wrongfully 
earned through LINA's breach of its fiduciary duties-
two separate remedies for two separate injuries un-
der two separate sections of§ 1132. Unlike Wilkins, 
Rochow proved that his medical condition war-
ranted payment of Plan benefits. And unlike Wilkins, 
Rochow sought his second remedy to attain make-
whole relief. These two remedies are not duplicative 
and neither repackages the other. Both remedies are 
necessary, working in tandem, to make Rochow whole 
for LINA's ERISA violations. 
By falsely characterizing the wrongs Rochow 
suffered and by denying the availability of equitable 
remedies, the majority opinion stands at odds with 
governing law and with the facts before us. Supreme 
Court opinions, our precedent, and cases from our 
sister circuits support the availability of dual ERISA 
remedies where two distinct injuries exist and two 
remedies are necessary to make the plan participant 
or beneficiary whole. I would affirm the district court, 
but I would remand the case for a recalculation of 
the amount of profit LINA must disgorge. Accord-
ingly, I must respectfully dissent from the majority 
op1ruon. 
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I. ERISA DEFINES LINA'S DUTIES AS A 
FIDUCIARY 
"ERISA is a comprehensive statute designed to 
promote the interests of employees and their benefi-
ciaries in employee benefit -plans." Shaw v. Delta 
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 
L.Ed.2d 490 (1983). Congress imposed fiduciary 
duties on ERISA plan sponsors and administrators 
that are the highest known to the law, Gregg v. 
Transp. Workers of Am. Int'l, 343 F.3d 833, 841 (6th 
Cir.2003), and in doing so, Congress drew much of 
ERIS.Ns content from the common law of trusts. 
Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 496, 116 S.Ct. 1065. These 
fiduciary duties attach to particular persons or enti-
ties engaged in the performance of specific ERISA 
functions. Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat'l Life. Ins. Co., 
725 F.3d 406, 413 (3d Cir.2013). 
A fiduciary's first obligation is to "discharge his 
duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest 
of the participants and beneficiaries." 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1104(a)(1). This duty of loyalty extends to the 
individual plan participants and beneficiaries, not 
only to the ERISA plan itself. Varity Corp., 516 U.S. 
at 507, 116 S.Ct. 1065; Cent. States, S.E. & S. W. 
Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 4 72 U.S. 
559, 571-72, 105 S.Ct. 2833, 86 L.Ed.2d 447 (1985). A 
fiduciary has "an unwavering duty" to act as a pru-
dent person would act in a similar situation and "for 
the exclusive purpose" of insuring that benefits are 
provided to plan participants and their beneficiaries. 
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a); Hi-Lex Controls, Inc. v. Blue 
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Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 751 F.3d 740, 751 (6th 
Cir.2014); Gregg, 343 F.3d at 841; James v. Pirelli 
Armstrong Tire Corp., 305 F.3d 439, 448-49 (6th 
Cir.2002). ERISA expressly forbids a fiduciary from 
"deal[ing] with the assets of the plan in his own in-
terest or for his own account." 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(1). 
The "absolute bar against self dealing'' prevents a fi-
duciary from "realizing a financial gain" at the ex-
pense of the plan participants or beneficiaries. Hi-Lex 
Controls, Inc., 751 F.3d at 750 (quoting Brock v. 
Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 341 (6th Cir.1988)); Pipe-
fitters Local 636 Ins. Fund v. Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield of Mich., 722 F.3d 861, 868 (6th Cir.2013). 
II. ERISA DEFINES REMEDIES FOR BREACH 
OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
A. Congress authorized equitable remedies 
in§ 1132(a)(3) 
Congress designed ERISA to include equitable 
remedies that run directly to the individual plan 
participant or beneficiary who is injured by a fiduci-
ary breach. The Supreme Court tells us that the 
"words of[§ 1132(a)(3)] -'appropriate equitable relief' 
to 'redress' any 'act or practice which violates any 
provision of this title' - are broad enough to cover 
individual relief for breach of a fiduciary obligation." 
Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 510, 116 S.Ct. 1065. The 
structure of § 1132 reveals that one of the two catch-
all provisions providing appropriate equitable relief 
for breaches of fiduciary duty that run to an injured 
beneficiary is § 1132(a)(3). Id. at 512, 116 S.Ct. 1065. 
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This catchall remedial provision acts "as a safety net, 
offering appropriate equitable relief for injuries 
caused by violations that[§ 1132] does not elsewhere 
adequately remedy." ld. 
In the majority's view, Varity Corp. emphasizes 
"that ERISA remedies are concerned with the ade-
quacy of relief to redress the claimant's injury" and 
that "equitable relief is not ordinarily appropriate 
where Congress has elsewhere provided adequate 
means of redress for a claimant's injury. In other 
words, a claimant cannot pursue a breach-of-
fiduciary-duty claim under § [1132](a)(3) based solely 
on an arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits 
where the § [1132](a)(1)(B) remedy is adequate to 
make the claimant whole." Maj. Op. at 371. If that 
were the case, the majority worries, then any arbi-
trary and capricious denial of plan benefits would 
potentially subject a plan fiduciary to disgorgement 
of profits under § 1132(a)(3) "after the claimant 
recovered for wrongful denial of benefits" under 
§ 1132(a)(1)(B). Maj. Op. at 371-72. 
This unfounded fear is allayed by a proper inter-
pretation of Varity Corp., the cases following it, and 
the Supreme Court's recent decision in CIGNA Corp. 
v. Amara, _ U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. 1866, 179 L.Ed.2d 
843 (2011). These cases demonstrate that a partici-
pant or beneficiary may recover under§ 1132(a)(1)(B) 
for an arbitrary and capricious denial of plan bene-
fits and may recover further equitable relief under 
§ 1132(a)(3) to redress a breach of fiduciary duty. 
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Together these remedies provide the make-whole 
relief Congress intended. 
In Varity Corp., the plaintiffs' employer, serving 
also as administrator of a self-funded employee wel-
fare benefit plan, persuaded the plaintiffs by decep-
tion to transfer their employment to a newly-formed 
subsidiary, thereby withdrawing· voluntarily from the 
welfare benefit plan and forfeiting benefits under it in 
exchange for the employer's assurances that the 
plaintiffs would receive the same benefits following 
transfer. 516 U.S. at 491-94, 116 S.Ct. 1065. Just as 
Varity Corporation had planned, the insolvency of the 
new subsidiary stripped the employees of welfare 
benefits. Id. at 494, 116 S.Ct. 1065. The employees 
could not sue under § 1132(a)(1)(B) to recover benefits 
because the plan was defunct. They could, however, 
and did sue for and obtain "appropriate equitable 
relief" under § 1132(a)(3) - their reinstatement to a 
different employee plan. Id. at 495, 116 S.Ct. 1065. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the reinstatement, 
holding that individuals may sue under the catchall 
provision of § 1132(a)(3) to obtain "other appropriate 
equitable relief" to remedy a breach of fiduciary duty. 
Id. at 510-13, 116 S.Ct. 1065. Given the objectives 
of the ERISA statute, the case explains, "it is hard to 
imagine why Congress would want to immunize 
breaches of fiduciary obligation that harm individuals 
by denying injured beneficiaries a remedy." Id. at 513, 
116 S.Ct. 1065. 
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Like the majority here, the amici in Varity Corp. 
worried that an individual would be able to "re-
package" a denial of benefits claim that is normally 
reviewed deferentially under the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard of Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 
(1989), and transform it into a breach of fiduciary 
duty claim decided under the "rigid level of conduct" 
expected of fiduciaries. Id. at 513-14, 109 S.Ct. 948. 
The Supreme Court dismissed their concern. 
"[C]haracterizing a denial of benefits as a breach of 
fiduciary duty does not necessarily change the stan-
dard a court would apply when reviewing the admin-
istrator's decision to deny benefits." Id. at 514, 109 
S.Ct. 948. "Mter all, Firestone ... based its decision 
upon the same common-law trust doctrines that 
govern standards of fiduciary conduct." I d. at 514-15, 
109 S.Ct. 948. Dismissing amici's concern that "law-
yers will complicate ordinary benefit claims by dress-
ing them up in 'fiduciary duty' clothing," id. at 514, 
109 S.Ct. 948, the Court explained "that where Con-
gress elsewhere provided adequate relief for a benefi-
ciary's injury, there will likely be no need for further 
equitable relief, in which case such relief normally 
would not be 'appropriate.'" I d. at 515, 109 S.Ct. 948 
(emphasis added). 
The majority transforms the Supreme Court's 
conditional language into an absolute bar to Rochow's 
claims, misconstruing the Court's instruction that 
ERISA authorizes "further equitable relief" if relief 
available "elsewhere" is inadequate. This may be the 
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unusual case that entails two InJUries, but Varity 
Corp. provides no basis for denying an equitable 
remedy necessary to accomplish make-whole relief. 
The repackaging fears the majority expresses, like 
those raised by amici in Varity Corp., should be met 
with the same response: there is not "any ERISA-
related purpose that denial of a remedy would serve. 
Rather, ... granting a remedy is consistent with the 
literal language of the statute, the Act's purposes, and 
pre-existing trust law." ld. 
B. Remedies under§ 1182(a)(8) were tradi-
tionally available in equity 
Section 1132(a)(3) "countenances only such relief 
as will enforce" ERIS.Ns provisions or the terms of the 
plan, and it "authorizes the kinds of relief 'typically 
available in equity' in the days of 'the divided bench,' 
before law and equity merged." US Airways, Inc. v. 
McCutchen,_ U.S. _, 133 S.Ct. 1537, 1544, 1548, 
185 L.Ed.2d 654 (2013) (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt 
Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 256, 113 S.Ct. 2063, 124 L.Ed.2d 
161 (1993)). The most definitive explanation of the types 
of equitable remedies available under · § 1132(a)(3) 
is found in the Supreme Court's pronouncement in 
Cigna Corp. v. Amara, _ U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. 1866, 
179 L.Ed.2d 843 (2011). Because Congress specified 
that courts may grant "other appropriate equitable 
relief" under§ 1132(a)(3), courts may employ remedies 
that were traditionally available in equity, including 
reformation of contract, injunctions, mandamus, res-
titution, and surcharge, which is a monetary remedy 
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against a trustee or fiduciary. Id. at 1878-80. "[T]he 
fact that this relief takes the form of a money pay-
ment does not remove it from the category of tradi-
tionally equitable relief." Id. at 1880. This is because 
courts sitting in equity "possessed the power to 
provide relief in the form of monetary 'compensation' 
for a loss resulting from a trustee's breach of duty, 
or to prevent the trustee's unjust enrichment." 
Id. (citing Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 95, and 
Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 5, Mar. 2, 2009)). The 
surcharge remedy extends "to a breach of trust com-
mitted by a fiduciary encompassing any violation of a 
duty imposed upon that fiduciary" and can be used to 
accomplish "make-whole relief." Id. The equity courts 
did not require a showing of detrimental reliance in 
surcharge cases but "would 'mold the relief to protect 
the rights of the beneficiary according to the situation 
involved.'" I d. at 1881 (quoting Bogert's Trusts & 
Trustees § 861, at 4). A fiduciary may be surcharged 
under§ 1132(a)(3) if the plaintiff proves actual harm 
and causation by a preponderance of the evidence, 
and actual harm might "come from the loss of a right 
protected by ERISA or its trust-law antecedents." I d. 
In explain~ng the scope of equitable remedies 
available under § 1132(a)(3), Amara also clarified two 
previous Supreme Court cases, correcting lower court 
decisions that had interpreted the cases as narrowing 
the scope of "other appropriate equitable relief" avail-
able under § 1132(a)(3). Amara, 131 S.Ct. at 1878 (re-
ferring to Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 113 
S.Ct. 2063, 124 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993), and Great-West 
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Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 122 
S.Ct. 708, 151 L.Ed.2d 635 (2002)). Mertens does not 
foreclose equitable relief against a plan fiduciary, as 
some courts had held, because in that case a plan 
beneficiary sought compensatory damages from a 
non-fiduciary, a private firm that provided actuarial 
services to a trustee. Id. (citing Mertens, 508 U.S. at 
253, 255, 256, 113 S.Ct. 2063). Relief was not availa-
ble under§ 1132(a)(3) because the beneficiary sought 
traditionally legal, not equitable relief, against a non-
fiduciary. I d. In Great-West, the suit was brought by 
the fiduciary against the beneficiary. Mter the injured 
beneficiary recovered compensatory damages from a 
tortfeasor, the fiduciary sought reimbursement for 
the medical expenses it had paid on the beneficiary's 
behalf. Id. The fiduciary tried to place a lien on the 
money the beneficiary collected, but a lien is tradi-
tionally considered to be legal, not equitable, relief. 
Id. at 1878-79. Because the fiduciary did not seek an 
equitable remedy - the placement of a constrt;tctive 
trust on the particular money the tortfeasor paid to 
the beneficiary- the Court determined that equita-
ble relief under § 1132(a)(3) was not available. ld. 
Mertens and Great-West thus do not present any 
obstacle to Rochow's use of § 1132(a)(3) to recover 
traditional equitable relief from LINA, a breaching 
fiduciary, even if that remedy is formulated to avoid 
the unjust enrichment of the fiduciary. See Amara, 
131 S.Ct. at 1879-80. 
Reading Amara and Varity Corp. together, we see 
that the remedies awarded to Rochow comport with 
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the statute, its purposes, and trust law. The principle 
is clear that a plaintiff may pursue relief under both 
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) and (a)(3) if wrongly denied benefits 
are recovered under (a)(1)(B) and "other appropriate 
equitable relief"- something in addition to the award 
of benefits - is necessary to make the plaintiff whole 
for a breach of fiduciary duty. In this case, requiring 
LINA to disgorge its profits earned on wrongly with-
held benefits, accomplished under (a)(3), was neces-
sary to make Rochow whole and to prevent LIN.Ns 
unjust enrichment. 
Our sister circuits recognize that Amara corrects 
misunderstandings of the lower courts that have led 
to the denial · of equitable remedies authorized by 
§ 1132(a)(3). Mter Amara, the Fourth Circuit ex-
plained, it is clear "that Section § 1132(a)(3) allows 
for remedies traditionally available at equity and that 
those remedies include surcharge and estoppel[,]" 
remedies "at the heart" of the appeal before that 
court. McCravy v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 690 F. 3d 176, 
177-78 (4th Cir.2012). The Fifth Circuit characterized 
Amara as stating "an expansion of the kind of relief 
available" under § 1132(a)(3) "when the plaintiff is 
suing a plan fiduciary and the relief sought makes 
the plaintiff whole for losses caused by the defen-
dant's breach of a fiduciary· duty." Gearlds v. Entergy 
Servs., Inc., 709 F.3d 448, 450 (5th Cir.2013). The 
Seventh Circuit pointed to Amara as "clarify[ing] that 
equitable relief may come in the form of money dam-
ages when the defendant is a trustee in breach of a 
fiduciary duty." Kenseth v. Dean Health Plan, Inc., 
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722 F.3d 869, 878-79 (7th Cir.2013). The Eighth Cir-
cuit observed that "Amara changed the legal land-
scape by clearly spelling out the possibility of an 
equitable remedy under[§ 1132(a)(3)] for breaches of 
fiduciary obligations by plan administrators." Silva v. 
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 762 F.3d 711, 722 (8th Cir.2014). 
And the Ninth Circuit recently reversed and re-
manded an ERISA case in part so that the district 
court could determine in the first instance under 
§ 1132(a)(3) whether a trustee's fiduciary breach 
injured the beneficiary and whether the surcharge 
remedy discusse.d in Amara is available to the benefi-
ciary. Gabriel v. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund, 773 F.3d 
945, 962-63 (9th Cir.2014). 
Members in the majority here have read Amara 
to leave "open the possibility that 'appropriate equi-
table relief' could potentially be awarded" under 
§ 1132(a)(3). Lipker v. AK Steel Corp., 698 F. 3d 923, 
931 n. 4 (6th Cir.2012). In this case, the majority 
agrees with Lipker and the other circuit cases cited 
above that equitable relief is available under 
§ 1132(a)(3) "to redress an ERISA violation by a plan 
fiduciary." Maj. Op. at 374. And two of our prior cases 
acknowledge the availability of dual ERISA claims 
and remedies under certain circumstances. In Hill v. 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 409 F.3d 710, 
718 (6th Cir.2005), we reversed the dismissal of a 
claim under § 1132(a)(3), because that claim chal-
lenged defects in systemic, plan-wide claims-handling 
procedures, an injury different from the denial of claims 
for individual benefits brought under § 1132(a)(1)(B). 
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Similar reasoning is apparent in Gore v. El Paso 
Energy Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 4 77 F. 3d 
833, 840-41 (6th Cir.2007), where we determined that 
the plaintiff asserted two distinct injuries permitting 
claims and recovery under both § 1132(a)(l)(B) and 
(a)(3). We thus learn from our own cases that ERIS.Ns 
remedy provisions are not mutually exclusive. 
III. LINA BREACHED ITS FIDUCIARY DUTY 
TOROCHOW 
The majority nonetheless denies relief on the 
ground that "Rochow did not suffer an injury rem-
ediable" under § 1132(a)(3). Maj. Op. at 37 4. That 
statement is plainly contrary to the factual record 
and extensive case law concerning the types of inju-
ries that plan participants or beneficiaries may re-
dress through equitable remedies available under 
§ 1132(a)(3). 
We previously recognized that LINA breached its 
fiduciary duties, Rockow v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 
482 F.3d 860, 866 (6th Cir.2007) ("Rockow I"), and the 
majority acknowledges as much. Maj. Op. at 366-67. 
We ruled in the earlier appeal that LIN.Ns decision to 
deny Rochow disability benefits was not made solely 
in Rochow's interest - in other words, LINA breached 
its duty of loyalty to Rochow - and LIN.Ns decision 
to deny benefits was not made for the exclusive pur-
pose of providing benefits to Rochow as required by 
§ 1104(a)(l). Rockow I, 482 F.3d at 866. 
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The majority opinion and the concurrence point 
out that this case comes to us with a complex proce-
dural history, pockmarked by irregularities. While I 
don't disagree that the case is procedurally complex, I 
do disagree with the conclusion that the district court 
reached a final judgment prior to our decision in 
Rockow I and that it violated the mandate rule by 
permitting the parties to litigate the disgorgement 
remedy for the breach of fiduciary duty claim after 
Rockow I. To be sure, the district court clerk docketed 
a separate document entitled "Judgment" on the 
same day that the district court entered the summary 
judgment order later affirmed in Rockow I, but the 
"record demonstrates ... that [this] document was 
not a judgment but a mere clerical error." Pkilkall 
Corp. v. United States, 546 F.2d 210, 213 (6th 
Cir.1976). The court had ruled on LINA's liability in 
the context of Rochow's motion for partial summary 
judgment and LINA's cross-motion for summary 
judgment. The court had not made the requisite de-
termination of the remedy. With this important issue 
outstanding, certainly the district court did not 
"intend[] the document to be a final judgment." I d.; 
15B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, et al., 
Federal Practice & Procedure § 3914.28 (2d ed.) ("[A] 
summary judgment that determines liability but 
leaves damages or other relief open for further pro-
ceedings is not final.") 
Moreover, the document purporting to be a final 
judgment "was not legally sufficient to constitute a 
final judgment." Pkilkall Corp., 546 F.2d at 213. The 
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Supreme Court has instructed that "it is necessary to 
determine whether the language ... (of any pur-
ported judgment) embodies the essential elements of 
a judgment for money and clearly evidences the 
judge's intention that it shall be his final act in the 
case. If it does so, it constitutes his final judgment." 
Id. (quoting United States v. F. & M. Schaefer Brew-
ing Co., 356 U.S. 227, 232, 78 S.Ct. 674, 2 L.Ed.2d 
721 (1958)). "[A] final judgment for money must, at 
least, determine or specify the means for determin-
ing, the amount." F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 
U.S. at 233, 78 S.Ct. 674. As in Philhall Corp., 546 
F.2d at 213, the document entered by the clerk below 
"did not have the indicia of a final judgment" because 
it failed to state that Rochow had prevailed and it did 
not memorialize any monetary award. Instead, the 
document erroneously "dismissed" the case, clearly 
contradicting the district court's summary judgment 
order fmding in favor of Rochow on liability. LINA 
filed a notice of appeal, effectively divesting the 
district court of jurisdiction to proceed with the 
litigation pending resolution of the appeal. 
Mter our mandate issued in Rockow I, the con-
currence posits, the district court lacked jurisdiction 
to take any further action in the case by operation of 
the mandate rule. The Hamilton case cited in the 
concurrence points out that the mandate rule is "dis-
cretionary, rather than jurisdictional," United States 
v. Hamilton, 440 F.3d 693, 697 (5th Cir.2006), and we 
have said the same thing, albeit in an unpublished 
case. Mylant v. United States, 48 Fed.Appx. 509, 512 
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(6th Cir.2002) (observing that the mandate rule is one 
of "policy and practice, not a jurisdictional limita-
tion"). "The basic tenet of the mandate rule is that a 
district court is bound to the scope of the remand 
issued by the court of appeals." United States v. 
Campbell, 168 F.3d 263, 265 (6th Cir.1999). The 
concurrence recognizes that the Rockow I panel af-
firmed the district court's summary judgment order -
on liability and did not issue any type of remand to 
the district court. Although the district court was 
bound to honor our Rockow I decision in completing 
the litigation, as "with all applications of the law of 
the case doctrine," the district court could "consider 
those issues not decided expressly or impliedly by the 
appellate court." Jones v. Lewis, 957 F.2d 260, 262 
(6th Cir.1992). Taking up the case again after the 
Rockow I appeal, the district court determined with 
fmality a monetary award for Rochow that included 
disgorgement for LINA's fiduciary breach. The court's 
final decision in no way conflicted with the Rockow I 
mandate. In this second appeal, a panel of our court 
affirmed the district court's final decision, Rockow v. 
LINA, 737 F.3d 415 (6th Cir.2013) ("Rockow II"), and 
that same final decision is presently before us for en 
bane review. Consequently, any procedural missteps 
that occurred earlier in the case are ultimately imma-
terial for purposes of our en bane decision. 
Contrary to the majority's assertion that the dis-
trict court failed to identify any grounds to support a 
breach of fiduciary duty claim, Rochow asks us to af-
firm the district court's findings that LINA's conduct 
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involved a number of deliberate and willful wrongful 
acts, including requiring Rochow to meet insurance 
policy requirements that did not exist, devising a 
knowingly false rationale for denying his benefits 
appeal, and acting without appropriate medical input 
or evidence. R. 67, Order; Rockow, 851 F.Supp.2d at 
1101. On the record before us, these findings are not 
clearly erroneous. See Cultrona v. Nationwide Life 
Ins. Co., 748 F.3d 698, 706 (6th Cir.2014). LINA's 
fiduciary wrongdoing, separate from its arbitrary and 
capricious denial of plan benefits, warrants an equi-
table remedy under § 1132(a)(3). 
IV. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY RE-
QUIRES A REMEDY 
Persisting in the fiction that Rochow seeks to 
recover twice for the same injury, the majority incor-
rectly posits that "the district court thus treated its 
finding of an arbitrary and capricious denial of bene-
fits, in and of itself, as a breach of fiduciary duty," and 
claims to be unaware of any "persuasive authority for 
the proposition that a wrongful denial of benefits in 
and of itself constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty." 
Maj. Op. at 370 n. 1. Even if that were the issue- and 
it is not because LINA engaged in fiduciary miscon-
duct in addition to denying Rochow's benefits - at 
least four circuits besides our own (the Second, Third, 
Seventh, and Eighth) recognize that a fiduciary's 
arbitrary and capricious delay in paying benefits due 
under a plan in itself can constitute a breach of fi-
duciary duty. I begin with our own precedent. 
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More than twenty years ago we stated the well-
established principle that "ERISA requires that a 
retirement plan be operated for the exclusive benefit 
of the employees and beneficiaries." Sweet v. Consol. 
Aluminum Corp., 913 F.2d 268, 270 (6th Cir.l990). 
Although we assumed there that a trustee acted 
prudently in withholding pension funds until a cer-
tain date, we nonetheless held that the delay in 
payment conferred a benefit on the trustee. Id. "Any 
additional time one gains, rightfully or wrongfully, in 
not having to submit payment of a sum of money 
owed another is without doubt a benefit. Moreover, 
the payee ... has been deprived of the benefit of those 
payments." Id. We expressly held that "[t]o allow the 
Fund to retain the interest it earned on funds wrong-
fully withheld from a beneficiary would be to approve 
of an unjust enrichment. Further, the relief granted 
would fall short of making the beneficiary whole 
because he has been denied the use of money which 
was his." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Ten years after Sweet we upheld a district court's 
decision reqUiring an ERISA fiduciary to pay to the 
plan participant class certain benefits along with the 
rate of return the fiduciary actually realized on the 
use of that withheld money. Rybarczyk v. TRW, Inc., 
235 F.3d 975, 977-78, 986 (6th Cir.2000). TRW argued 
that imposing the actual rate of return was "unprece-
dented," id. at 986, but we disagreed, pointing to the 
Seventh Circuit's decision in Lorenzen v. Employees 
Retirement Plan of Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 896 F.2d 
228 (7th Cir.1990). In that case an employee's widow 
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contended that the administrator of a retirement plan 
violated its fiduciary duties to her and to her de-
ceased husband causing a loss in retirement benefits. 
Id. at 230. The Seventh Circuit held that § 1132(a)(3) 
authorizes a civil action by a participant or bene-
ficiary to obtain "appropriate equitable relief" for a 
violation of plan terms and that equitable relief to 
remedy a breach of fiduciary duty can include a 
payment of money. Id. (citing Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. 
v. Russell, 4 73 U.S. 134, 154 n. 10, 105 S.Ct. 3085, 87 
L.Ed.2d 96 (1985)). Because the retirement plan had 
held money that belonged to the widow, the Seventh 
Circuit stated: "Now that the collateral dispute is 
over, the plan must return [the money] to her together 
with the fruits that it has gleaned by holding on to it." 
Id. at 236-37 (emphasis added). Relying on this 
passage from Lorenzen and our own prior opinion on 
unjust enrichment, Sweet, 913 F.2d at 270, we held 
that using the rate of return "actually realized by 
TRW on the relevant funds seems an appropriate way 
of avoiding unjust enrichment." Rybarczyk, 235 F.3d 
at 986. Importantly, we said that requiring TRW to 
pay the actual rate of return "merely deprives TRW 
of its profit on the wrongfully denied benefits." I d. 
(emphasis added). We decided this approach was 
equitable, not punitive, and appropriate under the 
circumstances where TRW "would arguably receive a 
windfall" if we permitted TRW to pay compensation 
for the delayed payment of benefits to the plaintiff 
that was lower than TRW's actual rate of return. Id. 
at 987. 
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Sweet and Rybarczyk align closely with the law of 
our sister circuits. The Second Circuit considered a 
case in which MetLife denied benefits for nearly five 
years after submission of a claim, but then reversed 
its prior denials without explanation and paid retro-
active benefits in a lump sum without compensating 
the claimant for the delay in payment. Dunnigan v. 
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 277 F. 3d 223, 226 (2d Cir.2002). 
Having received disability payments after almost five 
years of delay, Dunnigan filed suit under§ 1132(a)(3) 
alleging that MetLife breached its fiduciary duties by 
delaying payment and MetLife was unjustly enriched 
through its breach. Id. at 226-27. Dunnigan asked for 
a constructive trust on the amount MetLife earned by 
failing to pay the delayed benefits when due or, 
alternatively, restitution equal to the amount MetLife 
earned on the late payment and/or disgorgement of 
MetLife's profits. Id. at 227. The Second Circuit ruled 
that MetLife's delay in paying benefits long after 
Dunnigan was entitled to receive them constituted a 
breach of fiduciary duty because the "delay enriche[d] 
the fiduciary at the expense of the beneficiary." I d. at 
230. The court further concluded that no showing of 
bad faith by MetLife was required in order for 
Dunnigan to prevail, id. at 229-30, and she was 
entitled to an "equitable make-whole remedy" under 
§ 1132(a)(3) for MetLife's breach of fiduciary duty. I d. 
at 229. The court vacated the dismissal of Dunnigan's 
suit and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 232. 
The Seventh Circuit reached similar decisions in 
two cases, Clair v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 190 
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F.3d 495 (7th Cir.1999), and May Department Stores 
Co. v. Federal Insurance Co., 305 F. 3d 597 (7th 
Cir.2002), both involving § 1132(a)(3) claims for equi-
table remedies in addition to payment of benefits. In 
Clair, participants in a defined-contribution retire-
ment plan sued for breach of fiduciary duty because 
their benefits were not paid to them in a timely 
fashion and no compensation for the delay was of-
fered. Clair, 190 F.3d at 496-97. The participants 
characterized their remedy as "restitution of the 
wrongful gain that the plan obtained by having the 
interest-free use of money rightfully theirs under the 
terms of the plan." I d. at 498. Explaining that restitu-
tion can be either legal or equitable, the court noted 
that restitution is equitable when the person seeking 
the remedy complains of a breach of trust, as the 
plaintiffs did. Id. Constructive trust "is an equitable 
remedy commonly sought and granted in cases of 
unjust enrichment. It operates much like restitution 
- indeed it is sometimes referred to as a resti-
tutionary remedy, but it is securely equitable because 
it is never a legal remedy." Id. (citing 1 Dan B. Dobbs, 
Law of Remedies § 4.3, at 587 (2d ed.1993)). Accord-
ing to the Seventh Circuit, "such relief is squarely 
within the scope of" § 1132(a)(3). Id. at 499. Although 
the plaintiffs in Clair did not prevail on the merits, 
the court determined that they were "entitled to 
maintain this suit" under § 1132(a)(3). Id. 
In May Department Stores Co., 305 F. 3d at 603, 
the Seventh Circuit followed Clair and the Second 
Circuit's Dunnigan opinion to conclude that the 
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"wrongful withholding of benefits due can entitle the 
beneficiary to impose a constructive trust on interest 
on the withheld benefits, an equitable remedy that 
results in a money payment to the plaintiff" under 
§ 1132(a)(3). The court explained: 
By withholding benefits, a plan can obtain 
interest that would otherwise be obtained by 
the beneficiary. That interest is not itself a 
benefit, and so the beneficiary cannot bring a 
suit under (a)(l)(B) to recover it. But he can 
sue to recover it under (a)(3), because it is an 
amount by which the plan has unjustly en-
riched itself, and unjust enrichment is a ba-
sis, indeed the usual basis, for imposing a 
constructive trust on a sum of money. 
Id. at 603 (citing Wsol v. Fiduciary Mgt. Assoc., Inc., 
266 F.3d 654, 656 (7th Cir.2001), and Fisher v. 
Trainor, 242 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir.2001)). 
The same principles govern in the Third Circuit. 
In Fotta v. Trustees of United Mine Workers of Amer-
ica, 165 F.3d 209, 211 (3d Cir.1998), a plan partici-
pant invoked § 1132(a)(l)(B) and § 1132(a)(3) to re-
cover compensation for delayed payment of benefits 
where the benefits ultimately were paid without liti-
gation. The Third Circuit determined that § 1132(a)(3) 
was "the appropriate vehicle" to recover monetary 
compensation for delayed benefits because such an 
award "serves to prevent unjust enrichment. Restitu-
tion - the traditional remedy for unjust enrichment -
is widely, if not universally, regarded as a tool of 
equity." Id. at 213 (citing Chauffeurs, Teamsters & 
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Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570, 110 
S.Ct. 1339, 108 L.Ed.2d 519 (1990) ("Money damages 
are considered equitable when 'they are restitu-
tionary.'")). The court rejected the notion that it was 
engrafting a remedy on a statute that Congress did 
not. intend to provide. Id. at 214. Rather, the court 
determined that it "effectuate[d] ERIS.Ns objectives 
by recognizing, under principles of equity, that bene-
ficiaries should be fully compensated and that any 
unjust enrichment of plans at beneficiaries' expense 
should be avoided." Id. Accordingly, relying on 
§ 1132(a)(3), the court held "that a beneficiary of an 
ERISA plan may bring an action for interest on 
delayed benefits payments ... irrespective of whether 
the beneficiary also seeks to recover unpaid benefits. 
Because the remedy we recognize here is equitable in 
nature, its award involves an exercise of judicial 
discretion." Id. 
Significantly, Supreme Court Justice Ali to, then a 
circuit judge on the Third Circuit, concurred in the 
Fotta opinion, observing: 
If the plaintiff in this case can establish that 
the trustees violated the plan by failing to 
pay his benefits on time, an award of interest 
would constitute "appropriate equitable re-
lief." Such an award is recognized as ap-
propriate equitable relief in comparable 
circumstances under the law of trusts. See 
Restatement (2d) of Trusts § 207 at 4 70 
(1959); 3 Austin Wakeman Scott and William 
Franklin Fratcher, The Law of Trusts § 207.1 
at 262-63 (4th ed.1987); Nedd v. United Mine 
67a 
Workers of America, 556 F.2d 190, 207 (3d 
Cir.1977); Toombs v. Daniels, 361 N.W.2d 
801, 810 (Minn.1985). Thus, this is not a case 
like Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. 
Russell, 4 73 U.S. 134, 105 S.Ct. 3085, 87 
L.Ed.2d 96 (1985), in which we were asked to 
supplement the remedies specified in the 
statute. 
Id. at 215. 
In addition to the Second, Third and Seventh 
Circuits, the Eighth Circuit also adheres to the 
proposition that a fiduciary's delay in paying benefits 
due under a plan constitutes a breach of fiduciary 
duty that may be rectified through an action filed 
under § 1132(a)(3). "It is undisputed that an account-
ing for profits - the remedy that allows for the dis-
gorgement of profits awarded by the district court- is 
a type of relief that was typically available in equity 
and therefore is appropriate under § 1132(a)(3)(B)." 
Parke v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 368 
F.3d 999, 1008 (8th Cir.2004). "An accounting for 
profits is one of a category of traditionally restitu-
tionary remedies in equity, and is often invoked in 
conjunction with a constructive trust." Id. The court 
explained that "[a]n accounting is imposed when the 
property subject to the constructive trust produces 
profits while in the defendant's possession. The de-
fendant is forced to disgorge those profits, although it 
is not necessary for the plaintiff to identify any par-
ticular res or fund of money holding the profits." I d. 
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Significantly, "[u]nder traditional rules of equity, 
a defendant who owes a fiduciary duty to a plain-
tiff may be forced to disgorge any profits made by 
breaching that duty, even if the defendant's breach 
was simply a failure to perform its obligations under 
a contract. I d. (emphasis added)." If a. fiduciary 
breaches a contract and also breaches a fiduciary 
duty, that fiduciary can be forced to disgorge the 
profits he earned as a result of his wrong. Id. (quoting 
1 Dobbs § 4.3(5), at 611 n.16). "The important ingre-
dient added by the fiduciary status, however, is not 
that status in itself; what is added is wrongdoing as 
distinct from contract breach." Id. at 1008-09 (quoting 
1 Dobbs§ 4.3(5), at 611 n.16; Valdes v. Larrinaga, 233 
U.S. 705, 709, 34 S.Ct. 750, 58 L.Ed. 1163 (1914)) 
("holding that a 'proper case for equitable relief' 
existed where the defendant breached a fiduciary 
duty to the plaintiff by failing to pay money owing 
under the contract"). Based on these principles, the 
Eighth Circuit held that First Reliance owed a fiduci-
ary duty to Parke, First Reliance breached that duty, 
and First Reliance could be forced under § 1132(a)(3) 
to disgorge its profits earned as a result of the breach. 
Id. at 1009. See also Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont De 
Nemours, 372 F.3d 193, 212-14 (3d Cir.2004) (follow-
ing Fotta and Parke to hold that an ERISA benefi-
ciary could force disgorgement of profits earned on 
withheld benefits). As do several other circuits, the 
Eighth Circuit authorizes the remedy that the district 
court below awarded to Rochow. 
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Thus, our own cases and a litany of others from 
four of our sister circuits undermine the majority's 
premise that no legal basis exists to conclude that 
LIN A's delay in payment of benefits to Rochow consti-
tuted both an arbitrary and capricious denial of plan 
benefits under § 1132(a)(1)(B) and a breach of LINA's 
fiduciary duties remediable under § 1132(a)(3). The 
majority ignores these cases because they correct the 
majority's mistaken impression that the district 
court's "award reflects concern that LINA had wrong-
fully gained something, a consideration beyond the 
ken of ERISA make-whole remedies." Maj. Op. at 371. 
Not only does the district court's award appropriately 
address LINA's wrongful gain at Rochow's expense, 
but the relief for the wrongful gain falls squarely 
within ERISA's equitable remedies, as recognized by 
the Supreme Court, our court, and other circuits. 
"ERISA's duty of loyalty bars a fiduciary from profit-
ing even if no loss to the plan occurs," and the remedy 
of disgorgement exists to deprive "wrongdoers of 
ill-gotten gains," not "to compensate for a loss." Ed-
monson, 725 F.3d at 415 (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 122 (7th 
Cir.1984) ("ERISA clearly contemplates actions 
against fiduciaries who profit by using trust assets, 
even where the plan beneficiaries do not suffer direct 
fmancial loss."). According to the majority, the pay-
ment of benefits, attorney's fees, and prejudgment 
interest are sufficient to compensate Rochow for his 
injuries. But only the disgorgement of ill-gotten 
profits can wholly remedy LINA's breach of its fidu-
ciary duties. 
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The court below got it exactly right. By arbitrar-
ily and capriciously failing to pay Rochow benefits 
owed under the terms of the plan and by delaying the 
payment of full benefits for more than seven years to 
enrich itself, LINA violated both the plan terms and 
its fiduciary duties under ERISA. LINA's wrongful 
gain of profit, earned through breach of its fiduciary 
duties, can be equitably remedied under § 1132(a)(3) 
by ordering an accounting and by directing LINA to 
disgorge the profit and pay it directly to Rochow. See 
Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 534 U.S. at 214 
n. 2, 122 S.Ct. 708 (recognizing "an accounting for 
profits, a form of equitable restitution"). "The elemen-
tary rule of restitution is that if you take my money 
and make money with it, your profit belongs to me." 
Nickel v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 290 
F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir.2002). 
V. THE DISGORGEMENT AWARD MUST BE 
RECALCULATED 
I would return the case to the district court, 
however, for a recalculation of the award to Rochow. 
The figure awarded by the district court seems to 
derive from the total shown on Rochow's corrected 
Exhibit A filed on May 25, 2012, plus daily interest 
the court added until July 24, 2012, when the court 
filed its Order Requiring Disgorgement. R.121-2 Page 
ID 3712. 
LINA objected below to the corrected Exhibit A, 
pointing out several significant errors in it. The most 
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conspicuous problem is that full profits are calculated 
through March 2012, R. 1212 Page ID 3725 (and by 
the court through July 2012), even though Exhibit A 
confirms that LINA made all required payments to 
Rochow or his estate by September 2009, with the 
exception of $2,065.52. R. 121-2 Page ID 3722. The 
additional errors LINA identified in its June 2012 
filing with the district court? R. 122, may warrant 
further reductions in the amount of profits ordered 
disgorged by the district court. I would therefore 
reverse the award as calculated and remand the case 
to the district court for reconsideration. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We do not create new, double remedies out of 
whole cloth if we affirm the district court's decision to 
require LINA to disgorge the profit it earned by 
breaching its fiduciary duties to Rochow. Nor will the 
sky fall if we affirm this remedy, as the Supreme 
Court aptly pointed out in response to the concerns of 
amici in Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 513-14, 116 S.Ct. 
1065. By recognizing that some few cases may include 
claims and remedies for injuries incurred under both 
§ 1132(a)(l)(B) and § 1132(a)(3), we simply join the 
mainstream view of our sister circuits acknowledging 
the trust law principles that undergird ERIS.Ns 
equity jurisprudence. 
In this case, the disgorgement remedy is appro-
priate based on the evidence and the district court's 
fmdings concerning LINA's malfeasance, the length of 
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the delay in paying benefits due, and the extraordi-
nary profit LINAreaped from its malfeasance. Practi-
cal considerations abound. Allowing LINA to retain 
its profit creates an incentive for claims administra-
tors to delay paying much-needed benefits to partici-
pants and beneficiaries while investing that money 
for their own gain. LINA's conduct undercompensates 
the participant or beneficiary by forcing him to ab-
sorb expenses incurred as a result of the delay in the 
payment of benefits while LINA gains from delaying 
the claims process as long as possible. Permitting 
LINA to keep its profit also encourages fiduciaries to 
commingle plan assets with company funds. 
The courts will not often come across a case as 
troubling as this one. I recognize, as will district 
courts, that disgorgement of profit should be used 
sparingly and only when equity requires it. In the 
ordinary benefits case - where there is a wrongful 
denial of benefits but no breach of fiduciary duties 
like the ones here - an award of prejudgment interest 
might be sufficient to compensate the beneficiary for 
the lost time value of money. See, e.g., Schumacher v. 
AK Steel Corp. Retirement Accumulation Pension 
Plan, 711 F.3d 675, 679, 686 (6th Cir.2013); Ford v. 
Uniroyal Pension Plan, 154 F.3d 613, 616 (6th 
Cir.1998). But where an arbitrary and capricious 
denial of benefits is coupled with a breach of fiduciary 
duty, as it is here, ERISA provides a make-whole 
remedy that includes appropriate equitable relief 
under § 1132(a)(3). 
Because the majority holds that ERISA bars the 
make-whole remedy awarded to Rochow, I respect-
fully dissent. 
74a 
851 F.Supp.2d 1090 
United States District Court, 
E.D. Michigan, 
Southern Division. 
Patrick ROCHOW, Personal Representative of the 
Estate of Daniel J. Rochow, Plaintiff, 
v. 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
NORTH AMERICA, Defendant. 
Case No. 04-73628. I March 23, 2012. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
John J. Cooper, Cooper Law Firm, Troy, MI, for 
Plaintiffs. 
John D. Pirich, Brian T. Quinn, Honigman, Miller, 
Lansing, MI, for Defendant. 
ORDER SETTING METHOD OF ACCOUNTING 
ARTHUR J. TARNOW, Senior District Judge. 
Before the Court are the competing position 
statements of Plaintiff and Defendant with regard to 
the proper method of determining equitable account-
ing. This accounting is for the purpose of correctly 
determining the amount of unjust enrichment derived 
by Defendant from the wrongful withholding of 
disability benefits to Plaintiff, so that Defendant may 
disgorge said profits as previously ordered by this 
Court. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds 
that Defendant has failed to rebut Plaintiff's method 
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of accounting and has failed to justify various offsets 
to the amount of profits to be disgorged. 
I. Background 
This case stems from the wrongful denial of 
disability benefits for Plaintiff Daniel Rochow 
("Rochow") by Defendant LINA. On June 24, 2005, 
this Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment [12], finding that Defendant LINA had 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying Plaintiff 
benefits under LIN.Ns long-term disability plan. This 
Court's order granting summary judgment was 
affirmed in Rockow v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 482 F. 3d 
860 (6th Cir.2007). Subsequent to the mandate from 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, Plaintiff filed his 
Motion for an Equitable Accounting [ 46] on November 
10, 2008. Argument was heard on this motion on 
February 5, 2009, and in an Order [67] issued on 
June 16, 2009, the Court found that an equitable 
accounting and disgorgement by Defendant was an 
appropriate remedy. 
On August 23, 2010, Defendant [88] and Plaintiff 
[89] submitted position statements regarding the 
method the court should use to calculate the amount 
of unjust enrichment derived by Defendant from its 
wrongful withholding of benefits to Plaintiff. Both 
Defendant [91] and Plaintiff [92] submitted responses. 
On November 4, 2011, the Court held an evidentiary 
hearing regarding the parties' positions. Plaintiff 
[106] and Defendant [105] submitted supplemental 
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briefs on November 18, 2011. On February 3, 2012, 
the Court heard additional argument· regarding the 
parties' positions on the proper method of equitable 
accounting. 
II. Analysis 
Unjust enrichment is the principle that "a fiduci-
ary may not profit by his breach of the duty of loyal-
ty." Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Murdock, 861 
F.2d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir.1988). In this case, it has 
already been determined that Defendant owed Plain-
tiff a duty of loyalty and breached this duty through 
its arbitrary and capricious denial of disability bene-
.fits to Plaintiff. Defendant has, in whole or nearly in 
whole, already paid to Plaintiff the actual amount of 
benefits that were wrongfully withheld. Thus, the 
question before the Court is the amount of financial 
benefit that Defendant derived from withholding 
benefits to Plaintiff. As set out in this Court's Order 
[67] requiring an equitable accounting and disgorge-
ment by Defendant, Defendant is required to remit 
any profits derived from Plaintiff's wrongfully with-
held benefits. The parties have provided extensive 
briefing on how the Court should arrive at this 
amount, and have had two opportunities to argue 
their positions before the Court. 
A. Burden of Proof 
An equitable suit for accounting is tried in two 
stages. First, the party seeking accounting must 
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establish that there is a right to an accounting. 
Am.Jur.2d Accounts and Accounting § 66 (2005). This 
Court has already found that Plaintiff has a right to 
an accounting. Once this right has been established, 
Plaintiff must produce evidence from which the Court 
can make a "reasonable approximation" of Defen-
dant's unjust enrichment. If a Plaintiff cannot provide 
a reasonable approximation, the claim of unjust 
enrichment is merely speculative and disgorgement 
will not be allowed. However, this "reasonable ap-
proximation" is not a high burden. In SEC v. First 
City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231-32 (D.C.Cir.1989), 
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. CircUit held that a 
showing of the "actual profits" on tainted transactions 
presumptively shifted the burden to the defendants to 
demonstrate why the approximation provided by the 
plaintiff (the defendant's actual profits) was not a 
reasonable one. Similarly, in Nickel v. Bank of Am., 
290 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir.2002), a bank (later acquired 
by Bank of America) improperly charged $24,000,000 
in fees to various trusts. The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals found that the district court's focus on the 
"speculative" nature of the disgorgement in question 
was incorrect. The court found that focusing on 
questions of traceability simply insulated the wrong-
doer, the bank, and violated a rule of restitution, 
namely "if you take my money and make money with 
it, your profit belongs to me." !d. at 1138. The court 
also found that if the manner in which the bank had 
utilized the money was not traceable, there was 
a presumption that the bank was deriving profit 
from the funds. Thus, an appropriate remedy was a 
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proportional share of the bank's profits for the period 
the funds were utilized. Id. at 1139. 
Once a reasonable approximation has been 
provided, the accounting process proceeds to the 
second stage. The burden at this stage switches to the 
party "in control of the books" who has "[t]he burden 
of proving the correctness of an account." Am.Jur.2d, 
Accounts and Accounting § 66 (2005). Defendant has 
the burden of proving the correctness of its account-
ing and methodology of disgorgement because "every 
reasonable doubt is resolved in favor of the party 
wronged." George E. Palmer, The Law of Restitution 
§ 2.14, 180 (1978). 
Defendant argues that "a plaintiff seeking dis-
gorgement of profits is not entitled to defendant's 
general profits where it is possible to identify which 
of the defendant's profits flowed from the wrongdo-
ing." Def.'s Br. at 5.1 While true, it is Defendant's 
burden to demonstrate which profits flowed from its 
wrongdoing; it is not the burden of the Plaintiff. See 
Nickel, 290 F.3d at 1138 ("the problem of showing 
where the money went is the tortfeasor's problem"). 
Defendant has failed to do that here. 
In similar cases, courts have required violators to 
return "all profits" that derive from the tainted 
activity. See SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d at 
1 References to Plaintiff's and Defendant's briefs refer to 
their position statements, docket numbers [88] and [89]. 
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1232 (requiring defendant to return all profits de-
rived from tainted trades when defendant could not 
provide precise measure of profits derived from illegal 
trading). Similarly, analyzing a Louisiana law, the 
Fifth Circuit has ruled that "the burden is on [a 
fiduciary] to demonstrate that application of the 
usual rule [of complete disgorgement of profit] will 
produce a real injustice." McDonald v. O'Meara, 4 73 
F.2d 799, 805-06 (5th Cir.1973). In Leigh v. Engle, 727 
F.2d 113 (7th Cir.1984), the court placed the burden of 
accounting on the defendant, an ERISA fiduciary. The 
court, finding that there would be little reason to 
require restitution under ERISA's remedial provision, 
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a), if "beneficiaries confronted an 
insurmountable obstacle in proving the extent of a 
fiduciary's profits," and placed "the burden of proof on 
the defendants here to ensure that the disgorgement 
remedy is effective." Leigh, 727 F.2d at 139; see also 
Connelly Mgmt. Emp. Welfare Benefit Plan v. N. Am. 
Indemnity, N. V., 2008 WL 1336085 (S.D.Ind. Apr. 8, 
2008) ("the burden shifts to the defendants to show 
that commingled trust assets are not 'profits' subject 
to ... disgorgement ... ") (citing Leigh, 727 F.2d at 
138-139). 
Reasonable Approximation 
Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to 
present a "reasonable approximation" of the unjust 
enrichment because Plaintiff has not shown a "casual 
connection between LINA's withholding of benefits 
and a measurable increase in LINA's profit." Def.'s Br. 
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at 3. Defendant compares the situation to one de-
scribed in Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1122 (7th 
Cir.1983), ·wherein the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals stated that "[i]f General Motors were to steal 
your copyright and put it in a sales brochure, you 
could not just put a copy of General Motors' corporate 
income tax return in the record and rest your case for 
an award of infringers' profits." The comparison to 
Taylor is inapposite. In Taylor, the plaintiff failed in 
any way to attempt to determine what portion of the 
defendant's sales were derived from the use of plain-
tiff's product, and instead simply created a percent-
age of the defendant's profits that the plaintiff 
claimed entitlement to. That is not the case here. 
Here, the amount of wrongfully withheld funds are 
already known. 
At the hearing held on November 4, 2011, Plain-
tiff set forth a reasonable approximation of the unjust 
enrichment gained by Defendant through the with-
holding of benefits to Plaintiff. Plaintiff did so by 
calculating the amount of wrongfully-withheld prin-
cipal, $910,629.24, which includes base interest on 
the principal, and then assumed that this figure, 
gradually accumulated over time by Defendant, was 
part of Defendant's general equity and used for all 
corporate purposes. Plaintiff then calculated Defen-
dant's of profit rate during this period, compared the 
percentage gain to the amount of principal owed to 
Plaintiff, and arrived at an approximation of $2.1 
million dollars of unjust enrichment on the part of 
Defendant. 
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Based on general principles of accounting, the 
burden then shifts to Defendant to provide some 
reason why this approximation is not reasonable. 
Defendant's "Investment Account" Defense 
Defendant's theory regarding why Plaintiff's 
approximation is not reasonable is that the money 
owed to Plaintiff was confined to an "investment 
account" which limited its use and the profits derived 
from the use of the money. Defendant asserts that it 
places money in these investment accounts, for 
instance in the following excerpt from Defendant's 
position statement: 
When LINA receives premiums from its cus-
tomers, those premiums are invested in se-
curities to generate investment income while 
providing the necessary liquidity to meet 
cash flow requirements and pay claims ... 
[i]f claims were not paid in a timely manner, 
those funds remained in the investment port-
folio longer than initially expected and gen-
erated increment income - i.e., the causal 
connection ... [t]he retained investment in-
come totals $32,732. 
Def.'s Br. at 6. 
However, at the hearing held on November 4, 
2011, it became clear that the idea of an "investment 
account" within which the money that Defendant 
unlawfully withheld from Plaintiff was kept segregat-
ed from Defendant's general account was inaccurate. 
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The following is an exchange between Plaintiff's 
counsel and Timothy. Holzli, Defendant's expert 
witness and Chief Accounting Officer of the Group 
Insurance Division at CIGNA Corporation, Defen-
dant's parent company: 
Q. All right. There is a procedure at LINA 
for setting up a segregated account, is there 
not? 
A. What do you mean by "segregated ac-
count"? 
Q. An account that is separated off from 
the rest of LIN A's investment funds. 
A. You used the term there is a separate 
account, which is a specific terminology. 
Q. But that would be segregated, wouldn't 
it? 
A. A separate account is a segregated ac-
count, yes. 
Q. And if that were done and the withheld 
benefit payments simply filed up in that ac-
count, and that account earned interest say 
from a bank that was added into the account, 
we could simply go to the bank or go to the 
account,· check the records, see what the 
principal was and see what it earned over 
the time it wasn't paid. Mr. Rochow could 
take that and we would be done. Is that 
right? 
A. Correct. 
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Q. All right. In Mr. Rochow's case, LINA 
didn't establish a segregated - or, a separate 
account until it actually started paying his 
benefits, correct? 
A. Are you referring to a separate account 
now? 
Q. Yes. 
A. The policy that Mr. Rochow's employer 
had with LINA was a general account obliga-
tion. So, there would have never been a sep-
arate account established under that type of 
policy. 
Q. Okay. During the time period between 
2002 when the claim was filed and late 2007 
when LINA started paying on it, did LINA in 
any way earmark or segregate the money as-
sociated with Mr. Rochow's claim? 
A. There's never a segregation in the general 
account assets, of assets to a specific benefi-
ciary. 
Q. How about earmarking? 
A. Not in the general account assets, no. 
THE COURT: Could it go to a reserve? 
A. The only reserve that would have been 
established at that time, Your Honor, would 
have been the incurred, but not the full re-
serve, which is in the aggregate. 
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THE COURT: But that would be part of the 
aggregate at some point or not? 
A. Yes, it would. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Q. And as you sit here today, can you rule 
out the possibility that a portion of the funds 
LINA owed Mr. Rochow were used to pay for 
LIN.Ns ongoing operating expenses? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. And I would like to talk then 
about some of the outflows from the invest-
ment account. 
Is it fair to say that LINA will be paying op-
erating expenses out of the investment ac-
count? 
A. That's normally how the process in an 
insurance company works, yes. 
Tr. of Nov. 4, 2011 Hr'g at 119-23. 
Thus, it appears that repeated references by 
Defendant to an "investment account" from which to 
pay claims out are not accurate, or at least are not 
accurate with respect to the money that should have 
been paid to Plaintiff. Defendant's expert admitted 
that the money withheld from Plaintiff was not 
segregated in any manner but would have been 
present in a general fund from which Defendant could 
pay out other claims or even general operating ex-
penses. This seems to be precisely the situation 
described in Connelly Mgmt. · Emp. Welfare Benefit 
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Plan, 2008 WL 1336085, at *12 (S.D.Ind. April 8, 
2008) ("the burden shifts to the defendants to show 
that commingled trust assets are not 'profits' subject 
to ... disgorgement ... "). Finally, this seems to be 
precisely the situation in which Defendant acknowl-
edged a duty to pay a percentage of all profits: "[A] 
plaintiff seeking disgorgement of profits is not always 
entitled to a percentage of all of the defendant's 
profits; rather, a plaintiff is so entitled, if at all, only 
where the defendant cannot specifically identify 
which of its profits flowed from the breach." Def.'s 
Resp. to Pl.'s Br. at 2 (citing Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 
113, 138 (7th Cir.1984)). Defendant cannot specifical-
ly identify which of its profits flowed from its wrong-
ful withholding of Plaintiff's benefits. 
Defendant has failed to specifically identify 
which of its profits flowed from the breach of Defen-
dant's duty to Plaintiff. Plaintiff's money appears to 
have been placed in a general "pot" of equity, which 
could have been used for investment or for general 
operating expenses or for any other expense by De-
fendant. Defendant's contention regarding an "in-
vestment account" somehow segregated from general 
equity appears to be purely theoretical. Defendant 
has the burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff's 
approximation is not reasonable. The Court fmds that 
Defendant has failed to meet this burden. Thus, as 
discussed below, the Court adopts Plaintiff's method 
of determining the profits derived by Defendant from 
the use of Plaintiff's unpaid benefits. 
86a 
B. Method of Determining Profits 
Calculating the amount of unjust enrichment is 
the function of four variables, of which the parties 
agree ori. the first three. First, the underlying princi-
pal amount due from LINA to Plaintiff's estate -
$910,629.24, which is inclusive of simple interest on 
the base payments2• Second, the amount of time 
during which those amounts were unpaid - the 
parties agree that the principal should have been 
paid in equal monthly installments beginning in 
2002. Third, the form of compounding- the parties 
agree that compounding of interest on the amount 
owed should take place on a monthly basis. Only the 
fourth variable is disputed - the amount of Defen-
dant's unjust enrichment derived from use of the 
principal that was owed to Plaintiff. 
Return on Equity Theory ("ROE") 
Plaintiff argues that Defendant's profits from the 
use Plaintiff's unpaid benefits should be calculated 
using a "Return on Equity Theory." Under ROE 
theory, the correct measure of profit is Defendant's 
annual rate of growth in its net worth between 2002 
and the present, that percentage rate varying annual-
ly between 11% and 39%, excluding certain growth in 
2 Plaintiff states that this total amount is the amount of 
payments made in multiple installments over three years, and 
that Plaintiff is still working to determine if this is the exact 
amount of principal. However, both parties seem to agree that 
this figure is at least a close approximation. 
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net worth, such as injection of capital by Defendant's 
parent company, CIGNA Corporation. 
As discussed above, Plaintiff argues, and De-
fendant's expert admitted, that the withheld benefits 
were retained as funds that went straight to Defen-
dant's ''bottom line" equity. The profit from the with-
held benefits could have been used by Defendant for 
any and all investments and/or corporate expenses 
(thus freeing up other money for investment). A 
useful case in analyzing how Defendant's profits 
should be determined is Nickel v. Bank of America, 
290 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir.2002), a case where a bank 
improperly overcharged various trusts $24,000,000 
over the course of fifteen years. Bank of America 
acquired the bank and later refunded the 
$24,000,000, along with $17,800,000 in simple inter-
est. The district court agreed to this restitution, 
ruling that any account of profits derived from the 
improper overcharges would have been too "specula-
tive" and too difficult to track given the relatively 
small amounts of various trusts. The Ninth Circuit 
reversed, fmdlng that the district court's focus on the 
"speculative" nature of the remedy and traceability 
simply insulated the wrongdoer in this case, the 
bank, and violated a rule of restitution, namely "if 
you take my money and make money with it, your 
profit belongs to me." Id. at. 1138. The court also 
found that if the manner in which the bank had 
utilized the money was not traceable, there was a 
presumption that the bank was deriving profit from 
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the funds. Thus, an appropriate remedy was a pro-
portional share of the bank's profits for the period the 
funds were utilized. ld. at 1139. 
Retained Investment 
Management Theory ("RIM") 
Defendant's theory of how its profits should be 
measured has already been discussed and rejected 
above based on evidence that Defendant did not, in 
fact, maintain a separate "investment account" in 
which Plaintiff's withheld benefits were placed. The 
Court therefore does not accept Defendant's asser-
tions regarding separate "underwriting" and "invest-
ment" income. Defendant had argued that its 
"retained investment" profit was roughly 1% per year. 
Further, Defendant's assertions that unpaid 
claims that have been approved for payment are 
placed in "investment accounts" used only for limited 
investment purposes is inapplicable to the case at 
hand: Plaintiff brought suit to recover wrongfully 
withheld benefits from Defendant precisely because 
the benefits had not been approved by Defendant. 
Defendant argues that unpaid benefits that sit in 
"investment accounts" then generate only "incremen-
tal investment income." Def.'s Hr. at 2. Again: it is 
unclear why Plaintiff's unpaid benefits would have 
been set aside in an investment account given that 
Plaintiff's benefits claim was wrongfully denied. 
Moreover, as discussed above, the argument that 
Defendant's "investment account" is somehow cabined 
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from Defendant's other sources of income and spend-
ing is inaccurate: 
Q. And as you sit here today, can you rule 
out the possibility that a portion of the funds 
LINA owed Mr. Rochow were used to pay for 
LIN A's ongoing operating expenses? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. And I would like to talk then 
about some of the outflows from the invest-
ment account. 
Is it fair to say that LINA will be paying op-
erating expenses out of the investment ac-
count? 
A. That's normally how the process in an 
insurance company works, yes. 
Tr. at 123. 
The Court rejects Defendant's "Retained Invest-
ment Management" theory of profits and accepts 
Plaintiff's "Return on Equity'' theory as a baseline 
measure of profits gained by Defendant as unjust 
enrichment through the use of Plaintiff's wrongfully 
withheld benefits. The Court must now determine 
whether the various "offsets" proposed by Defendant 
should reduce the baseline measure of profits. 
C. Offsets 
Defendant argues that, regardless of the method 
used by the Court to establish baseline profits, the 
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profits gained by Defendant as unjust enrichment 
through the use of Plaintiff's wrongfully withheld 
benefits should be reduced by various "offsets." The 
Court will analyze each proposed offset in turn. 
Attorney's Fees 
Defendant's original position statement and 
expert report indicated an offset of $232,000 for 
attorney's fees. At the evidentiary hearing held on 
November 4, 2011, however, Defendant indicated 
through counsel that attorney's fees were not an issue 
and "ha[d] never been an issue .... " Tr. at 89. The 
Court will therefore not consider attorney's ·fees as a 
potential offset. 
Discount for Retained Income 
Defendant argues that when a claim is approved 
it triggers "the establishment of a specific case re-
serve in Defendant's administrative and financial 
system." This reserve is the "present value of the 
amount to pay to the claimant over the expected 
duration of the claim," but is "discounted," (meaning 
that there is actually less in the case reserve than the 
actual value of the claim, because money "now" is 
worth less than money at the time the claim will be 
paid out) and will "increase each year simply due to 
the passage of time as the discount is unwound," i.e., 
as money approaches its present value. Def.'s Br. at 4. 
Defendant states that the income generated by the 
investment portfolio is "therefore intended to offset 
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that reserve increase over time . . . only the invest-
ment income generated in excess of the amount 
needed to offset the unwinding of the discount is truly 
retained by LINA" Id. at 4-5. This is true in the sense 
that only this amount is "pure profit" for Defendant; 
however, Defendant is profiting from ALL the money 
in the investment account, not just the amount that it 
can retain - the fact that Defendant offsets the pay-
ment to discount for payment in the future makes 
sense fmancially, but Defendant is benefitting from 
that offset by not having to use other funds to make 
up the difference in Plaintiff's benefit account. 
Regardless, however, much like Defendant's 
general claims regarding an "investment account," 
there is no evidence that a "specific case reserve" was 
established for Plaintiff's claim. This makes sense as 
Plaintiff's claim was not approved by _Defendant. It is 
thus unclear why Defendant would have created a 
specific case reserve. Moreover, Defendant's expert 
admitted during the hearing of November 4, 2011 
that no such reserve existed: 
Q. So, the money just wasn't building up in 
a reserve account up to the point of payment. 
It was general equity as to LINA before that, 
wasn't it? 
A. LINA maintains incurred but not re-
ported reserves, which are reserves in the 
aggregate and not associated with a specific 
claimant. So. LINA did have reserves on its 
books for disability benefits. 
92a 
Q. But there was no reserves specific for 
Rochow, was there? 
A. Not specifically to Mr. Rochow, no. 
Tr. ofNov. 4, 2011 Hr'g at 93. 
The Court therefore finds that Defendant may 
not discount its profits for retained income. 
Net Income 
Defendant next argues that after the gross 
amount of incremental investment is determined, 
"specific adjustments" are made to determine the 
amount Defendant actually retained. Defendant uses 
the metric of "net income" to determine its invest-
ment return, saying that this is "the standard metric 
used to measure profitability within the insurance 
industry." Def.'s Br. at 9. While not identifying what 
"specific adjustments" being referred to, Defendant's 
argument seems to be that it should be permitted to 
deduct the costs of running its investment portfolio 
from profits gained by the use of Plaintiff's wrongful-
ly withheld benefits. This seems to be against the 
spirit of restitution, as Defendant is essentially 
reimbursing itself for the administrative costs of 
using Plaintiff's money to make a profit. As noted in 
Nickel, supra, "if you take my money and make 
money with it, your profit belongs to me." 290 F.3d at 
1138. The Court finds that Plaintiff should not be 
required to compensate Defendant for the costs of 
administering Plaintiff's wrongfully withheld bene-
fits. 
93a 
The Court therefore finds that Defendant may 
not offset its profits to reflect a "net income" meas-
urement. 
Direct Interest Crediting 
Defendant applies a 50% slash in the "rate of 
investment return" because it states that said 
amount is "returned to policyholders via direct inter-
est crediting to the policyholders' benefit or indirectly 
as policy reserves increase due to the passage of 
time." While it is unclear how this amount would 
apply in comparison with overall profits, Defendant 
has again failed to demonstrate that this investment 
return actually applies to the benefit payments 
withheld from Plaintiff. The following exchange took 
place between Defendant's counsel and Defendant's 
expert Timothy Holzli: 
Q. Would you stop there and please explain 
to the Court who this crediting involves or 
what it involves. 
A. There are three specific circumstances 
where LINA credits investment income. The 
first of those is for group universal life con-
tracts, which is a combination of a life insur-
ance policy and an investment policy. Under 
those policies, the beneficiaries have a side 
account which is credited with a stated in-
terest as per their policy documents. 
Q. Other than the first adjustment, what 
did you do next? 
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A. The second adjustment refers to certain 
experience rated contracts. LINA has certain 
contracts with employer groups that pass the 
claims experience of that group back to the 
policyholder. So, to the extent that that poli-
cy - that employer group has favorable 
claims experience, LINA establishes a liabil-
ity payable back to that employer group. On 
that liability, LINA again credits interest to 
that employer group based on a stated con-
tractual rate. 
Tr. of Nov. 4, 2011 Hr'g at 35-36 (the third "credit" is 
the "discount for retained income"). 
A. [F]ifty percent represents the invest-
ment income that is, in fact, credited back to 
contract holders and policyholders. 
Q. By the way, that 50 percent figure, is 
that a number that you just picked out of the 
air? 
A. It is not. It's based on an internal analy-
sis that we monitor. And over the years in 
question, it ranged between 45 and 55 per-
cent. 
Tr. of Nov. 4, 2011 Hr'g at 56. 
While the Court credits Defendant's expert's 
statements that these credits do exist, Defendant has 
provided no evidence that the profits derived from the 
improper withholding of Plaintiff's benefits were or 
were not used for the purpose of refunding these 
credits. Nor is Plaintiff responsible for satisfying 
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payments due because of Defendant's · contractual 
agreements with third parties. 
As such, the Court therefore finds that Defen-
dant may not offset its profits by "direct interest 
crediting." 
Deduction of Taxes 
Defendant argues that the "statutory rate" on its 
income is 35%. Defendant argues, based on In Design 
v. K-Mart Apparel Corp., 13 F.3d 559, 567 (2d 
Cir.1994), that they may deduct income taxes from 
restitution, but fails to note that the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals only permitted said deduction when 
the wrongful act leading to the unjust enrichment 
was not "willful and deliberate." There is a long line 
of cases running against Defendant that hold that 
taxes cannot be offset from restitution payments 
where a Defendant deliberately engaged in a wrong-
ful act. See, e.g., Do nell v. Kowell, 533 F. 3d 762, 778 
(9th Cir.2008) (investor in Ponzi scheme could not 
offset unjust enrichment by amount of taxes); SEC v. 
Razmilovic, 2011 WL 4629022, at *31 (E.D.N.Y.2011) 
(no offset for income taxes in insider trading case); 
SEC v. Svoboda, 409 F.Supp.2d 331, 345 
(S.D.N.Y.2006) (no deduction for capital gains taxes 
in securities fraud). 
The Court finds that Defendant's underlying 
actions in this case in refusing to grant Plaintiff 
benefits qualify as "deliberate and willful" wrongful 
acts. The Court has already ruled that Defendant 
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acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in its 
Order granting summary judgment to Plaintiff [12], 
and the Sixth Circuit has affirmed this ruling. 
Rockow v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 482 F.3d 860 (6th 
Cir.2007). In addition, in the Order [67] requiring 
disgorgement and an equitable accounting, this Court 
found that Defendant, in denying Plaintiff disability 
benefits, created "non-existent [insurance] policy 
requirements," concocted a "[k]nowingly false ra-
tionale for [the] second denial" of benefits, and closed 
the administrative record without medical input or 
evidence. This Court also found that Defendant had 
acted in bad faith. The Court finds that Defendants 
therefore acted in a "deliberate and willful" manner 
in carrying out the underlying wrongful act, the 
denial of benefits. Therefore, Defendant will not be 
permitted to deduct taxes from the disgorgement of 
their unjust enrichment. 
Realized versus Unrealized Gains 
Plaintiff argues that "unrealized gains" should be 
taken into account in determining Defendant's profit. 
Essentially, unrealized gains are gains in investments 
that Defendant has not yet "cashed in" or sold, but 
that have increased in value. Defendant argues that 
said gains are "paper gains" on investment that could 
decrease in value later, and thus it would be unfair to 
provide Plaintiff with a share of profits on invest-
ments that Defendant has not yet realized. 
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The circuits are divided on this question, and 
there is little clear caselaw. In Ivan Allen Co. v. 
United States, 493 F.2d 426 (5th Cir.1974), the court, 
in valuing securities for purposes of determining 
whether a corporation had unreasonably accumulated 
profits, set the value of the securities not at their 
original cost but at their fair market-value minus cost 
to realize said value. The court recognized that it was 
necessary, in considering profits, to look at the pre-
sent fair-market value of an investment, particularly 
given the fact that the investments were easy to 
translate into liquid cash. The same rule applies in 
estate tax cases, where tax is assessed at the time of 
decedent's death, and investment value is based on 
fair-market value at time of death. See Gump v. 
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 124 F.2d 540, 543 (9th 
Cir.1941). Thus, both cases seem to support Plain-
tiff's position that unrealized gains in value should be 
taken into account in determining profit, as they 
suggest that this Court should look at the "present 
value" of Defendant's assets, regardless of whether 
the gains are realized or unrealized. 
On the other hand, in C.I.R. v. Godley's Estate, 
213 F.2d 529, 532 (3d Cir.1954), the court, in attempt-
ing to define "dividends" as "a corporate distribution 
to its shareholders out of its earnings or profits," 
defined "profits," and found that "unrealized gains 
should not increase earnings or profits." This sup-
ports Defendant's position. 
The Court finds that this situation is more simi-
lar to levying an estate tax or other tax where a 
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snapshot of fair-market value is necessary. Defendant 
has not and apparently cannot demonstrate that 
Plaintiff's withheld benefits were segregated into a 
fund from which it derived only realized gains. As the 
burden is on the Defendant to establish which profits 
flowed from its unjust enrichment, the Court must 
assume that Plaintiff's funds were used in both 
realized and unrealized investments. Defendant 
should not be able to reap a windfall in unrealized 
investments from the use of Plaintiff's funds down 
the road merely because Defendant has not yet 
chosen to cash in on those investments; Defendant 
will likely realize eventual profit from the day-to-day 
increase in value of those investments purchased in 
whole or in part through the fruit of its unjust en-
richment. While it is, of course, possible that said 
investments may decline in value over time, uncer-
tainty in this issue should be resolved against the 
tortfeasor, in this case the Defendant. 
The Court therefore finds that Defendant's 
profits must include unrealized gains. 
III. Conclusion 
In summary, the Court finds that the Defendant 
has the burden of proof in demonstrating that its 
accounting is correct, and that uncertainty in ac-
counting is resolved against Defendant. The Court 
finds that Defendant has failed to establish that the 
benefits wrongfully withheld from Plaintiff were 
segregated in a fund that limited profit to "investment 
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income," and thus the Court adopts Plaintiff's meth-
od of determining the extent of Defendant's profits 
during the relevant period. The Court also rejects the 
various offsets proposed by Defendant. 
RELIEF 
Plaintiff will, within two weeks from this order, 
submit a final amount to be disgorged by Defendant 
based upon the Court's rulings, above. Defendant 
may then submit a memorandum in response within 
seven days. This memorandum is limited only to any 
objections regarding the accuracy of Plaintiff's calcu-
lations based on this order, and is not an invitation to 
relitigate issues already decided by this Court. 
SO ORDERED. 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 
SOUTHERN DIVISION 
PATRICK RocHOW, Personal 
Representative of the 
Estate of DANIEL J. ROCHOW, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF NORTH AMERICA, 
Defendant. I 
-----------------------
Civil Case No. 
04-73628 
Honorable 
Arthur J. Tarnow 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION [46] FOR EQUITABLE 
ACCOUNTING; GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN 
PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION [46] FOR ATTORNEY FEES; 
ANn DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION [60] TO STRIKE 
(Filed Jun. 16, 2009) 
Before the court are plaintiff's motions for equi-
table accounting and for attorney fees. These matters 
came on for a hearing on February 27, 2009. Also 
before the court are updated reports from plaintiff's 
expert, along with defendant's responses, as well as 
plaintiff's motion to strike the affidavit attached to 
one of defendant's response briefs. 
This court and the Sixth Circuit have already 
concluded that defendant Life Insurance Company 
of North America (LINA) acted arbitrarily or capri- . 
ciously when it denied plaintiffs claim for disability 
lOla 
benefits. Rockow v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am., 482 
F.3d 860 (6th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, Daniel Rochow, 
now deceased, is entitled to benefits, payable to his 
estate. 
The controversy between the parties concerns the 
kind of remedy available to plaintiff, as well as the 
calculation of the benefit. There are four main areas 
of contention. First, is Rochow entitled to the remedy 
of disgorgement? Such a remedy would disgorge from 
LINA any gain that defendant had accrued while it 
had custody over money that it withheld from Rochow 
in breach of its fiduciary duty to him. The short 
answer is that the catchall provision of ERISA, 29 
U.S. C. § 1132(a)(3)(B), recognizes plaintiff's entitle-. 
ment to this remedy. 
Second, the covered-earnings issue: what are 
Rochow's base earnings, from which his benefit is 
calculated? The court determines that plaintiff's 
entire actual earnings in the year prior to the onset of 
his disability, even those earnings that did not come 
from Rochow's employer, count as plaintiff's "covered 
earnings" under the plan. 
Third, is the disability benefit subject to an 
automatic cost-of-living increase? No: the policy does 
not require cost-of-living adjustments, and there is no 
authority to support plaintiff's proposition that the 
failure of an insurer to inflation-index benefits is per 
se unconscionable. 
Fourth, should attorney fees be award to plain-
tiff, and if so, is a 50% enhancement of the award 
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warranted? The court will award attorney fees but 
will only enhance the award by 20%. 
I. Disgorgement 
A. Does equitable accounting control this in-
quiry? 
Plaintiff urges the court to apply the remedy of 
equitable accounting. Equitable accounting, according 
to Rochow, is required when a fiduciary breaches its 
duty. The court must then examine and adjust the 
accounts between the parties. Furthermore, at oral 
argument, plaintiff insisted that the remedy of equi-
table accounting subsumes the three areas of dispute, 
apart from the issue of attorney fees. In other words, 
the court's resolution of what income counts as "cov-
ered earnings" under the plan, of whether the benefit 
is indexed according to inflation, and of whether 
LINNs profits on the withheld benefits should be 
disgorged, the resolution of these issues would all be 
components of the remedy of equitable accounting. 
The court is not persuaded by this theory. Rather, 
the statutory language in ERISA guides the award of 
benefits to Rochow. It is unnecessary to superimpose 
plaintiff's version of equitable accounting onto the 
structure that Congress has already established. 
Accordingly, the covered-earnings issue and the 
dispute over inflation-indexing are simply determina-
tions that the court must make in order to calculate 
the benefits. due to Rochow under the terms of his 
plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B). Cognizant of this 
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statutory structure, equitable accounting is extrane-
ous to the resolution of these two issues. 
B. The basis for disgorgement 
Likewise, the statute guides the court's analysis 
of whether the remedy of disgorgement is available. 
The benefits-recovery provision of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(a)(1)(B), allows a plan participant to recover 
"benefits due to him." Profits unjustly accrued by 
LINA do not easily fit within this provision's re-
quirement that "benefits" are what are recoverable 
under § 1132(a)(1)(B). Nor does the court choose to 
rely on the suggestion that disgorgement is recog-
nized as relief incidental to the recovery of benefits. 
See, e.g., 1A C.J.S. Accounting § 10 (2009) ("Equity 
frequently takes jurisdiction of an accounting ... as 
incidental to some other relief within the jurisdiction 
of equity, as in the case of fiduciary relations"); Peck 
v. Ayers & Lord Tie Co., 116 F. 273, 275 (6th Cir. 
1902) (articulating principle that accounting is inci-
dental relief to primary claim for breach of fiduciary's 
duty to prevent waste of a property); Adams v. 
Catrambone, 359 F.3d 858, 861 n.2 (7th Cir. 2004) 
("An accounting is a form of equitable relief incidental 
to a substantive claim."). Even if other courts may 
have recognized disgorgement as incidental relief 
under the benefits-recovery provision, sturdier ground 
for disgorgement lies elsewhere. 
Plaintiff offers two other bases for disgorgement: 
the inherent equitable power of the court and 29 
----------
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U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B), the catchall proVIsiOn. See, 
e.g., Rybarczyk v. TRW, Inc., 235 F.3d 975, 986 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (in ERISA case, court set pre-judgment 
interest at the rate of defendant's earnings, meaning 
that statutory interest rate was not the court's only 
option and that setting pre-judgment interest rate at 
actual rate of return avoids unjust enrichment). The 
court declines to rely upon its inherent authority 
where Congress has otherwise expressly empowered 
the court to disgorge LINA's profits through the 
remedy of an accounting for profits. See Parke v. First 
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 368 F. 3d 999, 1008 
(in benefits-denial case, court stated that "[i]t is 
undisputed that an accounting for profits- the reme-
dy that allows for the disgorgement of profits award-
ed by the district court - is a type of relief that was 
typically available in equity and therefore is_ appro-
priate under § 1132(a)(3)(B)"). The catchall provision 
allows a plan participant to "obtain other appropriate 
equitable relief" to "redress ... violations" of the plan 
or ERISA. Disgorgement through an accounting for 
profits is appropriate equitable relief. 
C. The catchall provision 
In a nutshell, LINA argues that plaintiff's law-
suit is necessarily a benefits-recovery suit controlled 
by 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Though plaintiff has 
invoked both the benefits-recovery and catchall 
provisions, defendant maintains that a plaintiff 
cannot plead both claims, under Varity Corp. v. Howe, 
516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996). The court acknowledges 
105a 
that benefits cannot be recovered under the catchall 
provision, and that the catchall provision is only 
available to those who cannot avail of other remedies 
afforded by ERISA. But this is not fatal to plaintiff's 
request for disgorgement through an accounting for 
profits. Furthermore, the court rejects LIN~s argu-
ment that there has been no finding of a breach of 
fiduciary duty, which is required to trigger the avail-
ability of equitable relief under the catchall provision. 
As Varity explains, an arbitrary or capricious denial 
of benefits can count as a breach of fiduciary duty. I d. 
at 514-15. Furthermore, disgorgement, cognized 
under the catchall provision, is not an attempt to 
avoid the limitations of the benefits-recovery provi-
sion, because disgorgement seeks a different kind of · ·· 
relief than simply recovering benefits. Disgorgement 
through an accounting does not seek to compensate 
plaintiff for his injury or for the time-value of the 
withheld benefits. Rather, disgorgement remedies the 
unfairness of unjust enrichment. Therefore, dis-
gorgement is available under the catchall provision 
as "other appropriate equitable relief," even when a 
plaintiff has recovered benefits. The court will now 
expand upon this summary. 
In Varity, the Supreme Court explained that the 
catchall provision provides equitable relief for "inju-
ries caused by violations that § 502 [of ERISA] does 
not elsewhere adequately remedy." Varity, supra, 516 
U.S. at 512. LINA asserts that plaintiff's lawsuit is 
about recovering benefits due to him and that a 
catchall-provision claim is not relevant or cannot be 
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maintained. But plaintiff has pleaded for relief under 
both the benefits-recovery and catchall provisions. 
And the Sixth Circuit has recognized that under some 
circumstances a plaintiff may maintain catchall and 
benefits-recovery claims simultaneously. Gore v. El 
Paso Energy Corp. Long Term Disability, 4 77 F. 3d 
833, 839 (6th Cir. 2007). 
Defendant also suggests that there has been no 
fmding of a breach of fiduciary duty that would count 
as a "violation" of the plan or ERISA, under the 
catchall provision. But Varity explains that a denial of 
benefits can be a breach of fiduciary duty. See Varity, 
supra, 516 U.S. at 514-15 ("characterizing a denial of 
benefits as a breach of fiduciary duty'' does not 
change the standard a court would apply when re-
viewing an administrator's decision to deny benefits, 
meaning that a catchall-provision claim related to the 
denial of benefits is not necessarily a repackaged 
benefits-recovery claim). In this instance, LINA's 
denial of benefits to Rochow was arbitrary or capri-
cious. Surely, arbitrary or capricious action by a 
fiduciary is a breach of the high standards that the 
law imposes on fiduciaries. Accordingly, a denial of 
benefits can count as a violation that would trigger 
liability under the catchall provision. 
The best argument that defendant can make is 
that disgorgement is not "appropriate" relief, even if a 
catchall claim could be simultaneously cognizable 
with a benefits-recovery claim. See Varity, supra, 516 
U.S. at 515 (courts should expect that "where Con-
gress has elsewhere provided adequate relief for a 
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beneficiary's injury, there will likely be no need for 
further equitable relief, in which case such relief 
normally would not be 'appropriate'"). But Rochow 
asks for a different kind of relief that does not merely 
duplicate the benefits that he is already entitled to 
recover. In other words, plaintiff's request for dis-
gorgement under the catchall provision is "appropri-
ate," because his claim is not merely a repackaged 
benefits-recovery claim, disguising itself as a catchall 
claim in order to circumvent the procedural strictures 
-judgment on an administrative record and deferen-
tial review, for instance - of the benefits-recovery 
prOVISIOn. 
The reason why, in Rochow's case, there is a 
"need for further equitable relief" under the catchall 
provision is this: disgorgement through an accounting 
offers a remedy distinct from the relief offered 
through the benefits-recovery provision. Disgorge-
ment is not the same thing as compensating plaintiff 
for the time value of benefits that LINA has arbitrari-
ly withheld. Disgorgement looks at the breaching 
fiduciary's unjust enrichment, rather than the benefi-
ciary's loss or entitlement. And because disgorgement 
is distinct from simply recovering benefits due to a 
plan participant, plaintiff can invoke the catchall 
provision as a basis for requesting disgorgement, 
given that the benefits-recovery provision does not 
plainly recognize the availability of disgorgement. 
Therefore, any gain that LINA accrued from the 
money it withheld from Rochow will . be disgorged. 
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The court will set an evidentiary hearing to deter-
mine the amount, if any, of this unjust enrichment. 
II. Covered earnings 
The parties dispute the amount of Rochow's base 
earnings, from which his benefit is calculated. The 
relevant language in the policy says that "Basic 
Monthly Earnings," related to "Covered Earnings," 
will be the greater of "your current monthly base 
salary or 1/12 of your prior year base earnings, over-
time, and eligible bonus as determined at the time of 
disability. Covered Earnings are determined initially 
on the date an Employee applies for coverage." 
Both sides agree that the "your monthly base 
salary" route of calculating covered earnings does not 
apply. Rather, the benefit is determined in Rochow's 
case by looking at prior-year earnings and dividing by 
12. Both sides also agree that the "prior year" under 
this second route to calculate covered earnings is the 
year 2000, as this court and the Sixth Circuit deter-
mined that Rochow became disabled in 2001. 
Rochow believes that his covered earnings 1n 
2000 should be calculated by looking at his actual 
earnings from the entire year. He earned $269,000. 
LINA, on the contrary, wants to calculate 
Rochow's benefits by looking only at the salary at-
tributable to Gallagher, Rochow's employer, because 
the policy was issued to Gallagher. This would mean 
only counting the earnings attributable to the 
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Gallagher salary from June to December 2000, and 
then extrapolating from those earnings to arrive at a 
prior-year income of $150,000. 
LINA's contention must be rejected. There is no 
language in the policy that requires prior-year earn-
ings to only come from the policyholder. Defendant's 
secondary argument is that some of Rochow's non-
Gallagher income came from Rochow's sale of 
Universico to Gallagher. Rochow denies that this is 
the case and submitted a supporting declaration. 
LINA has not come forward with any evidence to the 
contrary. Therefore, the court credits Rochow's repre-
sentation that the $269,000 in covered earnings does 
not include money proceeding from the sale of 
Universico. 
III. Cost-of-living increase 
The court must decide whether the disability 
benefit is subject to an automatic cost-of-living in-
crease. Here, the court rejects Rochow's assertions. 
Nothing in the policy requires cost-of-living adjust-
ments to the benefit in Rochow's situation. Plaintiff 
cites the definition of "Indexed Covered Earnings" as 
support for the proposition that Rochow's benefits 
increase with inflation. But as LINA explains, In-
dexed Covered Earnings are only a basis for calculat-
ing the disability benefit when the "Work Incentive 
Benefit Calculation" is employed. And the Work 
Incentive Benefit Calculation only comes into play if 
the plan participant is "working while disabled." That 
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is clearly not the case in Rochow's situation, at least 
for the majority of the time for which the disability 
benefit must be calculated. Therefore, the Disability 
Benefit Calculation is denoted by the "schedule of 
benefits," which does not include any language about 
inflation indexing. The schedule of benefits merely 
states that the monthly benefit is based on the "Gross 
Disability Benefit," which is defined in relevant part 
as "60% of your monthly Covered Earnings." The 
definition of Gross Disability Benefit could have been 
based on Indexed Covered Earnings, but the text only 
refers to Covered Earnings. The plan reflects a dis-
tinction between Covered Earnings and Indexed 
Covered Earnings. Accordingly, the plan language 
does not support plaintiff's position. 
Nor is the court persuaded by plaintiff's asser-
tion that it is per se unconscionable for an insurance 
company to issue a policy whose benefit is not in-
dexed for inflation. There is no authority for plain-
tiff's argument. 
IV. Attorney fees and enhancement 
ERISA allows the court to award attorney fees 
and costs. Under Secretary of Dept. of Labor v. King, 
775 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1985), there are five factors 
that flexibly guide the court: 
• the degree of the opposing party's culpability 
or bad faith 
• the opposing party's ability to satisfy an 
award of attorney's fees 
• 
• 
• 
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the deterrent effect of an award on other 
persons under similar circumstances 
whether the party requesting fees sought to 
confer a common benefit on all participants 
and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or resolve 
significant legal questions regarding ERISA 
and 
the relative merits of the parties positions . 
The court will award attorney fees as well as a 
20% enh,ance~ent. 
A. Bad faith 
Rochow notes that it is the norm for a court to 
deem a defendant culpable when that defendant has 
denied benefits arbitrarily and capriciously. Further-
more, plaintiff cites defendant's invocation of non-
existent policy requirements, LINA's knowingly false 
rationale for the denial of Rochow's second appeal, 
defendant's closing of the administrative record 
without medical input or evidence, and LINA's incon-
sistency. 
1. Non-existent policy requirements 
Rochow says that LINA acted in bad faith when 
it initially denied his claim for benefits. Specifically, 
LINA - though conceding that Rochow experienced 
symptoms of encephalitis throughout 2001 - had 
decided that Rochow could not be considered disabled 
because he continued to work in 2001. Plaintiff calls 
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this the "walking wounded" defense. Plaintiff is right: 
there was nothing in the policy that said that work-
ing in a job would prevent a beneficiary from being 
considered disabled, even if a beneficiary would 
otherwise be considered disabled due to an inability 
to perform the material duties of one's regular occu-
pation. 
Likewise, Rochow is correct that there was no 
policy language requiring plaintiff to submit "medical 
evidence" to demonstrate his disability. The policy 
only required "satisfactory proof" Nevertheless, LINA 
persevered in trying to apply a standard that was 
foreign to the policy language. 
2. Knowingly false rationale for second 
denial 
Rochow explains that LINA's rationale for the 
denial of his second appeal was that he had filed his 
claim too late, as the claim was filed after Rochow's 
termination date. 
However, nothing in the policy said that the 
claim was too late. Moreover, Rochow argues that 
LINA knew that such a rationale was false. Plaintiff 
points to an internal note handwritten by someone in 
LINA that said, "claim submitted late by [Rochow] 
but not more than one year late." LINA does not 
dispute this in its brief. 
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3. Closing the administrative record with-
out medical input or evidence 
Rochow maintains that LINA waited until the 
last administrative appeal to rely on a new rationale 
for denying plaintiff's claim. The new rationale was 
the lack of medical evidence. Although Rochow ar-
gued before the courts that medical evidence was not 
required under the policy, Rochow's point still stands. 
Plaintiff contends that LINA showed bad faith by 
waiting until the last administrative appeal to rely on 
this new rationale, which left plaintiff without any 
means to supplement the administrative record to 
include medical evidence that could have persuaded 
LINA. 
LINA reminds the court that Rochow was chal-
lenging the need to provide medical evidence, sug-
gesting that plaintiff cannot now say that LINA 
should have required medical evidence up front. The 
court rejects defendant's position. 
Rochow also observes that LINA did not seek 
expert evaluations of the evidence that plaintiff did 
submit, considering the rarity of the herpes encepha-
litis that afflicted Rochow. This goes to the arbitrary 
and capricious nature of LINA's decision and also to 
LINA's bad faith. 
4. Inconsistency 
Several times Rochow asserts that inconsistency 
itself shows bad faith. In other words, if an insurer 
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keeps changing its reason for a denial, that demon-
strates bad faith. The court need not reach this 
argument, because there are plenty of other reasons 
why LINA acted culpably. 
B. Common benefit 
Under the second King factor, Rochow contends 
that his case conferred a common benefit by resolving 
significant legal questions surrounding ERISA 
Rochow notes that the Sixth Circuit's decision in 
Rockow has been cited over 30 times already, even 
though it's only two years old. Courts have discussed 
the rejection of insurance companies' "walking 
wounded" defense; the sufficiency of non-medical 
evidence to show "satisfactory proof" of disability; 
and the possibility that disability is present before a 
claim is filed and that retrospective diagnosis can 
establish this. 
The court agrees with Rochow. 
C. Relative Merits 
It is clear that Rochow's victory, despite the 
arbitrary-or-capricious standard, shows that his 
position had more merit than LINA's. The question is 
whether plaintiff's victory was overwhelming. 
Rochow does not expand on this point much. 
LINA cites this court's bench ruling, where the 
court stated "I agree with you; the letter is not - from 
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Dr. Forman is not overwhelming. But when you put it 
in the context of his job ... I think the Plaintiff has 
prevailed." . 
In view of the arguments that Rochow makes to 
support a finding of bad faith, Rochow did win his 
claim for recovery of benefits overwhelmingly. LINA 
did not have serious arguments based in the policy 
language to support its position. 
The other King factors - LIN.Ns ability to pay 
and the deterrent effect of attorney fees are self-
evident. 
D. Hours and rates 
Rochow wants nearly $194,000 in attorney fees. 
This figure does not account for interest that accrued 
from the times that the various fees were incurred. 
LINA balks at the number of hours that Rochow's 
counsel worked on this case. While Rochow's trial 
attorney only worked 43 hours during the district-
court proceedings, appellate and trial counsel present 
a bill for 608 hours on appeal. LINA suggests that 
this does not make sense, particularly considering 
that LIN.Ns fees were only 1/3 of what plaintiff now 
seeks. 
Rochow explains that much of the work at the 
district-court level built on work that plaintiff's 
counsel did during the administrative appeals. So 
much time was spent on appeal because Rochow 
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needed to defend a bench ruling before a Sixth Circuit 
panel. 
LINA also asserts that some of the hours on 
appeal resulted from unsuccessful motions that were 
a waste of time. Rochow notes that LINA does not 
point out which motions were unsuccessful and why. 
Plaintiff explains why he needed to file these motions 
on appeal. The court finds these explanations reason-
able. 
LINA also maintains that hourly rates are exces-
sive: $225 for trial counsel and $335 for appellate 
counsel. The court disagrees. 
E. Enhancement 
Rochow also asks for a 50% enhancement of the 
attorney-fee award. Deciding whether to award an 
enhancement is guided by 12 factors announced by 
the Supreme Court in Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 
U.S. 87, 93 (1989). See also Murphy v. Reliance 
Standard Life Ins. Co., 247 F.3d 1313, 1314-15 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (ERISA attorney-fee statute similar to 
other federal attorney-fee statutes, which were at 
issue in Blanchard). These factors are 
• the time and labor required 
• the novelty and difficulty of the questions 
• the skill requisite to perform the legal ser-
vice properly 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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the preclusion of other employment by the 
Aattorney due to acceptance of the case 
the customary fee 
whether the fee is fixed or contingent 
time limitations imposed by the client or the 
circumstances 
the amount involved and the results ob-
tained 
the experience, reputation, and ability of the 
attorneys 
the "undesirability" of the case 
the nature and length of the professional re-
lationship with the client 
awards in similar cases 
The fact that a case is taken on a contingent-fee 
arrangement cannot be the basis for an enhancement. 
Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 567 (1992). 
Rochow highlights the novelty and difficulty of 
the case, the skill needed, the preclusion of other 
employment, the results achieved, and the undesira-
bility of the case. The undesirability of the case is 
demonstrated not only by the fact that this is an 
ERISA claim facing the usual substantial procedural 
obstacles, but that Rochow's first attorney encouraged 
Rochow to give up in the face of LINA's arguments. 
Trial counsel attaches a letter saying so. Plaintiff's 
counsel also present a declaration from an appellate 
expert, Nancy Wear, who read the papers in this case, 
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listened to oral argument, and reviewed counsel's 
billing request, which she supports. 
Whether to award an enhancement Is In the 
court's discretion, and the court believes some en-
hancement is warranted. Rochow asks for 50%. He 
presents a Sixth Circuit case, Paschal v. Flagstar 
Bank, 297 F.3d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 2002), where a 50% 
enhancement was affirmed. Instead, the court will 
award an enhancement of 20%. 
V. Plaintiff's motion to strike affidavit 
Shortly before oral argument on the motions for 
equitable accounting and for attorney fees, plaintiff 
moved to strike an affidavit that LINA had attached 
to one of its briefs. The parties have continued to brief 
the issue of LINA's profits. Therefore, plaintiff's 
motion is DENIED. 
VI. Conclusion 
The court grants the remedy of an accounting for 
profits. Any profits that LINA accrued on the benefits 
withheld from Rochow will be disgorged. The parties 
have briefed the issue of LIN A's rate of return, so the 
court will set an evidentiary hearing. 
The motions for equitable accounting and for 
attomey fees are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED 
IN PART. 
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SO ORDERED. 
S/ARTHUR J. TARNOW 
Arthur J. Tarnow 
United States District Judge 
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OPINION 
OBERDORFER, District Judge. 
Daniel Rochow, the former President of Arthur J. 
Gallagher & Co. ("Gallagher"), currently suffers from 
* The Honorable Louis F. Oberdorfer, United States District 
Judge for the District of Columbia, sitting by designation. 
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HSV-Encephalitis, a rare and severely debilitating 
disease. , The question in this case is whether or not 
the insurer, Life Insurance Company of North Ameri-
ca ("LINA") acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it 
concluded that Rochow was not disabled on the date 
that he left his job, therefore denying his claim for 
disability benefits. The district court held that LINA's 
determination was arbitrary and capricious and 
unsupported by the administrative record. For the 
reasons hereinafter stated, we AFFIRM that decision. 
BACKGROUND 
A. Rochow's Symptoms and Diagnosis 
The Administrative Record reveals the following 
facts. Daniel Rochow was the President of Gallagher 
for ten years. He had long-term disability coverage 
through Gallagher's Group Insurance Plan (the 
"Plan"), administered by LINA. In 2001, Rochow 
began to experience short-term memory loss, occa-
sional chills, sporadic sweating, and stress at work. 
On June 15, 2001, he visited Dr. Bruce Forman to 
discuss his symptoms. Dr. Forman took notes, but did 
not record any conclusions. 
In July 2001, Gallagher demoted Rochow from 
President to Sales Executive - Account Manager. 
According to Jack Tellerico, an Area Vice President 
and Rochow's co-worker at Gallagher, this demotion 
occurred because Rochow could no longer perform his 
duties as President. 
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On August 21, 2001, Rochow returned to Dr. 
Forman. He reiterated his concerns about his short-
term memory loss, which had now been ongoing for 
six to eight months. Dr. Forman again took notes 
regarding Rochow's complaints. He concluded that 
Rochow was suffering from depression, prescribed 
anti-depressants, and referred him to a neurologist. 
[JA 131]. 
On October 2, 2001, Rochow saw a neurologist, 
Dr. Mary Ann McKee. According to Dr. McKee's notes, 
during the examination, Rochow was at times unable 
to answer her questions or describe his problems. He 
was tearful and cried often during the exam. He told 
Dr. McKee that the reason for his visit was "distracti-
bility and difficult[sic] with memory." [JA 153]. He 
explained that "for the last six months he has noticed 
that he might think of something and then in the 
middle of his thoughts he will lose the rest of the 
thought and not be able to complete the sentence." 
[JA 153]. Dr. McKee concluded that ''his memory 
difficulty is really secondary to depression and does 
not represent an organic brain disorder." [JA 154]. An 
MRI on October 9, 2001 was. "unremarkable." [JA 
156]. 
During this time, Rochow was having increasing 
difficulties at work. According to Tellerico, Rochow 
became unable to perform duties as a Sales Executive-
Account Manager, which included budgeting revenue, 
developing sales plans, and identifying new clients or 
new products for existing clients; "[s]ince Mr. Rochow 
could not perform these material duties, he was not 
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able to continue working at Arthur J. Gallagher & 
Co." [JA 113]. January 2, 2002 was his last day of 
employment, and the day on which his disability 
coverage with LINA lapsed. 
In February 2002, Rochow visited his son in 
Sarasota, Florida. On the evening of February 17, 
security guards discovered Rochow wandering alone 
in a parking lot, unable to explain why he was there. 
His speech was slurred, and he exhibited amnestic 
symptoms. The Sarasota Fire Department transport-
ed him to the emergency room at Sarasota Memorial 
hospital. There, Rochow believed he was in Michigan 
and continued to exhibit amnestic symptoms. A 
radiologic scan was again "unremarkable." [JA 415]. 
He was involuntarily civilly committed at a psychiat-
ric hospital. 
On February 20, 2002, Rochow was brought back 
to the emergency room because of a "sudden change 
and altered mental status." [JA 223]. The emergency 
room staff conducted a lumbar puncture. An infec-
tious disease specialist and a neurologist diagnosed 
Rochow with HSV-Encephalitis. HSV-Encephalitis is 
an extremely rare form of herpes that can cause 
"brain trauma not unlike the sort associated with 
strokes, car accidents, or gunshot wounds." In re 
Myrick, 624 A.2d 1222, 1224 (D.C.Ct.App.1993). He 
was prescribed long-term anti-viral medications. On 
February 25, 2002, a physician attempted to inter-
view Rochow; he was still unable to provide helpful 
information. Based on discussions with Rochow's ex-
wife and a colleague, this physician concluded that 
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"[t]he patient's history fits better with a more slow 
onset process." [JA 262]. 
On March 5, 2002, Rochow was transferred by 
medical helicopter to Henry Ford Hospital in Michi-
gan for continued treatment. He was discharged on 
March 14, 2002 with a recommendation for assisted 
living or 24-hour supervision at home, and with the 
sad prognosis that "he may never fully recover or be 
able to function on his own." [JA 467]. 
B. The Claims Process 
In late December 2002, Rochow, through his 
personal representative, filed a claim for disability 
benefits pursuant to LINA's insurance plan. The plan 
provided in relevant part as follows: 
WHEN COVERAGE ENDS 
Your coverage ends on the earliest of the follow-
ing dates: 
... the day you are no longer in Active Ser-
VIce. 
*** 
DESCRIPTION OF BENEFITS 
WHAT IS COVERED 
Disability Benefits 
We will pay Disability Benefits if you become 
Disabled while covered under this Policy. You 
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must satisfy the Elimination Period, be un-
der the Appropriate Care of a Physician, and 
meet all the other terms and conditions of 
the Policy. You must provide to us, at your 
own expense, satisfactory proof of Disability 
before benefits will be paid. 
*** 
DEFINITIONS 
Active Service 
If you are an Employee, you are in Ac-
tive Service on a day which is one of 
your Employer's scheduled work days if 
either of the following conditions are 
met. 
1. You are actively at work. This 
means you are performing your reg-
ular occupation for the Employer on 
a Full-time basis, either at one of 
the Employer's usual places of busi-
ness or at some location to which 
the Employer's business requires 
you to travel. 
2. The day is a scheduled holiday, va-
cation day or period of Employer 
approved paid leave of absence. 
You are in Active Service on a day which 
is not one of the Employer's scheduled 
work days only if you were in Active 
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Service on the preceding scheduled work 
day .... 
Disability 
You are considered Disabled if, solely be-
cause of Injury or Sickness, you are ... 
unable to perform all the material duties 
of your Regular Occupation or a Quali-
fied Alternative[.] 
[JA27-37]. 
Rochow's initial claim form incorrectly stated 
that he was still employed at the time of his medical 
crisis in February 2002. LINA issued its first denial 
letter on January 27, 2003, concluding that Rochow's 
actual employment terminated on January 2, 2002. 
Rochow, now represented by counsel, responded that 
his employment had indeed terminated on January 2, 
2002, but that he had been disabled and suffered the 
effects of his condition throughout 2001. 
LINA issued a second denial on April 3, 2003. It 
acknowledged Rochow's disease and symptoms but 
still concluded that Rochow was not disabled until his 
acute medical crisis: 
"[l]t is evident that Mr. Rochow ex-
perienced the affects [sic] of enceph-
alitis throughout the calendar year 
of 2001[.] ... According to the medi-
cal records, Mr. Rochow has experi-
enced the symptoms of depressive 
disorders continuously while work-
ing in 2001. Because he continued to 
127a 
work, he cannot be considered disa-
bled based on the policy's definition 
of disability. It appears his inability 
to function did not occur until Feb-
ruary 18, 2002." 
[JA 121-22]. 
Rochow again challenged the denial. He submit-
ted a letter from Dr. Forman, dated September 28, 
2003, stating: "it is my opinion that Mr. Rochow had 
memory problems that would have affected his ability 
to perform tasks as an Insurance Salesman in 2001." 
[JA 112]. On December 22, 2003, LINA issued a third 
denial suggesting that his claim was being denied for 
general lack of documentation. Finally, on July 16, 
2004, at the end of the administrative appeals pro-
cess, LINA denied his claim for lack of medical evi-
dence. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Rochow's challenge of LINA's determination in 
the Eastern District of Michigan involves the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act· of 197 4 
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. The district court 
ruled from the bench that LINA's determination that 
Rochow was not disabled on January 2, 2002 was 
arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by the 
administrative record. In the context of the record as 
a whole, the district court found that "the February 
17th [2002] incident [was] corroborative evidence of a 
pre-existing disability." 
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Specifically, the district court reasoned as follows: 
[T]he fact that he was able to work is cer-
tainly evidence for the Defense. However, 
when we have Mr. Tellerico saying he was on 
the payroll, but he wasn't able to do the work 
that he had been doing before, and we have 
such a severe loss of memory, compounded by 
the depression, and it is clear that that 
memory loss - it seems to be clear that that 
memory loss may have contributed to his be-
ing demoted before he claimed disability, I 
think he has prevailed. 
And certainly the Defense is right; that the 
Plaintiff has the burden of proof initially as 
to disability and has a much heavier burden 
of proof, when he comes to this court, to show 
not only disability, but that the decision was 
arbitrary and capricious. 
The fact that he was collecting pay, I don't 
think is relevant. You've got a person who is 
the head of the agency, Arthur Gallagher & 
Company. . . . [T]he letter is not - from Dr. 
Forman is not overwhelming. But when you 
put it in the context of his job, career - his 
career path, which was downhill, and the 
lack of any medical evidence presented in 
support of finding him not disabled, I think 
the Plaintiff has prevailed. 
[JA 552-54]. Defendant timely appealed. 
The primary issue before us is whether Rochow 
presented sufficient evidence to establish that he was 
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disabled within the meaning of the Plan before or on 
January 2, 2002. 
DISCUSSION 
Rochow's claim is governed by ERISA. ERISA 
provides that insurance companies "shall discharge 
[their] duties with respect to a plan solely in the 
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and [] 
for the exclusive purpose of [] providing benefits to 
participants and their beneficiaries ... in accordance 
with the documents and instruments governing the 
plan insofar as such documents and instruments are 
consistent with the provisions of this subchapter ... " 
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). 
We "review de novo the decision of a district court 
granting judgment in an ERISA disability benefit 
action based on an administrative record." Glenn v. 
MetLife, 461 F.3d 660, 665 (6th Cir.2006) (citing 
Wilkins v. Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc., 150 F. 3d 609, 
613 (6th Cir.1998)), petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 
3368 (U.S. Jan. 3, 2007) (No.06-92). 
Where, as here, an insurance plan administrator 
is vested with discretion to interpret the plan, we 
review the denial of benefits under the arbitrary and 
capricious standard. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 
v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 
L.Ed.2d 80 (1989); Evans v. Unumprovident Corp., 
434 F.3d 866, 875 (6th Cir.2006). This standard 
requires "review of the quality and quantity of the 
medical evidence and the opinions on both sides of 
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the issues." McDonald v. W.-S. Life Ins. Co., 347 F.3d 
161, 172 (6th Cir.2003). In conducting our review, we 
are limited to consideration of the pre-packaged 
administrative record. See Moon v. Unum Provident 
Corp., 405 F. 3d 373, 378 (6th Cir.2005). A decision 
should be upheld if it is "the result of a deliberate 
principled reasoning process" and "supported by 
substantial evidence." Killian v. Healthsource Provi-
dent Adm'rs, 152 F.3d 514, 520 (6th Cir.1998) (quot-
ing Baker v. United Mine Workers of Am. Health & 
Ret. Funds, 929 F.2d 1140, 1144 (6th Cir.1991)). 
We conclude that the record before us supports 
the district court's decision that the Plan Administra-
tor's denial of Rochow's claims was arbitrary and 
capricious. The fact that Rochow remained on the 
payroll until January 2, 2002 is not determinative as 
to whether or not he was disabled during that time; 
there is no "logical incompatibility between working 
full time and being disabled from working full time." 
Hawkins v. First Union Corp. Long-Term Disability 
Plan, 326 F.3d 914, 918 (7th Cir.2003). Tellerico 
states that Rochow was demoted, and ultimately 
terminated, because he could no longer perform the 
duties required of his position. Rochow does not have 
to prove that he was disabled in 2001 due to HSV-
Encephalitis; only that in 2001 he was unable to 
perform his duties due to injury or sickness. Fur-
thermore, the policy does not require medical evi-
dence, only "satisfactory proof." 
The medical evidence in the record is inconclu-
sive as to the reasons for Rochow's 2001 symptoms, 
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although we note that LINA's April 3, 2003 denial 
letter conceded that he was suffering from those 
symptoms throughout 2001. Contemporaneous medi-
cal notes document Rochow's cognitive deterioration. 
Competing evidence in the record showing that his 
2001 symptoms were not disabling is conspicuously 
absent. The ultimate tragic incident in Sarasota and 
its extended onset and sequelae, Dr. Foreman's 
retrospective letter, Tellerico's account of Rochow's 
duties and his inability to perform them, and the 
entire record, viewed in perspective, confirm the 
district court's ruling that LINA's denial of benefits 
was arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by 
substantial evidence. Killian, 152 F.3d at 520. LINA's 
determination was not the result of a deliberate, 
principled reasoning process. I d.; Glenn, 461 F. 3d at 
666. Nor does the decision appear to have been made 
"solely in the interest of the participants and benefi-
ciaries and[] for the exclusive purpose of[] providing 
benefits to participants and their beneficiaries" as 
required by ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, the district court's order 1s AF-
FIRMED. 
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Musmeci v. Schwegmann Giant Super Markets, 159 
F.Supp. 2d 329, 356 (E.D.La. 2001) (applying 
La.Civ.Code art 2924 and La.R.S. 13:4202 (at the 
relevant time rate was 9.25%)) 
Roig v. Limited Long Term Disability Program, 2000 
WL 1146522 at *15 (E.D.La. 2000) (applying 
La.Civ.Code art. 2924) 
Carrabba v. Randalls Food Markets, 145 F.Supp. 2d 
763, 775 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (applying Tex.Fin.Code.Ann. 
§ 304.003(c) (at the relevant time the state rate was 
10%)) 
Estate of Bratton v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 24 
F.Supp.2d 667, 671 (N.D.Miss. 1998) (applying 
Miss.Code § 75-17-1(1) (8%)) 
Bourg v. NN Investors Life Ins. Co., 1992 WL 28063 
at *4 (Feb. 4, 1992) (applying La.Civ.Code art. 2924) 
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Tenth Circuit District Court Cases 
Applying State Prejudgment Rates 
Lynn R. v. Valueoptions, AT&T, 2014 WL 4232519 at 
*9 (D. Utah Aug. 26, 2014) (applying Utah Code Ann. 
§ 15-1-1(2) (10%)) 
Garrett v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 2013 WL 1914632 at 
*2 (W.D.Okl. May 8, 2013) (applying Okla. Stat. tit. 
36 § 3629(B) (15%)) 
Gunderson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 2011 WL 
6020575 at *6 (D.Utah. Dec. 1, 2011) (applying Utah 
Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2) (10%)) 
Dove v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 2011 WL 
197880 at *3 (D.Kan. Jan. 20, 2011) (applying K.S.A. 
§ 16-201 (10%)) 
Meek v. Zurich North America Ins. Co., 704 F.Supp. 
2d 1069, 1076 (D.Colo. 2010) (applying Colo.Rev.Stat. 
5-12-102 (8%)) 
Boggio v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co., 2009 
WL 1505536 at *7-*8 (D.Kan. May 28, 2009) (apply-
ing K.S.A. § 16-201 (10%)) 
Kellogg v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 2009 WL 
3064748 at *1 (D. Utah Sept. 21, 2009) (applying 
Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1(2) (10%)) 
DeGrado v. Jefferson Pilot Financial Ins. Co., 2009 
WL 1198173 at *2 (D.Colo. May 1, 2009) (applying 
Colo.Rev.Stat. 5-12-102 (8%)) 
Feldman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 2008 WL 
376252 at *2 (D.Utah. Feb. 11, 2008) (applying Utah 
Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2) (10%)) 
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Kansas v. Titus, 452 F.Supp. 2d 1136, 1152 (D.Kan. 
2006) (applying K.S.A. § 16-201 (10%)) 
Hornafius v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2005 WL 2293654 at 
*2 (D.Colo. Sept. 16, 2005) (applying Colo.Rev.Stat. 5-
12-102 (8%)) 
Wilson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 2005 WL 
1661621 at *2 (D.Kan. July 15, 2005) (applying 
K.S.A. § 16-201 (10%)) 
DeGrado v. Jefferson Pilot Financial Ins. Co., 367 
F.Supp. 2d 1315, 1328 (D.Colo. 2005)) (applying 
Colo.Rev.Stat. 5-12-102 (8%)) 
Toman v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. Medical Plan, 2004 
WL 988983 at *7 (D.Utah April 8, 2004) (applying 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2) (10%)) 
Mein v. Pool Company Disabled International Em-
ployee Long Term Disability Plan, 989 F.Supp. 1337, 
1352 (D.Colo. 1998) 
LaSelle v. Public Service Co. of Colorado, 988 F.Supp. 
1348, 1354 (D.Colo. 1997) 
Goad v. Rogers, 1996 WL 42132 at *2 (D.Kan. Jan. 22, 
1996) (applying K.S.A. § 16-201 (10%)) 
Van Hoove v. Mid-America Building Maintenance, 
Inc., 841 F.Supp. 1523, 1536-37 (D.Kan. 1993) (apply-
ing K.S.A. § 16-201 (10%)) 
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Eleventh Circuit District Court Cases 
Applying State Prejudgment Rates 
Kinser v. Plans Administration Committee of 
Citigroup, Inc., 2008 WL 762200 at *1 (M.D.Ga. 
March 18, 2008) (applying O.C.G.A. § 7-4-12 (9%)) 
Borroughs v. BellSouth Telecommuncations, Inc., 446 
F.Supp. 2d 1294, 1302 (N.D.Ala. 2006) (applying Ala. 
Code§§ 8-8-1, 8.:8-8 (6%)) 
Engelhardt v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 77 F.Supp. 2d 
1226, 1236 (M.D.Ala. 1999) (applying Ala. Code § 27-
1-17(b) (18%)) 
Anderson v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, 414 
F.Supp. 2d 1079, 1110 (M.D.Ala. 2006) (applying Ala. 
Code§ 27-1-17(b) (18%)) 
Levinson v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 2000 WL 
193623 at *14 (S.D.Fla. Jan. 5, 2000) (applying Fla. 
Stat. §§ 55.03 and 687.01 (10%)) 
Waschak v. Acuity Brans, Inc. Senior Management 
Benefit Plan, 2009 WL 2461038 at *5 (N.D.Ga. Aug. 
6, 2009) (applying O.C.G.A. § 7-4-12) 
Lyons v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. Salaried Employees 
Retirement Plan, 196 F.Supp. 2d 1260, 1271 (N.D.Ga. 
2002) (applying O.C.G.A. § 7-4-12 (12%)) 
DeMatte v. Brotherhood of Industrial Workers' Health 
and Welfare Fund, 1996 WL 588921 at *5 (M.D.Fla. 
Sept. 20, 1996) (applying Fla. Stat. § 687.01) 
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Ninth Circuit District Court Cases 
Applying Section 196l(a) Rate 
Delaney v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 68 
F.Supp.3d 1214, 1231-32 (D.Or. 2014) 
Sullivan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 2014 WL 
3529974 at *36 (E.D.Cal. July 15, 2014) 
Avila v. Pediatrix Medical Group, Inc., 2014 WL 
1569502 at *3 (D.AlaskaApril16, 2014) 
Topits v. Life Insurance Co. of North America, 2013 
WL 5524129 at *11-*12 (D.Or. April11, 2013) 
Rabbat v. Standard Ins. Co., 894 F.Supp.2d 1311, 
1323 (D.Or. 2012) 
Abdullah v. Accentcare Long Term Disability Plan, 
2012 WL 4112291 at *12 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 19, 2012) 
Lasheen v. Loomis Co., 2013 WL 1178209 at *9 
(E.D.Cal. March 21, 2013) 
Taylor v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 2012 WL 113558 
at *5 (W.D.Wa. Jan. 13, 2012) 
Letvinuck v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 2011 WL 6056878 at 
*1 (C.D.Cal. Dec. 2, 2011) 
Mazet v. Halliburton Co. Long-Term Disability Plan, 
2011 WL 148269 at *1 (D.Ariz. Jan. 18, 2011) 
Galvin v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 2010 
WL 3619572 at *5-*6 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 13, 2010) 
Stone v. Bayer Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 2010 
WL 2595675 at *3-*4 (D.Or. June 21, 2010) 
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Schramm v. CNA Financial Corp. Insured Group 
Benefits Program, 718 F.Supp. 2d 1151, 1165 
(N.D.Cal. 2010) 
Verderose v. Envisedge, LLC, 2010 WL 1531066 at *4 
(D.Ariz. April15, 2010) 
Lee v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 2010 WL 
2231943 at *7 (D.Or. April1, 2010) 
Smyrni v. US Investigations Services, LLP, 2010 WL 
807445 at *4-*5 (N.D.Cal. March 5, 2010) 
Perryman v. Provident Life and Accident Insurance 
Co., 690 F.Supp.2d 917, 955-56 (D.Ariz. 2010) 
Langston v. North American Assert Development 
Corp. Group Disability Plan; 2010 WL 330085 at *9-
*10 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 20, 2010) 
Porco v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 682 F.Supp.2d 
1057, 1082 (C.D.Cal. 2010) 
Gemmel v. Systemhouse, Inc., 2009 WL 3157263 at 
*19 (D.Ariz. Sept. 28, 2009) 
Dube v. N etmanage, Inc. Long-Term Disability Plan, 
2009 WL 2356191 at *3 (N.D.Cal. July 29, 2009) 
Frank v. Wilbur-Ellis Co. Salaried Employees Ltd 
Plan, 2009 WL 1812826 at *14 (E.D.Cal. June 25, 
2009) 
Minton v. Deloitte and Touche USA LLP Plan, 631 
F.Supp.2d 1213, 1220-21 (N.D.Cal. 2009) 
Lona v. Prudential Ins. Co of America, 2009 WL 
801868 at *14 (S.D.Cal. March 24, 2009) 
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Fontana v. Guardian Life Ins., 2009 WL 585811 at *1 
(N.D.Cal. March 4, 2009) 
Kowalski v. Farella, Braun & Martel, LLP, 2008 WL 
5397511 at *15 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 23, 2008) 
McAfee v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 625 F.Supp.2d 
956, 972 (E.D.Cal. 2008) 
Caplan v. CNA Financial Corp., 573 F.Supp.2d 1244, 
1253 (N.D.Cal. 2008) 
Lasheen v. Loomis Co., 2008 WL 2880408 at *7 
(E.D.Cal. July 22, 2008) 
Leick v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co., 2008 WL 
1882850 at *10-*11 (E.D.Cal. April 24, 2008) 
Cyr v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 2008 WL 7095148 
at *12-*13 (C.D.Cal. Jan. 16, 2008) 
Archuleta v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 504 
F.Supp.2d 876, 886 (C.D.Cal. 2007) 
Gardner v. Bear Creek Corp., 2007 WL 2318969 at 
*20 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 6, 2007) 
Schwartz v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 2007 WL 
20234 76 at *2 (D.Ariz. July 12, 2007) 
Hawkins-Dean v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 514 
F.Supp.2d 1197, 1200-01 (C.D.Cal. 2007) 
Younkin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 2007 WL 
1378413 at *8 n. 3 (D.Mont. May 3, 2007) 
Scott v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, 2007 WL 
666320 at *3 (N.D.Cal. March 2, 2007) 
Kniespeck v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, 2007 WL 
496346 at *2 (E.D.Cal. Feb. 13, 2007) 
/-
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Rorabaugh v. Continental Casualty Co., 2006 WL 
4384 712 at *8 (C.D.Cal. Dec. 8, 2006) 
Hyder v. Kemper National Services, Inc., 2006 WL 
2917956 at *1 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 11, 2006) 
Cherry v. Digital Equitment Corp., 2006 WL 2594465 
at *11-*12 (E.D.Cal. Sept. 11, 2006) 
Shane v. Albertson's Inc. Employees Disability Plan, 
2005 WL 6141287 at *2 (C.D.Cal. Sept. 9, 2005) 
Fleming v. Kemper National Services, 373 F.Supp.2d 
1000, 1012 (N.D.Cal. 2005) 
Hamilton v. Plumbers and Pipefitters National Pen-
sion Fund, 2004 WL 5571414 at *5 (W.D.Wa. July 23, 
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Sabatino v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 
2003 WL 23932613 at *2 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 9, 2003) 
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State Interest Statutes 
Utilized in ERISA Cases 
in the Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits 
Fifth Circuit 
Louisiana Statutes Ann. - R.S. 13:4202 B(1) (after 
2002 rate is Federal Reserve Bank discount rate plus 
3.25%) 
Mississippi Code Ann.§ 75-17-1(1) (8%) 
Vernon's Texas Code Ann., Finance Code, § 3004.003 
(prime rate, but no less than 5% and no more than 15%) 
Tenth Circuit 
Colorado Revised Statutes Annotated§ 5-12-102 (8%) 
Kansas Statutes Annotated 16-201 (10%) 
New Mexico Statutes Annotated §§ 56-8-3 (15%), 56-
8-4 (8 3/4%) 
36 Oklahoma Statutes Annotated § 3629 (15%) 
Utah Code Annotated§ 15-1-1 (10%) 
Wyoming Statutes Annotated§ 40-14-106 (7%) 
Eleventh Circuit 
Alabama Code 1975 § 27-1-17(c) (1.5% per month) 
Florida Statutes Annotated § 55.03 (Federal Reserve 
Bank discount rate plus 400 basis points) 
Ga. Code Ann., § 7-4-12 (prime rate plus 3%) 
